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PLEADII\ G 'Ai'!D P l111 C Tl C E --- ~)ELC..C TB D ULD EAR EXA}'f QJESTiuNS
1. ft ectio~ 43-17 of t110 Cod 8 of Virc ini.:J. provi d t;) S t i11.t no sui t to e nforce a mechanics

- oftt=f ,_ ._lien sha ll be br ought aft e r six montiw f r om t ho t i me wh:::n t ho whole amo unt cove r ed by
•til such li en become s payable . A brings a suit in c~q ui t y !o ;;:n.f'o rc t: suc h a lhm s Gve n mon·
ths afte r · the timo when t he wnount COVi:.. r E:: d by the li<.. n bec ame p ayc?.ble . B, tho defend
ant,

~ -;.Jli)

.>,

PL:D~AD I N G

i\ND PRACTICE:

Jomurred to the bill on the grol,l!ld that the .right to enforce the lien was_ barr€d by tl
six mo nths statute of limi~tions. Is the ;lomurrer proper in this _ca.so?
The demurrer is proper.. Where a ri$ht ·is crea.te.d --by statuto till ex<;J c·· he
ri ght within th e statu~e r1.od is of· the ..e~bfltonce of the ri ht nnc;L_t.he part~s
p l o ·-~Jir:t-~ must show affirno.tively tho.t he has · exercised his rir;ht within' .t.h{; time so
lij-,;U t.B.C. or i t does not eta
a cause of action and is d<:lmurrable. No-t es: (I) V'Cere
shtute of limitations is . a matter oi' romeny and not of substantive law it must be
_p l o~.d c d s pecially and. cannot be taken advantage of by demurrer. (2) The statute of
lj_·n it ~ ~ti ons is ~ matter of .subst?-:0+.ive_)o.w 1
(a) ·where tho right is ore-:1.ted by statut
rrn:l a. timo limited within which the right mey be exorcised. Examples aro the mecho.ni
lien 1.-;:v; mentione_%above, o.nd recovery for a doo.th by wrongful net of another 'ih whic
the time limit is ~ yof:ll't.f (b) Where the running of the a.tatuto o.ctunlly passe$ ti tl
o.s in d0tinuo o.nd ejectmen-t.

to

- 2. Who.t is the object of the action of detinue, C\lld what aro ·the essentials t o mnintsin the ac'i;ion?
I .J.' .. • ..J
The object of the action of detinu(~~o .recov vr ba ck specific personal prope rty
wrongfully lwld by rmother, or if _that is impossible, thr:. valuo · of that pr operty, togethe r with clo.mo.ges for its wrongful detention. The es sentials to mo.intain tpe actic.
are (1) Plaintiff must hu.v0 a r;unoral or sno · ' "o . o_pnr.:ty i :n tho ~~o ods sued for, (2)
t ogether with th e rj,_ght to tho ·ilm:-tcd irl.tu_p_gs q_ps si Qll.• (3 ) The goods must be co.~.oble ai'
i~smtificution o.nd 'indent.if.iacL,by tho plo.intiff' in his plen.cft'ings, ( 4 ) the goods must
have somo,~e which must be stat ed, (5) 'l'he doi'0ndnnt must
vo <.l otained or be dota.in_inr; the goods v;rortgfulj.y prior to 0r t:t tho time suit is started. Pro co ure ~s now
by notice of moti on for jucl t,"mcnt, a.s per Rule 3:3.
Notes-: (1) In Vir g inio tho c onrrnon l o:vr acti on of Hoplevin h::J.s boon nbolished • . Detinue
t ook its plo.co nnd now, instead of brinf; ing detinue n motion for judgment is filod ·
with tho clerk o.s po r the Rulos o.t 1 flll'f. ( 2) Tho judgr.tEmt in detinue is for tho goods
or thdr o.l't e rnc.t o value . (3) In c e rtain c:::ses c o v ~S:~rod by V# 8·58,.? among which ure i .
sol voncy of defoncl~.nt, chngor of nogloct or destruction of prop erty by cl.ofendnnt, or
Fl sworn statement th o.t nffif.mt be-l.iov0s himself ontitlod to tho goods, tho goods sho.L
bo b .kun at onctS and de li'v ored to tho plaintiff providod ho puts up a bond for nt le v..
doublG tho value of the t;oods ; hut the defondnnt mey got the proporty back by putting
· uf a forthcoming bond of doutle thc vo.luo of the prop erty.
3. Wht:1.t a.ro the gr oun(~S in Virg inin for o. motion in o.rrest of a. judgment?
A.mc,ti on in arrest of judgmont lios only for mo..ttor-ia.l orr or n.ppar e nt on the face
of wh ."J.t is per se 'n part of the r<::JCord. · 'rho court, in n. prope r cas ~ , riot only · grants
tho motion but takes such addi tionn.l :lOtion as the c n.se demnncl s. Exam:)les: ( n.) X sues
B for n. tort. B p l eo.ds infancy by wily of ccmfe ssi on o.nd - n.voidnnce and asks· for n rop:
X tr o. vcrses the infancy. T'he jury find s thr: -.t B was · un infn.nt. X should mo.ke · o. moti o;
in arrest of judgment. and. o.lso ns k f or u judgw:.'nt non o hst~;:mto verdicto. (b)' :x:' suos
B for c onversion of l'l. hors e on De c. · 28, 1951. B donios ho stole tho horse on Doc, 28
1951. Tho jury r eturns a v 0rdict tho.t the horso was not stolen on Doc, 28,1951, X i,
entitled t o a motion in on· est of judgment and u r cp le11dor as it is probably immater•
in.l whether th e horse wo.s t nken on Doc. 28~ 1951. Noto th nt the court in this co.so
cannot t e ll for whom judgment should be [~ i ven hut c an in (a). · Not e also tha.t in (o.)
the pl oadinr:. is. o.lwa.ys by wo.y o f confossi on and o.voida.nce while in (b) i t is by wo.y o ·
tr n.verse, with no issuo b o ing joinod on tho m!\t<~ri a. l fnct, ( c ) X sups B. Tho plen.dings · are corr ect but th o jury was impr ope rly _chosen o. s o.pponrs hy the record, or returned an unc et·tnin, or i mporf oct, verdict. Eith er 11o.rty is entitl ed to mo.k:e. a moti on
• 7
1
in. arrest of jud gment o.nd a ls o, o.sk f or .':\ vonir c f r:cin.s de nova. This results in a n m .,.)"'>
tri o. l but should no t bo c onfus ed vrith Fl. motion f or r-. n <:.w tri :::~ l. ( d ) In o.ny of thEJ o.b \Vf ~v
ove ca.sos i f the dofect is cur fd ::,y th e st ntut e •>f j e ofo.ils, Yfl' 8-487, tho motion wou:j t.<'"'
bo o:vcrrulod. Tho gist of this s t l;'. tut <J is tha.t no jurl[:;mo nt sho.ll bo o.rrested or rovt.,;r- e/
ors ed for any C.ofe ct i n tho · r ec ord, or f or nny orr or committed u po n tho trial where it\)ct
plainly . a.ppea.rs from the r ocor cl O.ncl tho evi den ce given a t th o trial that th e p e rti es
ho.ve had n frtir tri al on the rnc rit.s o.nd sul1st nnti nl judtico ho.s bccm r eached. ·
Quory: SuE>OSe nn err or not a pparent on th o f ~c c o of th0 r e c•,rd is mr.td o and not dis·
c0ver·ed until nftor. vt,rdict. Viho.t c o..n to done th.:m? :... .• If n ot cur 0d by the sta tut e
of j eo ~nils, a moti on f or o. n r;w trb.l .rn.o.y be marJEl. ~:1w usu~l gr ounds for such a. motic.·
n.z:o (1) E:ror or miscond uct <;>f t he judgv (2) Of,jury (3) Of counsel ( 4 ) of a party
(5) Df thnd persons (6) Ac c~ de nt and surrn.so ~ 7) Inn.de qunte or excessive d o.m~es
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(8)Newly discovered evidence provided{a)the evidence has bean discovered since the ~
t :c ial(b)it j_s material and probably w:i.ll change the result(o.)it is not merely cumul.:'.-·
t i ve(d)it could not have been ciiscoll'er·ed before the trial by use of due diligenc e . h.
all the above cases remember that a motion for a new trial is adaressed to the sound
di sc r etion of the court and is not a matter of right as are the motions in arrest of
,judement.
.
5. If all l:,he counts in a motion lor judgment are good except one, and the defendant
desires, before going to trial, to get rid of the bad count, what is the remedy?
Interpose a demurrer to the faulty count or move the court to reject it and instruct
jury to disregard it. Do not demur generally, for the demurrer 1>1ould be overruled because of the · good count. Note: Under Rule h:l the court might order the bad count
stricken' at the pretrial conference.
- - 6. A,
employee of the Hercules Auto Co,_ a Virginia corporation, the chief office
of which is in Richmond, was injured on !'January 2,1957, in RQanoke County by the
negligence of the company. He sued the company in Roanoke County by notice of motion
for judgment. The notice vms served in Roanoke County upon B, the agent of the Compan:
for the City of Lynchburg, who resided in Lynchburg. Is the service valid?Give reason
The service is not valid. By Y#-8-6S_ serviQe on any person other than the Secretary
of the Commonwealth(after July 1,1958 Clerk of the State Corporation Co~nission)in
connection with service of process on a corporation "shall be by delivering to him a
copy of the process or not.i ce in the county or city wherein he r esides or his place 0 1
business is, or the principal office of the corporation is located; and the return
shall show this, and state on whom, and when the .service "'as; otherwise it shall not
be valid."
Query 1. What facts should be remembered about service of process on domestic corSe'"" ~.. ~ porations? A. By V#8-59.(l)a cjty or town ~ay be served with process by serving its
d
mayor, recorder·, or any aldern:an.• ~ cour..cilman, or trustee of such eity or town; (2)
fy , tA!.--~!'- if it be against any other corporation created by the laws of this State, on its
~
president or other chief officer., or on its vice president, cashier, treasurer,
~,o~secretary, general manager, or any one .of .its directors, or any agent of such corpora·
tion, if any such officer or agent be found in the cit or count
in wh ch_tb5L p~o
c~eding is commence~, and whether any such of ficer or agent be so found or not, it
may e sent'"'·- o the county or city in which is located the ~pal -O r registered
offj.ce of such co
nd be th · ·e_a-.e<Lo_n_the regi,ste_.r_ed ggent or on any officer
or agent of such company found in such county or city. Note: V/ll3.1-9(corporation law:
requires each corporation to have and continuously maintain in this State(a)a registered o:('fice which may be,bltt need not be, the same as its place of business; and (b)
ru re istered agent, which agent must be an individual resident in this State w hose
bu::1 ness office · s identical with such registered office and who is an offic er or
director of the corporation or a member of the Virginia State Bar, and by Y£13.l-~l
this registered agent may be served with any process, notice, or dem~nd. If the Corporation fails to maintain such an agent or he cannot be found with due diligence
then process may be served on the clerlc of the Corporation Commission. Thi.s section
is cumulative and dbes not limit the right to serve process under V#8-59(supra).
(!.~) Substituted service is not valid on a corporation.
Query 2. Where are actions usually brought and how are corporations affected by the
vf.,~A-IJ. .
statutory provisions thex·eon? A. Th:i.s is governed by V#B -38, 8-39, 8- 0 ~
Suits may be brought unless otherwise provided(l)wherein any of the defendants reside.
(?~~f a corporation be a defendant where-in its principal or r egist ered office i s, or
wherein its mayor or chief officer resides;(4) if it be tQ; r ecover land or to subject
it to a debt, .wherein such land or part of i t may be:(5)if it be a suit to construe
a will or for the direction of the court in the admi nistr.ation of the estate of a deceased person, or a suit or action aga1.nst a perso nal representative, curator,
committee, guardian, or other fiduciary, in the county or cpDporation w herein the
will was admitted to probate, or such fiduciary qualifi ed;(6}if it be against a foreign corporation, .wherein its statutory agent res.ides, or i ts registered office is
situated or, in case of withdrawal from the State where its last statutory agent resided or its last registered office was situated or where it has any estate or debts
owing to it within t his state.(6a)if it be against a non-resident and the cause of
action arose because of t he operation of a motor vehicle on the highways of this Stat8
wherein the plaintiff r esides, or wherein the cause of action or any part thereof
arose; (7)if it be against a de('rhe next page is p.31.)
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-c 1ho rer:;ic1.cs ~d .thout tllis rit<:.te, ulw r ej_ n r'c 1;1.a y i)O :_ O'..'_ncl <md sc:cvccl :r.i:U··~y-·occo s, o:,· net~,- ~.1C?Vc es·c0te o:c (~_eb ts dne hira, ::_)l'ovit'.cc1., hoFeVel', t:1et n o-~l1in c; sc·!·~ 
::..:-.ine c.t 5.11 ·:Ollie: so c·cion shall be so cons-trn(_;d as ·::.o ~JCj~r,Ji t tho _jo ~_nin::; o::: g c~m.Jcr: 
-~:: . c col')orc:l:.ion or residGnt__ ;L'1L.i'rld~'..al <:-.s codeiend2.nt l!i·0:l a f ore i gn cor;x:.:~·-:~:i. on
~j~" i:~:m -:::·c ::d. C..ent
inC:i.vidual in a ju3~i sc'J.ction u:1erc S"~..1.cl1 c.:.o;;1c st:Lc corl)Or<e ·0iori o:c·
,~ eh"'.8n·t il.K:iv:_ (ll~L c-ov.ld. not be sued; (G) if it be Oil bchal .i' of t:1e Gor.::· 10n~ realth,
, r:,c;.,>c::.:!." :.l1 "tSe--nar.lc o.i ·i:,he ilttorney Uoncral or othe::u:!.se , ii:, rnc:t:T be in the cit;;r cf
. ~:L ch;,J.ond; (~· ) if it be an action or D on.i.t ili~hicll it i s nec1;;ssar y o:c· ~):rl o~•c r ·i:,o ·.:olce
:::::7 .)::: tllC: :;:ollm Tin~ f!<-~blic ofl"ice::.•s a :~n1.rty CLO ::.'C;nclant , tu- u:i.t , ·~~:1e Cove:cnor, .. tt o1·n:.:7 Ce!K::.·c.l, Str:ce 'lroasurer, ~.lecretar:',r of the Conr,1om:eal t h, Cor,l:)·i:,rollor, Super~c!: -~r:: ndent o::: :?1'~) l:l. c Jns·l:.ruction, or Co· ·1.1iasioner of Lcri cnl tu:co a nd lrm1i~r2:cion;
oT 5.n ~,h:i. ch i ·i:, :nc-:," ~)O necessa:c~r or p3."0J)er t.o r.J.[1l~c '-'- ;xl"t ;'/ o~c? cmcl.a.nt the .'-)tate Doo:cd
of ::_/l.ucat.i on , or other l)1.'blic corpox·e.-~:,_on c on1~)osed o:: o :~'ficc;;.·s of ·::.he ~ ; ovm· ~1nent,
o:~' tl-:e {unc:.f> .:'llt~ ~l:i."::>,;or t~T of ,ri1icll -~w Cor.1J:lom:s.:-.lt h is solo ouner; or in ~rbich it
sl1o.ll be 2.·iJtenptcd -~;o enjoin or otheru:i.se st.:Dpenc1 oi· o..o.fcct any judgment or c~_e cr oe
on be half of the Coi'l"lon~re.oJ. th, or Dn;or e:~ccu·(L on ~.o::mcd on st:ch juc'<''l':H.:nt or cl.ecree ,
i ·c shr.ll be onl:'.r in t~HJ ci·c~,- of ::.i chmond~ and
(10) :Lf any juG.r;e o:J: a circ·pj:i:, o~· cor;:)ol'.~' ~ :i. on CO'l.1.l'·l:. be :: .l~ter c s·ced ir1 2. c.:.se Hhich,
in,_t for suc~1 :i_·,_tr;r cst ~ !onJ. c~ be ::ll'O~)or :"i.'o·.::- t:w j1'1'isc:~i_c ti oE o~:· Lin court, the o.c·U.on or snit may be ~ll'O\l.c)rL in 2ny co1.U't i n ~-n cc~,joinj _n ~; ci~·c,_,_j_t, Ol' c orpor2:cion.
Any s uch actj_on or -snit I)J.."Ol'.~;h·c :i.n .:my comY~~r m·· co:;:·:)ol'<'' U.o:-:1 r::L·chin the territorial
J.ir.1its of -~he jn:c:Lst:U.c:0:i..on of such jucl~}') c~lt~:'.l, on 1~1ot.ion ol ~~n~r p2l"ty ·tbc1·eto_, bo
removed to t: ~e c:i.rcuj: (:, O:i." COY)01"'-'-t:i.on cou:i.'"C o:··_, D. connt,y u:.· .... o:;:·pm:c. t ion in en adjoining circ1.1.i·0.
Hote: len action o::.· su:i.t 1JJ J) 0-32 : l;: ::· ~)C :xcoF;- ~ ri:, j_n :- n;;~ cmmty o:;:· dt~r 11he rein
tlw cause of action or an;{ ~x· J· t ;bJiier o of c:>::osc, c.l·~Jwu::;ll no ~- o£ -~l l(:: ck:::'cncl2.nts rer;iC:e
therein . :u,,_t in this case as a :'/1' P(:·C.~ . c a.:. L·,ot·l;c:r one :~.<uD ·c :~o t se:::·v:i_ce o:i: l)rocess on
·011e cl8i cnd.;-n·L 1:ldle he is i n t he cotmt:,· v ~' city i n <: l 1~.ch tl-,8 cc t'..SC u:::· ;.tction .:-ros e ,
unless (by V;; ~ G-l17) i"i;, 0e (I) an 2c·~:~ . on ag. <:\~\.nst c:. co:;:·~)or.o·~.:Lon (II) an o.dj_on upon
· ,
b :; Dn o .~.D.c
~-r. • er lme:er
••
• · y o:·.·• SOl;'.e ~~-.:.t
• ul'."
• •~G ( r··r)
~·
· recover
D •,.Jonc,• ·co...:en
:::-. l'."~·:wr
:t·c
1 . 211 [:c·uJ.on
·co
c~.x.l.o.::;es :.C'or a Hrong (IV ) n1 o.ct:i.o;1 r.g£t: :Lm:d:. t1.ro or r:tore c!.cf cndo:1nts on one of' whom such
:):.:·ocess ;l<:'.S been e:~ ecu-i:,ed i n cll.e ::ou;rri;::· Ol' cit:r :i.n -~ ;h:i. c ]o_ ·cl1C nc·i:,::_,on i s iJrou::;ltt , in
11hich c; .:::ses 'Jl' occs::: " iJ.l is::me otr0 ·co ~Je so:cved on tl1e c'.:-. fnncl~· nt :.i .n t ;w c o1m·~y or cit;-/
in ull~.c l1 he r cr>i(es.
:~ ei ~c~_21YiJ

fsoo

7 . P cl o.ins
o.nd <Y vcn·d.ict of $·1 00 is ren de r ed . C<m P or c~ef~mdant apy-;eal?
'l'l1e a "_) Jcal r··)le <:.:.; .:ount :i_;:1 ~1CC'L1.Di.:-t.r~r i:lr·c,·c.c:.'<;J :L::.: .3C/'! c:~n lusL·e of costs . Int,ere st may
be included to date oi ' jucJ.:;n1ent of trial court., Hence P' could app8al but cle:fendant
could not. See Vi;lO-h64.

9. ~ hen a s 1.1.ret;:r on a l) mlC: cmrt,e.:i.:' :!.n: · c. -,;-r:d.ver. ot.JlU)!e:r:tctld. ~ c~ to..:,~1 the
1)ond, and t hen sues the principal t o collec t t he ebt .that. he-n ·a d paid for him., can
the principal pl e ad homestead <-2:c.inst tl1e ml.,r e ty?
Ho . V//34-22 pl"OVicles j_n ~)Cll't' ;;Ii' r:. c.e bt ul:ic;: :i..s S1.:pe:dor ·co tlc.e homestead, Ol'
as to ;:h~o }10r,J.c st Gad is ,,,a,j_ved, be ')<'.:i_d o.Cf i)~,r. 3. ::mre-ty t~1crcon, the pr5.nc:Lpal
sl1all not be alloued to claii-.1 t :_:e ~wr.:o s ·i:,c.s c~ 8.::. <c;d.nst such s"t:ret: r. 11
~:t.1.ery 1.
: .~1at debts a:r-e m.q r :rior ·t;o 1 ;omcs\:.ecd c: :,~r.mtio!·ts'? A(l) :?urchase ~--;ri ce of
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:!';:r:-oper·t;y in which exemption is clai~ed, or if it has been exchanged for other prop'"
erty such property shall not be exemp·!ioo f1•om the ps.yment of such unpaid prueha.sa
price.(2)Services rendered by a laboring person or mechanic (3)liability of a !iducia:r.y fo:t• money collected (I~) taxes, levies, &6sesements (5)rent (6) legal or taxable
fees of any public officer (7) no exemption may be claimed in a shifting stock of
merchandise (8) nor in any property the conveyance of which by the hon1estead claimant
has been set aside on the ground of fraud Br want of consideration (9) Since tort
c1:1ims are not "debts" they are superior to homestead. See V#J4 ..5.
Query 2. What else should be remembered about the homesteaa exemption law? A.(l) It
applies only to heads of families (2) the amount is $2;000 (3) It can be claimed only
once. Property set aside by the writing may be exchanged for other property,but if
the property set aside .is consumed there is no further exem.!)tion (4) It is claimed by
a writing signed by the householder(if. alive) and duly recorded as deeds are recorded
in the county or corporation wherein the real estate claimed is and/or if claimed in
personal property where he resides. Each piece of property is valued. (5) The exemption may be set aside at any time before the property is subjected to legal process
(6) The exemption may be waived. The waiver must be in writing. (7) The rent and
profits of the homestead are also exempt and may be put back into the corpus. (8) A
widow cannot claim her husband's homestead and also dower or jointure.
Query ).How does homestead exemption differ from poor debtor's exemption? A. (1)
Homestead exemption is in addition to poor debtors.' exemption. This latter exemption
embraces among other items wearing appearel, beds and a few supplies, a farmer's work
animals and implements~and three fourths of a wage-earner's wages but not more then
$150 per month nor less than ~~100 per month. Three four.ths of everything earned in
excess of $100 per month but not in excess of $150 per month is also exempt.(2)It may
be claimed as often as needed, nead not be set apal't by writing, and cannot be
waived (3) A non-head of a family is entitled to one-half of the exemption of a head
of a family. (4) A non-resident has the same wage exemption as does a resident.

10. John Smith verbally agrees to rent a farm from William B~own for a period of two
years, agreeing to pay a lump sum of $h00 at the end of the two years. A few days
later Brown informs Smith that he will not rent the farm, ha having been advised that
the verbal contrac·t; was unenforceable because of the statute of frauds. Smith sues
Brown, and the latter files a plea of the general issue. Can the defense of the. statute of frauds be proved under the, general issue?
No. By Rule 3:5 the general i.ssue is no longer allowed., The defense would have to be
stated by defendant in his grounds of defense.
11~ A person, not a party to an action at law, is in the possession of a ce~ tain
:paper that you desi.re to introduce in evidence. He refuses to deliver this paper to
you or let you see it. Under our statute what steps would you take to compel ita .
production?
.
V#~301 provides that when it appears by affidavit that any book, etc.,is in the
possession of a person not a party and is material and proper to be introduced before
a court, such court or a judge thereof in vacation, may order the clerk to issue a
subpoena duces tecum to compel such production at a time and place to be specified
in the order. Note: If the adverse party has possession and refuses to produce, the
court, having control of tpe partiep befor ~ it, maY: ,dismiss suit or give judgment by
default. See Yf8-324.
.) \!.e.- M s. (j
f\ t.c-/e_ i/, 9
12. You are plaintiff's counsel in a damage suit against the Southern Railway Co.for
personal injuries. The company files its grounds of defense,but you are desirous of
being better informed of the exact nature of the company's defense. What steps,if
any, could you take?
Rule 3rl8(d) provides that on motion made promptly, a bill of particulars may be·
ordered to amplify any pleading that does not, in the opirdon of the court,clearly
inform the opposite party of the true nature of the claim or defense.
Notea Under the Rules if defendant wishes to rely on the defense 'of contributory
negligence he must so state in his grounds of defense unless plaintiff's own evidence
ehowa that he is barred by his contributory negligence.
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·_· ·:...~;:;;e l for d.e:L'cnclarr~ in the ::·ore:;oing que s tion clemUl"S to the evidence. He offe:
c c.~ an :instn.d,ion settin2; forth v;:w.t he deemed to be the }.au r elative to the meas ure
d.· ::c.·x<:.ar~es . The co1.tct overrule d ·t,he •iemmTer, re f used t;w :i.nstruction, and t;:le jttry
;'U! ..~_cre d a verd.ict for $1 , 000.
t'h01.t ste~)S should be taken to bring the s e rulings be:!.' or ·l:llc ~)i.1pre:c1e Cour:t of Lppeals?
·r_lGre arc t1-ro e:trors alle3ed to lwvc been made (1) tho o··.rerrnling of the (el~l'l11'1'er to
: ~ .o e viC.:ance &nd ( 2) an erroneous instruction. A c~em1.'.:c:.~er ·i:,o tl1e evic.: ence i s 2. TJl ea <.i ::.c·. ~ ancl i s. per S8 a part of the re.c ord. By p ,,Je 5:1 #3(b), w!lte;:1 ·che judr;e gives in'::tr·,,_ct:;_on3 to t~·1e jury he shall initial each instruction; and. they t lw reb3r beco;·.1e part
of t h0 re cord, 11 and by sub-section (c) thereof, 11 I f the refusal ·co give an i :JStruction
i s excepted to, the judge shall mark it 11 refused 11 and inj:tial it; and ~-t tb.creby beco:· tes :9~rt of the record. 11 So the clei:'endant should ob.joct t o t h e refusal of the instr:_;_c;tj_on, and Hhen the o'b,jection is ove1·ruled, cxcep·C. t o -l:.~te r efusal. This uould. nol'·
-,,_c.~ 11y be clone in chambers and not in open court.
The juc\;e ~rroulcl then marlc the i11s·l:.r uction 11 refused 11 anc.1. ini·l;ial it and thereby r.w.ke it !.:O <::.rt of the record. If the delen•.lant c:.oes not except to ·che court 1 s ruling he has 11aivGd h:Ls objection. An objection
not insisted upon :i.n the trial court 1·1 ill not be consideroci in the Su~1ren1e CotU't of
Appeals. In Virginia tl:te triaJ. court need not be :·.iven <:' chance ( othej: t11ru1 the 21
day :Jcriod bei'ore judgr,Jents and C::. r: crees becorrte final) ·co correct its mm errors. Hence
no motion to the trial cou:t"t f or v ne1! t1·ial or in arrest of judgrilent is a condition
precedent to a riGht to seek o.n C".!_, ~ )e<'-1. The rest o:f ·i:,ae r,d:.e!Js in outline form are as
i'ollous: (a)Hal~e a. ;notion f or <m o:i"c1er .s:urpen(linc c~~8 cution. J efore the trial cotU't
uill c;rant such a mo·t;ion a b ond u~:Lh sure ·\.;~" .nn.1st be r.:j_ven. -:~h e snspension period orc.l inarily is from 60 to 90 c.ia~,rs aJ'ld r:-tr.-,;,r te exte•~.:le:d,. ._, (~)) I>·c-iol' t o t i1e expiration. ·of
60 days after entry of fim1.l ,judgment :I.:Lle Fith the clt.:rk of t.he tria.l court a notice
of appeal and aGsi.8ni·lcnts oi' error. ' 'i thin lh days the r eaftel' cou~sel for C1.ppellee
may fi.l e ui th the clerk hi~.:; as s1 ~~nmcnts of cross-error, if <my . J~ssignments of error
must be filed by 'b oth lX.rties Dt t his s t a ::::o, beca\~.S ·~ , until i'(, is !:nmm uhat points
1-JilJ. be raised on appe al, it is impossible to lmou uhat ~x:.:l'ts of t.'le record Hill be
mn terinl on a.? peal. (c) The c le rl·~ o:J: the ·erial c ourt malce s u:) the record and s errlsit
to the clerk of the Supreiile Court of Appe al E: a s ~)er Scc·cj.on 7 of nule 5:1. (d) Appellant Drenares his Petition fo:c~ 1 ~;YJe,;cl~ rCllis may s erve as l::is 'brief as l."J"ell. The attorney m~:st sta te that in ~ d_-s-ci9InT'On-thc c2. .-:;e should be revieHcd. Any judge of the
Supreme Court of j·.p)ealG m<.'..~.- 1; rant .all appeal, or, if he refuses to grant it, the petition may b e, submi t tcc1 t o the court en bane. Opposin::; co\msel must be ;z:i.v.en opport,_mity to oppose the L;r<mtin;:; of -the petition. .A trans cript of the r ec ord must accompany the petition.. (e) If t~1 c peti.t io:1 :i.G ~).·ante d it in.c~j_ c a t,cs uhat bond must 'be f).le c1
and ·Jhether or not supersedeas s~:all i s sue. (f) The C f. SC i s docketed in the .Supreme
Court of Appe.:lls. ( g ) :Jriefs mus t be i.'jlc:cl. (i.1) '.t' h c Su::):ceue Cour·t, of il.ppeo.ls certifi es its decision to the loner cour ·t. Tho u:vper col.': rt uill 1~c:.lce a final disposition
of -the case unless i t is ::.-er:,~mded for the de·l;cn·mina tion of issu.Gs clE;signated by the
hi gh court.
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On ~Tanuary 1 , 1 9 41~ , A e:~ec tr~es 2nd ·· 1.eJ.i·lrt:rs to D }~ is ~)1' <::1mi c> so:ry note for ~~ 500 payJ.ble on demand. On J a.rmc.-.r y 1, 15l:7, A p<\{S t o :'3 t l1c Sl'm of $300 on this note. He dies
:'eb:cuo r y 1, 1950, l eavi ng ·Gr.c 1:;a ::u::~.lc e ul:.! ):::>.:Ld. E:i. s ; clnini sb'·u tor s oelcs yotll' adv:i.ce as
t o Hhether or not hu s:10uld pay t :!e 1·cs id,_,_e . ~ ::.;.c,t ~iO' .J.ld you <:)vis e?
Do no·0 "'_)ay i ·c . 'i'~1r: st&h'.t c o~~ lil :rl.tc-~ticms on ur:. t; l:cn c ol'Lt:i:'<:>.~ ts is 5 _yee.rs; in Vire mia a partie.l ~ ,;;,yacnt docs :: ot str.rt the s t e tut e nu,nins over. A demand note is L1ue
a.s s oo:~1 e.s r:1o.c:.e .
Query 1. \•Jll<::.t is t ::.r 3:tc::C.ntor;/ ne r i od of liJ:ri.to. t.ions? fl.. Oral contract, 3 years;
,r.ritten contra c-ID, 5 years, s e21L;d instrur:1ents, J.O ;rre2r s . B. R8cover :r o.f property (real)
15 :'rears. c. Tort acti.<)'.1S t:~2t e·J.r viv.e , 5 ::rears; Tort ac ti r.ns not survi vi.11g, 1 yea.r
ur::les s othe!"':rise provi L~ed. iJ~,r Y#B-24 os c~·c.1e~:de c~ i:·, 195!-l- t he s ·ce.tute of limitations in
tllC c ase of an a ction fer pon :.::mc.,J. J.n .rc~ r :i.es ua.s c:'.nY;cc1 ·~ o 2 ~re ars, This chanc;e is
not a;_);_Jlicabl e to a ct i ons un()e:;," t:1e (};<.;.t!:. IJ:r 1-J~~on~;i\1l ac t c.:·l;c,tPtc s.
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Define a super s e deas a ~ nscd i n \~:i.r _;j_nia.
A supersedeas as us ed in ifir1inia , is an ancillary pro ce ss , <J.dd:t·essed to the of ficer
charged with -tht:J e;~ecution of the judgment o:f· t Le t rial C!!.om·t, directing him to stop
the execution of t i1e judGment belcH, .:m d al s o diroc ting him t.o summon the defendant 1n
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error to. the appellate court, there to have a rehearing of the whole matter.

16. The plaintiff institutes an action on a .contract for the payment of money;he obtains pe;rsona.l service of process on the defendant, and files with his notice of motion for judgment an affidavit made by himself that to the best of his belief he is
entitled to recover the sum of <;Ji300;that such a.inount is justly due;and that he claims
interest thereon from Jan.l,l952. The defendant~.denies . all liability and employs :you
to represent him. What steps would you take to protect your client's interests?
A sworn plea(i.e., one denying by an affidavit)denying liability in whole or in part
s4oul.d be filed. Unless this is done no defense would be allowed to a motion for
judgment on an account where plaintiffs have sworn to the amount and justice of their
claim unless plaintiff failed to object to. the filing of an unsworn plea within seven
days.The object of the statute is to prevent delay by means of frivolous pleas. See
V#8-5ll and V#8-721. Query 1. What pleas must be sworn to?(a)The one above(b)All pleat
in abatement(c)Plea denying allegation of partnership or incorporation(d)Special plea
of equitable set-off(V#8-24l)(e)Plea denying allegation . of signature(f)Plea denying
allegation of ownership, operation, or control.
17. State two rules of pleading which tend to p:i·oduce singleness of issue
(!)Pleadings must not be double. That is the rule against puplicity. Example: Defend·
ant in one plea pleads infancy and statute of limitations. In such a case defendant
should plead two separate and distinct pleas instead of one double one. Duplicity,
however, is a defect of form rather than of substance and under our present statutes
would not be fatal(except in the case of pleas in abatement which must be technically
correct.) · (2) The common .law rule that one cannot demur and plead to the same matter.
This rule '-1as designed to prevent issues of l aw and fact q.t the same time. However,
by Vl/8·134 nAny party in any action, at any stageof the pleadings, may plead as many
several matters, whether of law or fact, as. .he s.ball think necessary."
....-22. For what purposes are dilatory pleas available, and at vihat stage of the proceedings must they be interposed, i f at a.ll?
Dilatory pleas or pleas in abatement are avai lable principally to contest the venue.
A plea in abatement cannot be made by a defendant after he has answered, demurred,
pleaded in bar, pleaded to the merits, no~ after the expiration of 21 days after service of the notice of motion for judgment or the subpoena in chancery upon him.$Uch
pleas, not being to the merits, and tending only to delay, are discouraged. Example:
X sues D for a debt in the Circuit Court of Y County instead of Z County where D
should be sued. HovJever, he ·alleged f~cts which D can prove are wrong l'lhich(if true)
would show t11at the Court in Y County·· was the proper cou,rt. D should file a p+ea in
. abatement if D does not wish to be tried in Y County.
~ 3. You repreaent a client upon whose goods a distress warr ant has been. levied for
rent which he claims he does not owe. How would you test t he validity of the levy,
1
and mode of procedure?
Replevin, the common law remedy, has been abolished in Virginia. The client should
put up a delivery or forthcoming bond of double the amount for which the distress is
made. The property is then delivered to the client. He fails to deliver the property
as he agreed to;the bond is declared forfeited which has the force and effect of a
judgment against the obligors. The landlord then gives ten days' written notice that
on a certain day he will move the court for an av1ard of execlltion on the bond, and, in
r eply the client may show his defense.
If the tenant is unable to give bond, and yet has a valid defense,he may make affida·
vit to these facts, and. the officer levying the distress warrant is required to permit
the property to r emain in the possession and at the risk of the tenant,unless the
l andlord is willing to give bond. (See Bur·ks #h04(4th Ed.))
-.....24. A client places in your hands fox· cullt:ction a clai m f or ·!H,OOO against B,a resident of Ky. You learn that a carload of horses lias been shipped by B via the C.&O.
R.R. from Lexington, ICy., consigned to a firm in Newport News, Va . ,for export to France.
Can you sue B in Va.,and if so, how would you proceed?
Yes, a judgment in ram by attacl~ent under V#B-5~ may be obtained. This has been
held not to be an u·n reasonable interferenc e with interstate commerce.However,if the
cattle have been shipped under an order bill of lading no attachment will be valid unless the bill be first surrendered to the carrier or its negotiation enjoined.

Ju1

V

N"'~

•

groun~~E~~~N~n·~-~t:::::::,~~

Quory 1. Ylhut aro tho
( 1) Thnt dofendunt is e. foroi:·
c:or poration , or a non-resident, e.nd has estate or debts owing to such defendant in t h.
•.;<o.unty or city in which attaclunent procoEldings are brought, or is entitled to th o bonofit of o. li en lEJgo.l or equito.blEJ. (2) Is removing or o.bout to remove out ofl stnto
1v:i.th intent to change domicile.
( 3) Debtor is removing, or has r emoved, or int ends t ·
runevo tho sr:;eciul property sued fer out of the State so that there will probably not
l)G enou gh in the Sto.tc to satisfy the judgment.
(4.) Is about to, or ho.s converted his
~'r ope r~y int o money, securities or evidences of debt with int ont to hind0r, dolny or
lcf;.· o.uC. his · oreditors. (5) Has, or is nbout to assign or dispose of hiG estnte with
intont to hinder, etc., his creditors. (6) Ho.s e.bscondod , mr
about to ·ubscon(l .t'rorr
tho State, or has qoncealod himself ther~in to the injury of his creditors, or is ~
fugitive from justice~
Note: vThore separate and distinct grounds of attachment uro str.\tod nnd o.ll o.ro r e lied upon, t~eymust bo ste.tecl conjunctively.
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c 25.

Steps to be taken by u sub .. contr,::.ctor t() pnrfoct hi.s mochnnics' lien;wi tnin· what
must suit bEl instituted to enforce it; oncl where funds in tho hands of the owner
cluo to the general c ontractor aro loss th1.U1 th o aggrog;eto of all of the subcontactors '
liens, what priority, j_f ::my> is tb)re botvreen them?
·
This is regulated by Vi~· 43-1 ot sog. Tho sub .. cor:h·n.ctor has tvw romedief?. (1) If
the gEme ral contro.ctor has p0rf uctod his li en, tho subcontro.ctor may obtain the benefit thoroof by n writton notice of his claiB n!ja.inst the genernl contractor to, the
OWTIOr I Or hiS agent, before thO BlliOU!.'lt Of th o gener a l CODtr:.l ctor f S liop iS pa.id Off
or discharged. (2) Ho mo.y tnke: out o.n jn~.opl>ndont lien by do ing just who.t tho general
contractor is roquir od to do, nnd , in a.ildition, give notice in writing to tho owner of
tho property, or his fl.ge nt, of tho cunount an:i character of his cb.im but tho amount
socu:r ed by this lien cnnnot oxcec1d tho n .iount in whi.oh tho owner · is indebted to the
general contra.ctor at the time tho notice is given~ or sho.ll tho:ro nftor bec ome indebted to the general c ontr o.ct or.
Note: The ste P,S that must be token by the generrtl c ontrn.ctor to perfect his lion
are ( 1) Tho filing of a memorandum in th(·J clerk's office of tho county or city in
which building i s l oun.ted at ~y time oftor the work is dono and b.aforo thEJ expirr.~.tion
of · 60 days fr ()m the time tho work is t orrnin::ttcd. This memorand·um must contain (a)
Name of owner (b) NUJ!le of cl n.imant (c)' Am.:)Unt cln.imod (d) Cr:msideration (o) Time or
times sumo will become or d irl become duo. It must be verified by oath, be occompnnioc
by stntemcmt claiming tho benefit of the lien, nnd give notic0 thn.t clnimant intends
t o perf oct his lion. It is roc ordod in the miscellnnoous lien b;)ok and indexed in th€
Deed Book. A copy of the notico is sent to tho own or.. A liEm to.kos in t:ts much lo.nd
as necessary to tho proper onjoymont of the building . (2). The lien must be . porf·e cted
by D. bill in equity within six months from the. time th o dobt b ccot~Gs due. If the oYrrlr
hr.s ®Y rlofense ho mr..y 1:: ~ko it 'in those procoedin~.s ·.
Note 2 • A sub-c ontra.ctor ho.s profor- cnces ovor r.t {!Onornl contractor.. Thero is no
preference as betwe en sub-contr,~ ctors of the sn.me cla.ss oxcopt th at thoso furnishing
l r,.bor are entitled to a prof.::::renco for not no r e th·m 30 dr::.ys i mmedir..toly pr eced ing
tho d~ of the p0rf ormo.n0 e of the last lnbor.
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ou o!·f'er a deed for recor d to tho cl erk of the prop t:r court, ~nd tender the pror
er t r..x r.~.nd fees for r ocord. etti on. The cl ork r ef uses t o r ec ord the deod 0n the nlloged
ground tha.t a. hi r;ho:r tax shou ld bo p:-d.:t. How would you proc co;l to r oquir 0 the dood
to be admittod t0 rec ord?
To oompol the porformnnco of r.~. public duty of n mi n is toric.~l nature Mandamus is tho
proper remedy.
Notes a.s t o other extraordinary r omedios. (1) Prohibition is n writ issued by nn
upper court to a. lower court or(lering it to ce uso its do t crmination .of a. cn.so because
of lack of jurisdiction. (2) H~;\DC-lUS Cnrpus o.s su bjiciendum is a writ directed to ono
who is i'llegc. lly r os tr.1.ining c.noth<:: r of his lliibe: rty u.nd dir octs him to cease therefrom
or to· give the person so rcstro.inod t 0 a lsgal custodian Haboa.s Corpus o.d testificandum is a. writ directed to one ho.vin(s custody 9f o. person to produce <that nerson at
a. certain time and pla.ce that ho may ::; ivo testimony in n judio:i.o.l pr octJo<iing.. (3)
Certiorari is an orU.~r fr om a. highor court t o n lower court or r1Gring the record of the
co.s e to bo cortific~ a.nd s:ont up to th e hi r,hf:r. co urt. I n Vir gtnia, ·practicnll the
only use made of th~s writ i s by the Su. ;_;romo Court of Appeals, to obtnin a fur{h or 0 r
mor o p orfoct rec ord, when 0 completo rocord h·\s not boEJn furnished. (4) Quo wt:trra.nto
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is '.'\. ·li~J crc;tiona:ry writ, given by a court, uron petition of tho attorney gonera.l, or
Comrnumvon.lth's n.ttornoy, or, if thoy r ofuso, by apy one hnving a speci a l inte re s t, a;.::
':1.ir.st ( a ) a domestic corpora.ti.on ( othor than n municfpal one) for a misuse or non -u CJ (
A' .its corpornte ·privilogos and franchises (b) ·a. person for tho misuse or non-usc ·.)f
':.r.:y pri;riloge c onfe rred by b.w (u) eny person who sho.ll intrude into or .usurp a ny pu·o·
Lc ( ff1.ce.
No t.o nlso that nn extraordinary remedy never lies if th.Jro is n.n adoqunte ordinEI!'y
r c::mody.,
2'/ •. A recov0rs a judgment against B for $2,500 in o.n action f or breach of promise t o
nar ry . B a.ss e rts :1 claim to his homestea(, oxE:-mption. Ca n he sustain it against the
judg:r.wnt?
No. A hreo.ch of promise to marry, while t echnically in the n atur e of a contract,
is often regarded ns substantio.lly n. toDt. Thus exemplary dnmo.go s may be awardod, and
tho action dios with tho porson. Since this claim i s not oubst.cntinlly contr'lctuul
it is superior to homestead exemptions. J\nd the statuto of limit :1ti ons is one y en.r.
28.

A ontors upon" B's land und hauls n.wny o. l ot of building stone without pt:lrmission.

JJ.re B' s rameCid.es in tort or c ontro.ct? ·'

In either at his option. Thus B mny wc.ivo the t ort nnd sue on qunsi-contructual
principles, or file a motion for ,judgment f nr the building stone •
·
The theory on which o. contra.ct o.ction is brought by e. n()tice of moti on f or judgment
is tho.t in order to koop A fr om being unjustly enrichod the law will imply a. promis e
to pay B f'or the proporty.
29. · To an acti on for pe rs onal injuries not fo.tn.l, tho d ofendunt plo ':1.ds that the c uusc
of action did not o.cc ruo wi hin 2 y oc.rs. Soon ufter the inflictio~1 ef ~he in:fH:eti GR
of the injury the defendant l oft tho Stnto in on1e r. t .:J es co.pe hoin£; sued nnd did not
r oturp until just beJfor.c• you sued. . IIow d oes this r}.ffoct his pl ea, and how would you
r o.iso such nn issue on tho p l c~Yl in gs?
If dEJf'ondo.nt vrn.s a resident of this State un~l l of t nfter tho notion uccruod,. there~
by · obstructing suit, the time out of stn.to would nr.1t . he counted o.s any po.rt of the
total time. See Y# 8-33.
/ As to the method of raising such nn i s sue, Rulo 3:11 r ond.s in part, · "If a. plea set
~p new matter u.nd c onto.ins W()rds expre ssly requesting a r eply tho o.dverse party shall
vyithin ·21 daye fil e n r ep ly admittin g or denying such new matter. If it does not contain .such words the .nlleg:3.ti ons of new mnttor shnll be t".k en n.s deni ed or "tvoided with
o~t further plemdin&;•"
30. To .on notion on nn ordinary note not under sonl, th e. d e fondant ple<:tds thnt tho
c011se 0i' uc tion did not accrue within fivo year s •. You wish t o pr ovo o. new -promise . in
writing within that time. · How d o y (J U raise this question on the plead ings?
;rJ/: 8-26 .provides that if the ;jl n.intiff'' s action be on tho ori ginal · cause of a ction ,
and tho de fenclnnt ploo.ds the stDtu.to 0£' limi t nt ions , tba y: lrdntiff shall be a llowed t o
r op ly ·s p0c io.lly such, promise, or ho may, without r eplying spociully , show such promise
in e virlonce t o r opo.l tho bur o f thu pl c n , provi<.!.ed ho sh':1.11 hnvo gi ven the defendont
reo.sona blo. notice before· tho tri o.l of hi s intent i 0n t r:: r o l y on such promise .
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31. A fire insurrulCo policy f or $1,000 on a house worhh $1,500
own or, .. ..''loss , if any 1 payablo to B o.s h is interest mr:~.y a prou.r."
property for .$1~000 ). The h•Juse ie t ot aU y dostr ~.Jyod by fir e •
you sue.?
· By V=/J:. ·5'5-22 B mey bring th12J ucti on in hi s ovm nEJmo s i nco tho
his ··bonaf'it in whmlo or in ':' c~rt. A c C~ uld suo bccnuso h(; i s the
contra:c~.. Thus .eithr:)r ( b ut' n et both) c vuld su0• .and aoch would
ored: iC·j:>e.,l.mg.ing. t o the other CHJ tr ust oo for sueh oth or. .
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-, to::c.Q.-·briefly
when,

i s i ss uod .to A, the
(B holds a. li on on th
. I n whose name would
ccmtro.ct was meant for
·pn.rty who mo.do the
ho ld o.ny money rec ov.
·

.h aw and why fl gu crdinn ad litorn i s a~)po intod , o.ncl.. hLS duties.
Whcmpn .. i.nfant or insane pe rson f or whr:,:n no c :nnmitt oo ho.s bcon n.ppo int ed is sued,

n. guordinn--ad . litem is · O.j) p0irJt orJ . How'? By cle.rk, juclgo 0r c ourt. Why?· BeC!U.lse tho in f'u.nt . or insanE> per s.on is n ot duomeclC'o.'pao l o of pr otecting his int erO"Sts. Outies·? To
d.ofend tho particular suit hr ~mght . in av<:: ry l et;itimnte ·mnnnor s o os to ·pr otect the
ri ghts o.f his ward. f~ 1~ua.rdian o.d litem i s under thu contr ol of the court in which
o.ppo intod und ·may 1Je SWllJll...'Lrily d i cmi ssed f or cnuso.

' f. cJ_,
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PLE.@D~G ~~'\fD PRJ'.CTICE
07,.
is a 11ext "friend and what o.ro his duties?
~·>.n inf::J. nt, or insane person for. whom no committee l1as be.o n appointed; suos by next
.frLmd, His duties nre to -diligently pros..scute the suit,- l:l.nd to look out ft~r his
ar,rd ' s iritorests therein.
·
· ·

:55. In nn notion for libel or slander, cc.n the truth of the defamatory words be prov0r, undo:r thu genernl is sue?
.
No . T"h0 Rules abolish the general isslw. ~:..·At oommon law in Ul'l action on the Co.se
'l.nything, mo.y te shown under the general issue of not ~_guilty except statute of limitat11.
ons, truth to nn a.otion for defamation, and dis.chn.rge in bnnkruptcy.
/tf~ \ ~
.
36. Up t 0 whnt time can a plaintiff in a.n action n.t law amend his notice of motion·
for ,ju:lgmont as of right?
Huh 3:13 provides that no amendment shall be mndc to c.ny ple ad ing after it is
f'ilod s o.ve by le1.1V8 of court.
f
Note: By yjf B-119 a. .court may at rmy timo hi furbhf.lrance of justice, 'm1d upon such
t0rmr.> as it may deem just, pe:rnni t any pleading to be :31Tlende(l. Tho court must 11t every
ntage of the proceedings, disreg4rd any orr or or d efect which does not o~ffect the sub•
stantinl rights -of the parties. Of course n o amendment will be permitted under this
section which changes tho entire theory of the case.

J.

37.

On demurrer, what d0i'ects in pfeadings f'.re not to no regarded?
Except as to pleas in abatement, all defects of f orm are to be disregarded. By V#
8-109 no clemurror shall bo sustained to . a declaration in neglit;once because the facts
O"ftho ne gligence are not st :1.tod .
·

From what interlocutory decrees in cho.nceqr co.n on appeo.l bo taken?
By V/f- 8-462 an o.ppeal is :1llowed from tho following int erlocutory decrees: (ij__DB.c..r.oe di:ssolving on injunction. · Example: pondint the conclusion of' o. hard fought divorce case tho court enjoins tho husbund from disposinG of cert :cin prop~rty. :Before the
iivorce co.se is finally determined the court dissolves this in,junotion·. An appeal lie
(2) Decree or order r:equ.irJ.
mone to be aid · (3) Decroe or order requiring possession or title to propert;v.: to he cha."l "'ecl. Exrunple: Appo n men't o rece :Lver pending fino.
det ormino.tion of rit;hts. ( 4) j)e cr oo or order ndju.:liontine princj pl es of the case.
Example: Court decidos case:' is not barred by ~uehos and p:rocoods with srune.

""--40.

1. The Court of Appeals of Virginia has bef~re it o.n apponl in a chancery cause, and
writ of or or in a. suit ut b.w in which the ovi<lenco hils buon c ')rtifiod. What is th
differ en ce in the consid0r q.tion of thci evidence in th ese two cases by the- court?
Barton's ChoncGry Practice 3rd Ed. r• Q71 roads, "Tho .findings of o. connnissioner
will be given groo.t weight o.nd though n ot o.s conclusive O.'S _tho verdict of u jury~ they
will be sustained unlecs plo.inl~r unvrorrunt ed by tho Qvidenco. This rulo opern.tes with
particular force in on nppellntc court whero tho findin ~~ s of the comm~ss'ioner have bee
npprovod by the court below, but if the findin r,s u:ro diSi)pprovod by the chancellor,
thoy will be rego.rded me rely n.s o. circtLmstimco , . of mor-o or l oss weight, to bEJ considere d with the evidonco in testing tho correctness of tho dGcision of tho court."
In tho co.so a.t lc,w tho fi nd ings of fo.ct by the jury, or by tho judge ~r~ere there wo.r
no jury, will not be <iisturbod unless plninly contrnry t o any rea.sonablo '"V:iew of the
evidence. Everything not in c 0nflict with · the evid<:mce is o.drni ttod O.hd o.ll r e n.sonoble
inferences o.re drawn to s u pport the findings of th<1 cqurt bolow. ·
::t

43. A clr.dms his ex empti ons n.s householder nnd h 1J :d of o. fumily in personal · property
v o. lued o.t $1,500 and in n. hous o o.nd lot vo.lued t!.t $500. Ho c onsUI'les o.nd usos up the
whole of tho personcll prop erty s o sot o.pnrt us· his exemptions ~1 nd then a oquiros. othor
personal property worth $1,200 . His creditors seek to subj oct this property to their
debts, . and he cl a ims i t a.s cx er.1pt. Cru1 th e creditors subjl~ct it to thoir dobts'l
Yes, Once used U? th\:3 homesto ucl exemption is cone f'Q r O'I!EJr. lhd h e merely reinvest·
od tho original ex erapt proporty it woul.:l still havo boen oxernpt.
45 • In Doc0mbor, 1949, Cho.r lus Jones 0:tecutes u.nd (]eli vr_.rs n de eel of trust on a flock
of 100 sheep to secur e t ho Bnnk of Eoxinf:ton in tho sum of $400. "There is an increo.se
in the fl 0ck to the .extent of' 75 lombs , o.nd on June 1, 1950, r.t judgment or oditor of
,Jones levies o.n execution on tho lnmos for hi s judGment. Whoso ri ghts o.ro prior o.s
betwEJen the bank und tho judgment cr0dit or?

. ... 38.
PLEADING AHD PP.ACTICE
Y!Jhful0 tlwrt! is a c 'J nflict of authority 6n this ill~tt e r tho Virginia view is that -the
rr,or·cgat;c eovers thu flock in its gr aduil.ll;v c~o.nging chare,ctEi r both a s to increas e a.n c~
\.l ocro.ase . Thus tho bank's. rights a re prior.
. ,
. .

Who.t is the offico of a petition in a pending suit in chancery?
A potitj.on in a pending suit in chnncary may be filed by a pe rson not a party who
:'r..s intorvst;ed in tho results and wo.nts to bo roude a party, for the purp os e of uss erti.ng:. o. ri ght or soelsing relief therein. V# s·.. l26; Rule 2:15.

'r.G8

•

l

'•

What principles :~ ·go vern . a. court ~f equity in doter~dnin(i whether it will set as ide
rJr c onr' irm a judicial s a le? ·
·
.
.
Two apparently conflicting principles govern. One principl·:3 is that the pr operty
should bring a.s much a s ~~o ssibl e so as to do justice to deffmdo.nt and his crEtdi tors.
Tho othor principle is _that nothing should be dono to· di1Jcoura;:·;o . tho public fr om bid. ing at such . D a.los. If ov ary one who ge ts o: bargain is d<Jpri ved tho.reof by the courts
thor O will soon be no bidders. So a ~ulo win ·not ·b e s ot as ide , i f it has bee:.n duly
held, 1.mloss tho price is grossly inadequl\t.) ~ If sor.'loone c0me s along with a. higher
. bid in tho mon.ntimo ( a.r1 up.s et bid) the court mo.y, if tho bid is s ubstantially higher
'illd tho upset bidder accounts for his failure to bid before, allow the. new bid, upon
the new bidder giving bond that he v<lill keep his btd open , and after gi vinr, tho pr ior
bidder a ohonce ·to meot the new b id.

· 1±7.

'

.

48. Tho Front Royal Nc\tional B:..\nk obta ins a · judgnent aglli na t William Reid in tho Circ uit Court. of Rappahannoc k C o unty~ Re id bc irig a. rt~sill o nt of· tho.t county. Roid owns no
pe rs onalty, but he is th e ownor of a ·tr <.:t ct of l r:1.nd in War r en County. l'he bonk employs
you t 'o subject tho l and t o tho lion of' its judgment • . Whore c uuld you proceed?
Soe 6 Query 2, ( a ), (d). So th o answer is oithl:lr pbco as tho venue sta.tute is ctm
ula:!:iivt~ in this situation.
49. James Smith, William Lowis, · J ohn M•Joro r.nct Cho.rL:s J onos j oint ly execute c. bond
for *1 ,000. Smith o.nd Lewis becc"Jme insolvent o.nd J ones is compollod to pny th~l entire
s um. J ones employs y ou t o prot oct hir:> ri ghts. Sto.tos (1) How would you pro,.::eed?
(2) From whom and.wlH~t amount w·,Juld. y ou r ecove r?
The romedy e.t l aw is ine.d o qunte becf.l.use at lr.1.w Mc.oro could. only bo held on an impl:i.
promise to pay his pro•ruttt sh!:1.ro. So the proc edur e shc u l d b0 by bill in equity.
Could r o oover $500 .from Moore :ln o. ~~ourt d' c c:uity. Soe O'lsos cited ·in 2 DigE)s t 945 •
...... 50 • . Williron Johnson is on~c.god in the morcn.n.t il o husinoss, and his assets c ons ist of
o. s.took of .merchn.nd is o o.nd n debt owing him by .th o Southern R~ilw::ty C0mpo.ny. On Juno
1st the Luro.y Su pply Compmy obtains <..t jud gmont nl!; ninst him fo r $ 500, · upon whi.ch the .
clerk ti.ssues an ox ocuti<;m nncl del ivers to tho sheriff tho sn.me day . On Junu 4th J ohnson mnkos et ge-ne r e l dood of o.adr.;runont, conv<3yi ng hi s •Jntir o s t ock Fl.nd all his· debts
tho.t mey b e owinr, hiln t o n. trust ·;; o for th e . ::,onofi t of a ll his crcdi tors, . which n.s s i gnmont is f orthwith r ocordocl. On Jun.:; lOth the sherrif l ovics hi s ex ecution on the stoc
of merohfll'ldis c , o.nd on t he sarno (}ny ho gn.rnishoos tho R_;o.ilwo.y Compr.ny. What a re the
rights of' the · ju.igment cr od :j.tor u.n rl the trust oe , r ospo ctivoly?
).·,.,-r- The Lur ay Su pply Comp 11ny wouic bo o.hcrtd o.s r og!.trds t.ho t .:.tn .;ihle J?rnporty, and the
I: CJrv.,./ nssignee o.s regards tho ri ebt. At the moment the ox ocuti "n pr ooEJss wo.s pla.cod in the
shorif'f.' s hands he wo,s bound t o put th.c. dnte nn·:~ ho ur on tho bt\ Ck th '-' ·:·oof • . At tho.t
'
'
moment
FJ. lien atto.ches on r.L ll t :m gi bl o an ~l int anp.;i1) l e pe rs on1:1l pr :'l .porty.
Wh en the
1
·y
levy is actually mad e thf) lion is c lim:hod , llr>.cl f' a iluro t 0 mo.ko th o lovy bof or o tho
r e turh da.yof tho exe cuti on _l:' rocess annuls tho li en.
The rule a.s ' t o pr op .::rty capo.blc of bEJ int; l e vied Ui-"on is that th e lion hEl.s pref or enc
oven o.go.inst o. bonFJ. ficl o purcha.sor .foz:o vo.lu o ~ · Cn.vo cl.t .emptor.
·
But clobts cannot be l e.viod UJ:.o rf. Tho ruio · us t o s uch prope rty is that a.n a.ss ignmer
.for va.luo to o. bono. fiU. o pur ch asor for v nluo .b ofor o go.rnis hmont ·pr oc eedings hnvo been
t aken t ukos pr ecedonc ~ over tho executi on lion o I n Vir s inin. u o onvoyan ce t o pny or
soouro o. pro-existing debt i s one tor vc.l uo . Soo Burks 4/=373 ( 4th Ed .)
·

i'.J /), .

51. Char l es Morris i s tho he,.,d. of' a f nmily o.nd o. r osi-:-l out of' J e fferson County, W.Va. 1
he owns o. ,farm situEl.ted in Clo.r ko Cc: unty, Vo.., vrr;rt h rt1)out * 1,500 , he o.lso owns person
o.lty on ,the fo.rm wor.t h ~.b 1) ~t $500. Hu ( JWns r!l) 0th ci r pr opor tY. anywhere. Tiw Bunk of
Cl a rka County eo.t ches h J..m J.n Clarke , s ues hi!::. on o. not e f or ~ 500 o.nd obt a ins judgment.'
He consults y ou as t c his ri ght to c l aim the h .Jl1tCSb.l "ld oxcrn_!)t i on. Assumine; thnt the
noto did not wo.i'tlo t ho homc st0f.\d 1 whnt would you ndvise ?
·

FLI;!JJIN"G AND PRL:; 'I'IG8

He h.':\s no ri ght to homestea.d exemption , a.s such ex emption is g ivE:n only to r -es i der:
c•f' this State. . V4/= 34-4.
-· .

52o Frar,k Warner institute s an a ction .Ltg_ainst the .Norr-o-llcanC:: ·westo rn Ra.ilway Co:r.1pan;
fnr ~525 , 000 f'or per sonal injurie;; all v ,od to· ·-rnrve·· b <"en ne (~ li p;e ntly sustained . Tho jur .
r wturEs 11 v orrlict for $250 . What a.ro the rights of th o r esp0 ctive parties to carry_
tho t:a.SiJ to the Supremn Court of Appeals ? ·
Plo.intiff only could n.ppeal. This is a pe cunia!'y matter o.n:l so fo.r as r.L )fondant
is C:)!'C0rn (Y~ thoro is n~t $300. invo l VOd.
5·1 ; Yfillirun Jone s of W~ren County, holds a not e executed by Frank Smith, of Fa uquio1
/ County, fo r the sum o f ~ 200. Smith failin g t o pay tho n ot e , J ones proceeds by notico
of rnot i rm f or judgment, catnhos Smith in Warr en, ond . th o she riff sorves a c6py of th0
notic e on him. When the caso is calle d. Smith 1 s nttorncy moves to d ismiss for tho l ad
of jur isdicti on. What should be the <!l r dor of the court? · .
.
1
Sin co .Smi th d oes not r e s i do in 'Pfi1:treu County that Count y doos n ot. c;et jurisdiction
by virtue of V# 8-38, "First, W1wrein
o f the defend ants r es id e ."
WJ.1.ero no p l a ce of ·payment is ·expressed in the not e the p l o.ce of payment by the wei .~
oi' author ity is the maker ' s r e sido n ce - or ,pl uce ·::> f bus iness. 8 C.J. 567. But parol
0vid enco wou l d be admi ss ible t o es t ci.bl:Lsh th ;~t it wn.s ngroed thnt it sho uld be paid
at the p ay ee 's rosidcmce . Assmning s uch . IU1 agr eement, them the cause o f acti on arose
i n We.rron county and ur~J.c r V=//= 8-39 that .i s a. pr op,~r c ounty i n which t o sue pr ovided
s orvice ca.n be ob:ta.ined on Smith in Warren County as was done in thi s cas e . So Smith '
motion should be ov e rrul ed . In the r.:tbso~lGe _-of D.ny agr eement as to t he p l ace of paymor.
the pr oper venue would be Fauqui er County. But t h is is a ma.tte r of v enu e and n ot
jurisd iction-i. e . Smith i s privil eged to h ave· the case tri od in Fauquier County provided ho insists on his rig:ht t o h avo it triod thor c . Wh e r o tho proper · vonue de pend s
..J.as h er e on n que.sti on of fact tho p l n,intiff is· entitled to h av o that fact put in issuC'
J>!t.a· _, b- J by a plea in abat ement.
He nc o Smith'S · r.totion t o dismi ss f or b.ck of jurisdiction
"-~01.#"~ ' should be dismissed o.s th::1.t would n <) t r.c th o r.r 0por way to t es t venue. Note: If tho
(JJ'-""mat t e r involv ed jurisd iction in the strict· scinso. r ath or thrm v onu e only then a motion
P,bto d ismiss would bo pr ope r. Ex-:unp l e : X sues Y i n o.n actionof' e j e ctment in o. trial
j ustice court. y mov e s t o disr.iss for l1\ck of jurisd i cti on . 'r ho mo tion should be
gr unt ed .
55 . A., B and C· are ,j c int t ort-f easors arrtins t D. The l ntter o l octs t o sue A and obt - .
ains a j ud gment f or ~ B OO. It l ater deve l ops th at A is inso l vE-nt and tho jud gment
crmnot bo pai rl . Can D s u e B nnd C or eith,, r of them?
At com.rnon l aw a jud gment a(r,a ins t ono j oint t ort-f easo r r o l oo.sGd tho oth e rs on o.
theory that the ir li nb ility W!;',s 0xtinguishod by m0r ger ip tho judgmont . In our 1919
r ov e rsi•)n Jir g ini:'-_ chanl;ed the r ul e. Vi/: 8-3G8 prov ides tha t the p l a intiff may pr oceed
O.(l;ains t to:fot- f0Qsors seVi)r ally or ,i oint ly, ~nd that sat i sfaction of the. jud,gme nt o.s
<li ctinguished f r om jucl.t;Eiont only, dischuq ;os th0 oth ers.
.
Note : If one j o i nt tort-fc ~\sor i s fo rG ed t o pay tho ont ir u ,judg1;10 nt V=//= 8-627 provides t hat contribution amon g wron r;- doers mny be e nforcod whor e ·th\:J. wrong is a mo r e
act of nogli ge;nce and involves no f1lPr et l tur piturlo .
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Whon moy an i ssuo ou t 0f c[,r:ncc ry b o o:vr~rdod in nu equity suit?
In any co.s e in which oith .~ r _rc· rt~' dom!ll1ds it wh en th0 e::vi don ce on o. materi a l po int
in conf lict. FurthGr moro :i.f' tl:wr. o is (1, squ ar e conflict in tl-w ovid onc e tho c ourt
its own motion should dir Gct a n i ssue vut l'f chur:cEJry. _.iil so whor e a plea is ente ras a p l oa raises only on0 qu ostion . of fact , and whe r o it i s n oc osso.ry to inquir e
t o the amount of d~~agos o

58 . '1JVho.t cont rol h~s the court ovor V\:r <lic t of jury on nn i ss u e out 't f · cha ncery , . and
a l so a verd ict of jury in n comr:toll 18.' 1 cnse ?
In the ory the v erdi ct o f' a jur y wh ich c1 ec i des nn i ss u o r)ut c f' ~ hancery is purely
ndvis or y 1 b ut C.S a I'l3ttcr G f r r rwt i oo it is n lmos t . O.l WflYG f o ll owed. .
In t h e case of a conn,m l nw suit the V(.;r 0i.::t of the jury shouU on ly be ov erturuod
when i t i s · clearly contr ary to t h e evid t::::!Ce upon nny r e::son:1hl e vi ew t o.kon . All facts
not cove r ed by the .euiden co unc~ ~~11 i n f e renc:os tha t C!.ll1 !-,e f~li rly d rmvn from the evi denc e n,ust· be c c ns i dcn·od to bo in favo r o f Hl(~ v "r d i ct. But if no verdict could poss ·
i b l y r oo.s:Jnc,bly bo s~stuinod t M c vurt rr. o,y on t or jucl[;J:i.Ol1t non obs tante VE:lr ed icto .
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53 . V\Jhat _. pourts have juri6dict:Lon to entertain a... suit for collection of a lost bond

o1· note ?'
•·
. .
In absence · of statute only cour ts of equity,

1.

as

.,

no profert of the bond could b e mac
:,_ncl a lo st note might be in the hands of
hold er in due course. By ·v=/f 8-517 court s
af law a re given jurisdiction and must reqUire .an indemnity bond the condition of whil
:~s to save h.armle.ss
the defendant .fr-om lass
if h e is compelled to pay to som~ other
.
.
person.
.
.
Note the princ iple or.ought out by the case of ' ic~bl er v. Spe'nuer, 114 Va 589, 11 Court
of equity have juris~r(ction to enforce p·a::vmerrt of a lost bond, and altho u g h courts of
law· aro given .jurisdiction by ·this : soc~ion·, it is well :s'ottl ed that courts of equity,
ha.ving . once . ac.quired jur.isdic..tion .never los e it b e cause juris-diction of the same matt·
e:rs are g~ven to .courts of law, unless ·-the . statute conferring s uch jurisdiction us es
pl"'11ihitory or- ·restrictive··words."
·

a

~ -~

'- 60. What w:ould·y.ou say as to .. the-. co.nciu.s.:i:veness of record in the followfng cases: ( a )
A judgment in o.n a ction of debt was based upon proc ess serv ed upon th e defendantcts wif
the return upon· which - proces s did not s t ate that the· d.o..f ondant was not· found .at his
usual place of '.lbod o. (b).In s alo. of infant' s land in suit by his guardi.an , a decr e e
of sale r~i't-6d · thnt· the gu.ar.dian _ad litem f iled answe r for tho inf..tin:t.. and in.. pr-oper
p e rs.o n.. as required, but somo y ear s l ate r an a t torney exrunining ·title to the lnnd and
looking "throu.gb.- tb.e ·p-ap-ers· ·in- the .. s.ui:t .(whi ch suit had been final .a nd .di.srnis.so.d fr om
'bhe . .cioo.ke.t . f.or <:t t l on.st ten years), wa.s not ab l o to find crither a nswer among . the paper
in the sui~ .Could . the -attnrncy examining the tit.le r e ly upon the r-eo±tal. in .t-l;le--d.e oree -t1\e;t the answers in questi on ha.d baon...file d?
(a) --Ass.urn.ing·-that .:this ·was. . a.jud.gment by default it· would be void~ fur ·· the dei'ect
iS:~ appa.r-ent ·on .the f fice of 't ho 12rocoss... and · tho servic e was--not .pers.onal., but. s.ubs.ti:tut.io~. .
.
Note ·· 1. ~ -s:trppose-t-he. _o:ff'i-c·e r had··not· serve.d- -tho-·proce-ss ··at. nll, but.. ha.d.....ond.ors-ed.....it
-so -t..hn.t.· .on -±ts f ace it se ems to h av e b eon r ogul a rly se rve d'? · Tho_rul e in Vir ginia is
that tho reco:rd~..j;mparts.....ab.s.olut a "-verity, _and n judgment . bf.l.sed thDreor: . .is-·good... . Tho·
rot.w:n..--cn.nn.ot b o diroctly or collatoro.lly ·attn.ckod . See Burks, p. 98,... 4th Ed.
· .'Note 2: :rt-the--wr-±t--±toolf is valid nnd the s ervice -per-sonal (i. e .. .nOt--s.ubsti:t.a:tion
~gment-re.nc:Ler. ed on defuct±vc· ·~mc e.. is . not v oid , but vo.i..dahl.e -<lnly~...and .cannot
be-:.ccllat-orail.;y:..... o..ss.ai.lccL..._...Examp.l.o.: .An offic er .-s.e.rvos the ·-,.,rit on X, personauy--·but
no'g) e c:ts.. to endor-s-e the tim e or man:i:ler- of ·e..orv:ico.. This .d c.f.o ct must--be---takfiD-.ad:vantag
of.:. if·--a.t-all.,.. by-- a:--ploa..,...in_.a:but"'ment.
.
·
. · ""Noto.. .3-:. Former-ly--if .n pnrty.. du.fuctive:ty·· s ervod....en'Wred-..nn --appec:trance-- ottrerttrnn--a-· ·
¢pe.c.;lal- o.n.a._;t::or ..·th.o-s.Q)..D· -purpos. 0--.of obj e cting to tho defective sorvic e , h e was deemod~o ho.ve wai.Yod--the·-<iB.f.e.ct. But Rule· 3·: 6 now r ciruls- in pa rt, "A pl&a.._.;i.n... .u.bat-enrent-or
~rh:rt.iarr~s.s_ .nM.d. ....not be fil od u pon o. sp.e.cin.l ·nppenrance , and may~ be_£..i.l.Eui
tho dc:C.ondout j n --pr opor pGi--s-On- or by · cou.ns...e.L."
·
'(b)~.. a gonoral-prcrpori.ti.on...an-..o.t torney oxo.mining -tills ..is--srrf.e... in ·re'lying...npo n
~tut'OS" th o st~ps h av e b o..en -takon .When those steps.. · ore....all _tb..a:t __ are r e .q~ __Th.is.-..c.~ea.tfte-n.-p:r-es..umption ·-t.hat t h oy hnve-tak.on. . thelJ'l.
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6.~~1-er-to- t:ako...;!ldvanto:gc in --thG--·-appa.ll o.t~·· c ourt · o.f . o. wr (mg- ru.l.inC&f'...the--t r±-ar

'

c~,._ .in,. not porm~ t tin g tho ~ i tne..s.s . to rm:::wo:: ,n. qut7S.ti.on,.-what must the r eco rd s how
~one-m--ttr&-tr:t:a.l ..:co.urt

WJ.th a . . JTJ: ew to - br~ ngmg ··t h o o rror- -oofm-e-t~
'Note.....o.n_ex..ae'f:ltion . T!lk.o -witrres.s out of court room-a.nd ··find,_ ::ulS-wer he would h ave
. ~~m-y so thn:t---it ··mo.y · nppe-ar whethor.-...or-not t be ·etr or-Of"""the::.:tr:i:alcourt, iLlJ,ny , wo.s prejudicin.l. St at e . whDt wo. s oxprJc t ed to- b&--provmi....by:..)lim .
"Npjry> :.. l:~en--~itness i s r-ejuct-od on account .. f his- in.comp0toncy, ..it...is~
~--whut. it·- i-s·--ex.pactud.. to provr~ by· him . The objt;ction-to.::h.is=-·:campetency .
'jmp] 1 fl4.mab:rr;j olttJL..,.....nnd tira:t.J1C>.. i s adverse . 11 · B urk~ - #305. . ~4th Ed.).
·
·
(

_ · 62.

/

!~ _a_.dc.fo.n.dtll1t in . o.·ctio.n -Tf' debt d esired to offer pr oof' o-f peyment..-or-~:f:.r--·
whubc must--n.a .d.o b e'f'orv ..i ssoo is. j oined f or tho trinl of th e c11so?
_ ·~By Rul e 3:8 -ho ...lD.llSt· within 21. d £.:.y s nftor s En·vico on him of thu- no.ti~c .of ·:motiolL..for
j-udgment-p'lemLhis- set·-C'Jff n.s ·.1. count or c l n.im . I f th.o defense is payment ho must plen.d
\ ~t ._r~oc in.lly by fil.ing;_ hie · grounds of dofens.o n.s per Rul e 3:7.

'.}A'!-

~S.

Who.t -is ·nooos so.ry to aup?ort n. pl oo. of r os judico.t .ro,?
(1)- That the i ssue i nvo l ve d in the second pr oceeding v:o.s nocesso.rl ly involved- ·in- th
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f i r s t • . (2) That former pro.9oeding was bofor:f:1 a court of' competent jurisdiction. (3)
'l'hat th e issue is· botweontho srune parties or. t,heir privi es. (4) That the re was no
fraud or collusion ·in the former proceedings (5) In ·.the. -cas.e -of· a civil action that
thO l'C was a final . judgment or decree.
In a criminal case that the proceedings went
a s f ar as impanelling and swearing of the jury and charging then with the . issue i.; o,
fo r1:1o r jeopardy.
.
i

6 6~

What is meant by a case _agreed? And state the proceedings thereunder.
It is a substitute for a s'l;ieci.al verdict and is treated in the same manner. It
co.nsists of o.n agreed statement of facts and no facts are to be inferred that are n oi
set forth in this sto.tmnent. The duty of the judge thon is to apply the law to .the
facts and render his decision accordingly.
What is the leC'..ding difforcrice bet'vieen a plea in abn:~oment and
to the mf:iri ts 9f tho case whereas a plea
nothing to do w.ith tho merits of the case, and,· if successfui, only
Problem: What, i f a~ything, is wrong with the following ·plea in
In. the Circuit Court of York County
.\
67.

A plea in bar is a plea

c---c~----)

.

a plea in b.ar?
in abatement has
causes delay.
abatSijlont?

.

) Plea in Abntement.
n----.:.n~----)
The saicl defendant comes and s ·o.ys thp.t thfs court. ought not to hn.vo or tako · o.n~
further cognizance of tho action !l.foresn.id. of the said plaintiff' because the said
-defendant says that tho supposed cause of _the said n.ctiun did not, nor did any part
the reof, arise in the s rdd c ounty of York and of this' the said dofendnp.t puts himsel5
upon the country.
,
·
.
.~
.
lJIIherofore he pr nys judg:nont wheth0r this· court can or will take any further
cognizQnc e of the action aforesaid.
J.G.E., p.d.
(a) It should conclude with "And this tho defendant is ready. to verify" and not
with· putting himself upon tho country. .
· !
(b) It s ijoilld nn gotiy o ol J ather g~~ of jurisdic·:t;.ion; in this case it should
sta~ e that defendant is not a rosidGnt of York · County.
·
(c) It should give plaintiff a better \vra __ i.e. it should set ·forth facts .that
would show plaintiff . in what county he should proceod.
(d) It should 'be verifi<;Jd by aff idavit n.s all pl oas' in ·abatement are required by
statut0 to be so v erified.
. ·
.
.
.
Note: By Rule 3:6 a plea. in abatement iney be filed hy ·tho defendant in person or
by counsel.
·
·
In what c~unties' or corpqra.tions mny non~roi>:ident . def~nd ants · be sued1
the case of non.:.residents suits may bo brCiught whoro ·over they can be ser.':vod
:with prowess in Virginia. . in the case· o f transitory actions.t or wher0vor h~ he.e prop/ erty or debt$: :hie_ -~l:-il:;l : in this St::1.t0o
:r·: :t: · . . ·~
70.

< In

72. A picks up .a loaded gun, believing it to be unloaded, and, though warned that it
may be ·i oaded, points it at B. The gun goes o f f a.nd kills ·· i. (a) What crirne,- if nn~·
does A cormnit? (b) Suppose B to be me rely wounded? V'lhnt crime i f any ·does A commit?
( a ) Manslaughter (b) Probe,bly none, but possibly assault and' battery on the theor;
that the conduct of d·e f~mdant was rockies s n..''ld wont on o.nd hence equivalent to intent·
ional.
In the ln.tter cuse ( tho.t is, the wound.ing) suppose thnt the occurence was.- in F
C~unty on February 6, · 1950, th::-.t A live d in 11 County, r..nd left F County right after ·
the o.ccident.· .If you advis Gd any proct:Jedings, whnt notion would you bring?
Not·ice of motion for judgm(mt a s p0r Rulo 3:3•
73.

74.

In what court would you bring it?
It might be brought in oitbor county. · Sinco n tort is involved servioe could be
sont out . ofF County toR County.
75, Suppose that y ou are empl oyed on Tuosda y, Fe bruary 14, 1950, that a term of the
cour t ha ving jurisdiction b egins on the fourth Monday in F e bruary (the 27th), und
anothe r on the fourth Monday in March (tho 27th). Which term could iVOU catch o.nd why
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Since the defendant must be given 21 days in which to file responsive pleadings it
will not be possible to reach a February term of court. If defendant files his
grounds of defense within the 21 days the case will be sufficiently matured to be
docketed for the March term. But if defendant pleads in abatement or demurs such plea
would be disposed of in the March term of court and further progress of the s uit
would depend upon what additional time the Court allowed defendant in which to file
his grounds of defense.
Outline of Speps in Trial ~ Case at Law
·10 1. Preliminary to trial:
.
r
A. Filing in clerk's office a motion for judgment and a copy for each def,endarit· pay
ing the required writ tax and deposit against costs. Rule 3:3(a).
. .. . . ·"
B. Clerk prepares the Notices of Motion for Judgment <l:~:;..:,attaches a NO.~ice--·to each
copy of the I'1otion for Judgment. These combined papers ''constitute_,:the-·motion for judg
ment 1vhich the clerk delivt3rs for ser\ric_e .atr' p'laintiff !TlaY" direct.
C. Service, and Return on a p~per. ,. styled "Proof o~·- S"'ervice 11 within five days after
___ ..th~-~;r_!:j,~~:t;._~ervice l:l.POn -any- ·party as__p,eY Rule 3:4.
D. · Within 2I'"'·~dayq-' Cir· service· geferictaiit must file his responsive pleadings. If this
pleading is a demurrer oy~ ~l~~-~n abatement and is overruled in due course he must
file his groun<:l~td>f- ·defense within whatever time the Court orders him to so do.
E. C.a se.- dock'eted and set for trial. F. Pre-trial conference.
. II. ·~trial.
A. Case called.
E. Instructions given Jury.
B. Jury Impanelled. See Note l,infra F. Closing arguments-Plaintiff Defendant
C. Opening Statements-Plaintiff
Defendant Plaintiff
first-then defendant.
G. Jury retires.
H. Verdict.
D. Introduction of Evidence--See
I. Judgment--Is ipso facto a lien on real
Evidence, 19.
property.
III. After Trial.
A. Execution-Lien on personal property as discussed in question SO,supra.
B. Levy.
C. Sale.
Note 1. Each side has a constitutional right to a trial by jury, but the court may
~
try the case unless a jury is demanded. "A common law jury was a ,jury of twelve, but
. :J """~I
by the Virginia Constitution there may be a jury of not less than seven in cases not
cognizable by a justice of the peace at the time the Constitution was proclaimed, or
not less than five in cases so cognizable. Provision is also made for a jury of three
by consent of the parties entered of record, each party to select one, and they to
select the third, and i t is provided that any two concurring shall render a verdict
in like manner and with like effect as a jury of seven. ·
Note 2.Service of process on natural persons, residents of Virginia. This may be
(l)on defendant . himself if found anywhere in the officer's bailwick, or(2)substituted
service. This is of two kinds: (a)on the consort of the defendant or on any member of
his family above the age of sixteen. If served in this way the fact that i t was so
served and the fact that the defendant was not to be found at his usual place of a bod
must be endorsed on the process, and also the further fact that the purport of such
process was explained to the one on whom the notice was served.(b)If no one is found
above the age of 16 and a. member of the defendant's household then the process may be
tacked upon the front door. If served in this manner the possibility of personal
service, or service upon a member of the household over 16 must be negatived. Note
_ w~l~ t~t these met2ods are not c~ulative but successive.
D(, dAt-<i f/&rr/;c;/ ,·.,. Ji·'P
.
77. On the trial the court instructs the jury as follows:"Gentlemen of the jury, I
instruct you to find for defendant." The jury does so, and the court in due course
enters judgment. Was this proper procedure?
No. V#B-218 reads, "In no action tried before a jury shall the trial judge give to
the jury a peremptory instruction directing what verdict the jury shall render."
But note well that there are .less summary methods to accomplish the same result. A
demurrer to the evidence may be interposed; evidence may be stricken; · the trial court
may set aside the verdict, and in a proper case give judgment non obstante veredicto;
the trial court may. decline to give any instruction where the evidence would not
sustain a verdict, and it may in substance direct a verdict by stating in

f,u ._ ns.
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an instruction e. · h.ype:__'thatfca:l_:~-tha...jJ.J.ry_~:Lf.__t,h~_y ___S() ___'~~l~eV-e_, to · .N.n::l
otc. 139 Va 618. ~d Rule 3:20 provides that either party may file a motio'n 'for ·s .:.
-~ary judgment at ~y time after the parties' .a re at .issue.
If it appears from t~e pl
mgs, the orders. :1.f any,.. mad~ at the pretr.ial.c.a nference. and .the admis.s~ons, ~f :an;,
in a depositipn-. t!re:t' the moving party is· entitled to judgment, the court shall enter
ju.dgmi:m:t in his favor. but that.no summary jtJdgmeqt shall be entered if tho amount o1
dP. .ma ges or any · other material. fact is genuinely in dispute.
· · ,-. ' ·
· ··-_..,.,.,....;.,.,
78. Wbat papers consti~ute the record in. tho app~lla.te court?
This is governed1by Rule 5sl, · seqtion (3)'e. The.po.pers are ·:
1. All writs
·
14. Opinions of -the judge. ·
2. Processes
15 • .Instructions both. gro.nt;~d ond ..re_fus..od
3. Returns
. --·-··--- ·-· .... ··--...
'properly. initialed.
4. Reports
16. Exhi.b its whothor admitted or reje~ted
5'. Pleadings .
when proporly initialed. ·
6. Grounds of" DefE~nse
1.7. Oro.l tef;timony o.nd other incidonts of
7. Bills of Particulars
·the trial or hoo.ring transcribed by a
8. Noticos
reporter and
9. Depositions .
18. Any _writtonsto.tements ·of facts, test··
10. Stipulations ·
· imoriy or other incidents of _the case i
n. Notices of Appeal
. the trOJ.1SCript .or ·statement is signed
12. Assignments of Error
the end by Counsel for all parties and
13. Original drafts of orders~ docrocs
tendered to the judge within 60 days a.
und ~ Judgments signod or initialed
signed by him within 70 days . a.rter fin
by the judge.
judgment and
·
19. A trn.nscr~pt or stn.tement not signed b
·. Counsel for nll pn.rties as . per the pro
isions of subsection (f).
20. While the vordict of u jury is not 0xp
ly mentioned it will most corto.inly. be
part of the record.
·
Comment on· 17, 18 and 19 o.bover ThoBe provisions accomplish everything tha.t was ev'
accomplished by .the most formo.l bill or certificate of exceptions.
Que.r y 1. . Tho Court refused . to nllow a. corto.in paper to be o.dmi tted in evidence. D·
such order- prevent it ·r rom becoming a part of tho record? No. Sub..pa.rugraph . (a) expr essly provides that nn order r ojocting, striking or ~uppressing a.ll or part of ~
paper lodged with the clork shull not h!lve ~he effect of. taking it out of the record
on appeo.l.
. ·
·
query 2. What happens ·if the · judge who presided ut t~o trial dies? Sub·s·e.otion
(g) provides that the :transc.r ipt may be tenderGd to or signed by any judge· hnving
.
authority to enter· orders ~n tho ca.se. · Comment by Judioio.l Council, ncode section 8342 provides for some bu-t not nll situo.tions ' in wh;i.ch the judge who tried the case is
not o.ve.ilable to sign the transcript. ,The ··present proposal is designed to . (c-over all
such cases). It allows the transcript to be tender ed to -one judge and signed by a ·
different judge. When~ver p6s~ible the transcript should, of course, bo signed by thl
judge who presided at tho t'rial. The reo.son for not making it mo.ndo.tory that the tro.1
cript bo signed by ·the judge .'whenever pas sil?le' is to a.void controversies over wheth(
it is possible."
·

when

.

'i

79. Suppose a caa:e is tevors o_d. and rema.nJ.ed f'o:r a. sooond tria.l. You diScowr that Y'
principal witness has moved to o. qertain -o.ddress in New York City. How, if at all,;
co4ld y<iu s.ecure the benefit of his knowledge of the fo.cts?. ·
.Take his d O.positiori after giving adverso pc.rtios due_ notice.
80. S~ppose h~ ho.d di~d bef~r e tho second trial. How, if at all, could you secure tt
benefit of his knowludge of the fo.cts?
Under the reported - t e stimony exc eption to tho h oo.rsay rule testimony given by~ wit ·
noss in a formor trial is admissible in o. lnter pr o ceeding which iovolves the same
partie s and tho srJne issues.

81. Suppose your client dies before the second trial. How, if at all, does it affect
your suit, o.nd who.t woul.d you d o ?
By Rule 3:17 if ~ pnrty b ooomes incnpnble of prosecuting or defending because of ·
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death or other cause his successor in interest(in this case plaintiff's personal r et ·
resentative) may be substituted as a party ~n his place. This is done on motion of
the successor or of any party to the action.
Note 1: If no suit had been started and death was due to defendant's wrongful act
then the personal representative of the deceased ma#h;j:r.\W.tute an action for the ben··
efit of statutory beneficiaries for not more than ~~2~;ooo under the death by wrongfuJ.
act statutes also known as "Lord Campbell's Acts 11 • V :8-633 et seq.
Note 2. ~ .1 reads in part, "No cause of act1.on or injuries to person or
property ~ be lost because of the death of the person in whose favor the cause of
action existed, provided, however, in such action no recovery can be had for mental
anguish, pain or suffering,(and)provided(further)that no such action for personal
injuries, except an action brought by any person under disability at the time of the
in,jury, may be brought more than two years, after the injury occurred."
. 82. Suppose the defendant dies b~fore the second trial,_ but the plaintiff does not.
How, if at all, does it affect your suit, and what would you do?
V#8-628 provides that any right of act.ion which may accrue by reason of any injury
done to the person of another, and not resulting in death, by the wrongful act of
any person, shall survive the death of the wrong-doer, and may be enforced against
his executor, either by reviving against such personal representative a suit which
may have been brought against the wrong-doer in his lifetime, or by bringing an
original suit against his personal representative whether or not the death of the
wrong-doer occurred before or after the death of the injured party. So the thing to
do is to revive the suit against the personal representative by motion as per Rule
3:17 quo·tied above.

13.

Suppose for the purpose of this question that the plaintiff dies before the second
trial, and that his death does not affect the suit. Under what circumstances, if any,
can the defendant testify on the second trial?
At connnon law parties and person.<J interested in the result were incompetent witnesses. Where one party· has died the common law rule as to the other party is still retained in many jurisdictions. But in Virginia, by V#B-286, the surviving party is a
competent witness but cannot recover upon his own uncorroborated te.s.timony. Note:In
~h a case interested parties cannot corroborate each other.
A business man, finding that his debts amount to ~50,000(none of them reduced to
judgments), and his assets to only $2.5,000, makes a deed of assignment to a trustee,
securing first two notes to his wife, and son, respectively, of ::plO,OOO each, and
then, after. their payment, his other creditors pro rata, and authorizing the trustee
to turn the assets into cash and distribute as above. You have reason to bel:leve that
the debt '· to the wife and son are not bona fide. You are anployed by creditors vepresenting $30,000 to collect their debts. Assume for the purposes of the next four
questions that the bankruptcy law has been repealed.

84. Have the creditors any remedy1 If so, what?
They may bring a creditor's bill in equity, for the purpose of setting aside the
assignment as a voluntary or fraudulent conveyance. If the debts to the wife and son
are not bona fide, a court of eqility would set aside the conveyance. Note that i f the
debts . were bona fide the fact of preference alone would not be a sufficient ground fo :
the setting aside of the conveyance at Common Law. But by V#~ -156 no preferences are
allowed(except to the extent of the value of security given or secured debts) in
the case of assignments for the benefit of creditors.
85. If you advise any proceeding, state exactly what steps you would take towards in~' r stituting and maturing it from your employment until it is at issue.
The steps are as follows:(l)File the Bill of Complaint(and copies enough for each
defendant)in the clerk's office paying the required writ ta.x and deposit against costs
(a)Clerk issues· subpoenas in Chancery attaching one to each copy of the bill Of complaint{(3)Service of process(subpoena in chancery attached to copy of bill of complaint)and return on a paper styled "Proof of Se.c vice" as set forth in Rule 2:.5(4)
Defendants file their responsive pleadings within 21 days after service.Rule 2:7~· If
defendant files pleas in abatement,demurrers or other pleas and these are overruled
he has 21 more days in which to file an answer or within such st10rter or longer time
as
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the c our t may direct. ·Should defendant fail to filo any responsiv!OJ pleading within.
t he requir ed 21 days the bill is taken as. confessed ex~ept in divor ce cases. (5) If
pl ai nt iff doe s .noting more he is d e emed :to havo filed · a. gener,al ropliqfltion,.···. i. c . · f:l
. b ln.nkct .d.enio.l of. everyt.h ing +n ,tno·f®sw-or·:'.of'···.pl.ea; Rule 2 :9~ .
. -··· . : . . .

.

·-7-~

·-

'

:

In such c ases how is the evidence takon?
It is generally taken by deposition o.fter di:te ' uotice to all po.rtios 'o ther th an t L ..
0.s to whom the bill is taken as confessed, arid b efore a conun.is.s ioner in chance ry to
wh om the Chancellor has reforrod the e:;a:se foi- investigation and r e port, Rule 2:21
howev er provides that. ...:.evidonce may bo heard orally before the court in any c as e ; b\.lt
if: thoro are d ef endants proceeded against by o'rder of publico.t i on wh9 . h ·a ve . not appqar
ed, suoh evidence shoJ.l be reduced t ·a 1n•iting and pres erve<l a s a pnrt :of the record.
In othe r c as es . pres ervation of th0 evideri?e may · be requir e d by the jl.ldge in his . discreti on,
86 .

B7. rs· there any methcd l:y which oh brin~ing your suit, you can secure priority f or
· your c.lients in the distribution of the assetS in case the litiga.ti on is successful;
if s o1 what?
A- party instituting such n suit in 0 qui~y g'e ts a priority at the time of the insti
tution of the suit• In order to pr otect ,hims e lf he should filo
cl e ~k' s offioe whicih should set f 'o rth the namos of the parties, th e objects of the
proc eedings, a.nd a description of. the prop erty. · The theory is that one who discovers
f a cts that · r ~dound t o thE! ben efit of o.ll the creditors should, because of his superio:
dili genc e ~ have a li en on tho ass ets so d isc overed or freed f1~om liability. 15 C.J.
441~
Genera lly in other type s . of c o.s es. b efor e one co.n r esort t o equity he must h e.ve
first . gotten B. lien at lnw.
a. c n.so of d 0c.th of o. c ommon debtor tho genera:!. cr edit ·
ots, if necessary, ma.y subj e ct the de ce dent's r eal pr ope rty t o the pnyment of his deb,
~ithout ·first getting a lien at l aw, but in .this latter c a.s o no priorities are ~:t;l.lowe r

In

91. · Th0~a.lley Trust Co. plo:ce s - in your .hands a ne gotin.ble not e , · executed by J ohn
Smith, and instructs you to obt a in judg~ont. Stnte the different r0medies, bo.th a.t
coronion lo.w and .in Virginia, to which you muy r e sort •
... Debt, .or assumpsit .at c ommon l nw, If under . s eo.l · c ovenant a lso . Now the procedure
in Vir g ~nia 'would be by notice of mo ti on f or jud gment pursuant to Rule 3:3.

n

93. Wh at is the e ff e ct of a f aiiur e to wniv e answer und e r oath in
bill in equity?
. , At common law it. gives the answer the forc e of evidepc~3 so for as the answer is ·
r e sp6nsive t o tho bill, 'l#.3-123 re ads in part as follows, "Unloss .a complainant in
a s uit in equity shall, in 1i:IS bill, r e qu es t o.n unswor or answers under oath ·to cert a in '$peoified interrogntorie s, t he answer of tho dofond,u nt, though under o ath, sho.ll
not b e Qvidcncc in his favor, · unless the caus e · be h eQTd upon bill and enswer only. 11
94 ~

1~at is meo.nt by marsh o.llinG. of as s ets in a court of equity?
Whore ·.no harm will o0 d one t o on o ho l d i ng. a s or.i or i ncumbero.nc e, a court of equity
if it o.lre a.dy has .jurisdiction of the cas e , will r oquir o the holder tti~r oof to s a.tisf·
tha.t incumb. ere.nce
in SUCh. a. WilY a s will do the l OflSt harm to . tho s e holdinf;
junior in ..
.
.
cumberances.

-ss.

In what cases has · the Su r emo Court . o f Appe ~, ls of Vir glnin ori ginal jurisdiction·
Mandamus, Prohibition, nnd Habea s Corpus . · Not e that "this jurisdiction, while
original, is not exclusive.;

'-96. In wha.t oivll cases has the Supreme ·Court of Ap ?eals of Vir ginia appe llate juris·
d'iction irrespe ctive 0 ~ the amount i nvo lved . in lit.i gati cn?
.
.
Even in s uqh ca s e s the ri ght of .o.ppenl i s dl sorotiona.ry. Cas os concerning titl e ·
.t o or boundar ·i es of land, the condem.1a.tic)n of . pr opo r t y, probat e of a will, a.ppointme ni
of pe r~ onal re pr es ent ative , guardian,: 'c ommittee, or curat or, or conc erning. a mill,
· · r oa.dw:ay·, f erry, wha rf, or l anding , or ~i ght of · Stnt o, county, or muni,cipal o<hrporo.tion
t o l evy tolls or taxe s, or imrolving t ho c onstructi on of any s tatute pr ordinanc e imposing t axes, or by any fina l order, judgme nt, or find in g of tho St nte Corporation
Connni s sion, irr~t i.J:I:O.:...O f-t he-tunount invol ve d, ~h o int erlocutory decrees. mentioned
in qu esti on 40, r efU s nl to gr o.nt a writ of quo w~rr anto, or by the final judgment of
.~ sai d writ. Se o V# 8-462.
'l'he Consitution nl so givos the Su pr eme .Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction of
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of cases involving the constitutionality of any act, and cases affeuting life and
liberty. Constitution #88.

L~ 6 ..

97 u What is a bill of review? For what may it be filed? And when is leave of court
not necessary? What is the limitation on filing a bill of review?
(1) A bill of review is the only remedy to set aside a final decree in equity and
ohtain a rehearing in the trial court, if the term of the court at which the ·final
decree was entered has expired.(2) It may be .filed only in two cases(a)First, to
correct some error in law apparent upon the record itself, (b)When some material fact
haa been discovered or has occurred subsequent to the decree. (3) In (2)(a) leave of
court is not necessary. In any other ease, it is. V#8-613. (4) V#-8-611 provides that
no bill of review shall be allo·ued to a final decree unless it b e exhibited within
six months next after such decree, except that an infant or insane person may exhibit
the same within six months after the removal of his or her disability.
Note: If the proceedings are interlocutory and not final the remedy is not a bill
of review but a petition to rehear.
Note 2; Note well that a bill of reviel..r is not in an appellate court l:'U.t is a review of the trial court's own final decree in equity.

- 99. Can the statute of limitations be taken advantage of in Virginia, either at law
or in equity, by demurrer? If any exception, state it.
(1) Where a statu.te of limitations is a matter of remedy it must be specially plead.
ed. Demurrer will not lie. This is the usual case.
(2) Where a statute creates and limits a right within a certain period there is no
right after that period has expired. Here it 1nay be taken advantage of by demurrer if
the pleading does not affinnatively show that the action was brought in time.
(3) In ~ny case where the defense of the statute cannot be set up under the pleadings, it may be taken advantage of by instructions. See Burks #236(4th Ed).
101. Under the law and practice in Virginia, what are essential in a demurrer to the
evidence both on the part of the demurrant and the demurree?
(1) It must be in writing(2)Set forth the evidence introduced by each party(3)State
the grounds re],ied upon by demurrant. (4) Must be joined in by demurree.
102. For what will the court refu.se to compel joinder in a demurrer to the evidence?
(1) No joinder will be required unless demurrer in writing, (2) where the inferences
from the demurree's evidence are conflicting, or (3) where it clearly appears it is
interposed solely for a delay.
· Quf3ry 1. What is a demurrer to the evidence? A. It admits the truth of the demuree's
evidence, withdraws the demuz·rant 's evidence in conflict therewith, and allows all
reasonable inferences to be drawn in favor of demurree and against demurrant axcept
where demurree's evidence is conflicting and doubtful in which case the issues should
be submitted to the jury. A demurrer to the evidence takes the case from the jury,
and leaves it with the court. Yd-8-JAO gives the demurree the absolute right to withdraw his joinder in the demurrer and to introduce new evidence, or suffer a non-suit,
at any time before the jury reti res from the bar, and the demurrant is likewise
given the right to withdraw his demurrer within the same time. If the demurrer is
overruled the damages are fixed by the jury, and the demurrant 1s only ren..,Cy is to
note an exception and ask higher court for a writ of eiTor.
- ~.- ·, ..- e... F<L-e :-+-s - · r;_ e_.. p,',. c -rl li /:v ~:.
103. A recovers ~judgment agiinst'B, and execution issues on the judgment within a
year from its rendition and is returned "no effecto'lby the sheriff. ThBn B dies.
What are the proper proc eed:Lngs to r evive this judgment against B1 s administrator, and
within what time must this proceeding be had to prevent bar of statute of limitations
Generally the lien of a judgment may be enforced by a bill in equity at any .time so
long as a valid execution mar be issueJon the judgment.(l)By Code ~6 execution
can be issued br scire facias or action brought within 20 years from the date of judg
ment. It can be kept alive perpetually by extending its life by scire facias or
action brought within the 20 year period. (2 )vJhere the scire facias or action ·is
against the personal representative of a decedent, it shall be brought
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47.
wi thin five years from his qualifications, thus cutting down the life of a judgmenCagainst a judgment debtor who dies to five years from the qualification of his per,.
s onal representative, unless within that time the judgment be revived by scire faci c:'.:3
or action.(3) By V~B-393 no suit can be brought to enforce the lien of a judgment
against lands which have been conveyed by the judgment debtor to a grantee for value
unless the same be brought within ten years from the due recordation of the deed frv!r
such judgment debtor to such grantee • .
Applying{2)to qu~stion 103 no reviva+ would be necessary until just before the expir ation of twenty years or just before the expiration of five years from the appoint·
ment of a personal r ·e presentative(whichever should happen first).
109. What statutory substitute is provided in Virgirua for the bill of discovery?
V#8- 32Q .to 8-326 provide that in any proceeding at law pending before court or
coclmissione~ party may file interrogatories to adverse party. This does away with
the necessity of a separate equity suit in cases at law though'pure bills of discover
have not been expressly abolished.
/ 111. What is the method of procedure to subject to payment of judgment. the following
property of debtor;(a)Land;(b)Money in bank;(c)Growing crop of wheat on land_ leased
for term of years by debtor;{d)Livest.ock(e)Shares of stock in a corporation.
(a) The judgment is _per se a lien on the land.• A bill to subject the land to the
judgment ll€n ·is··tbe proper method of. procedure. Note(l)that it is not necessary to
·exhaust the personal property first in this case and(2)that the land cannot be sold
i f the re11.ts and profits will probably pay o.ff the judgment within five years.
(b) Have an execution issued on the jud~nent. This becomes .a lien on all personal
property tangible and intangible. Garnishrrient process is necessary to enforce . the
lien on debts due the judgment debtor.
(c) V#B-421,1 provides that no growing crop of any kind(not severed)shall be liable
to distress or levy except Indian corn, after Oct.l5, and also except sweet and Irish
potatoes over five barrels after same has been matured sufficiently to sever or to
market. Hence the remedy nere would have to be by bill in equity.
(d) Ordinary execution, levy and sale.
(e) Issue execution. Garnishee the corporation, if it is impossible to get the stock .
W/13.1-W-4 reads,"A creditor whose debtor i s the owner of a certificate shall be entitled to such aid from courts of appropriate jurisdictio~, by injunction and otherwis e, in attaching such certificate or in satisfying the claim by means thereof as is
allowed at law or in equity, in regard to property which cannot readily be attached
or levied upon by ordinary legal process."
112. A sub-contractor's bill for lumber furnished for tha building of a house wa~ due
January 1,1949. The house was completed July 1,1949. A mechani c's lien for the claim
was filed ~July 1.5,1949. State whether t his lien could be enforced, and if so,how?
~ 3-~7 provides that no mlit to enforce any lien shall be brought after six months
from the time when the whole amount covered by· such lien has become payable.
A contractor, for full value, assigns to a creditor balance due him by city for
pavine work. Before the as signment is present ed for payment, another creditor holding
judgment against the· c ontractor, has a writ of fi eri facias issued upon the judgment
and then a garnislunent process sued out against the city. As between the first menti oned creditor and the one having the garnisrunent process issued, which would be entitled to the funds in .the hands of t he city?
The assignee because the lien of an execu.tion creditor on the debts due his judgmen1
debtor is defeated by an as s ignment to a bona fide purchaser for value before the ex·
ecution· creditor has perfected his lien by gar nishment proceedings against the judgme1
debtor. See also answer to question 50.
·
ll4.What motions should be made befo re the trial court after verdict of jury where
it i s desired to apply for a writ of er r or?
None have to be made. But the various motions in a r rest of judgment discussed in 3,
and a motion to s et .t he verdict aside because contrary to the evidence might be made
i f the facts j ustified it as this procedur e, if succ essful, would be cheaper than
going up on writ of error.

~ 13.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE
48.
A owns real estate, but no personal prqperty, and dies largely indebted. Give
the character of the suit, parties defendant, and the several steps to be taken by
t ha creditors to secure the payment of their debts.
~reditor•s 1 bill in equity. May be brought by any creditor. Proper parties defend ~
an~ would be any creditor who refuses to join, the heirs of the deceased, those hav··
ing claims to the property. The executor or administrator should not be joined unlesc
land was charged or set aside for payment of debts. The steps are in the main those
already considered in answer to questions 84 and 85.
1~6.

118. Give an illustration of special appearance and state how the right to appear
specially may be waived.
Plea in abatement to the jurisdiction. This would be waived at common law by asking
for a continuance of the case or making any plea to the merits. This is all changed
by the new Rules.
In speaking of the changes made by the Rules in the case of pleas in abatement the
Judicial Council wrote with refereence to Equity Rule 2:10, 11A plea in abatement bein;
a dilatory plea must be filed at the outset. Equity Rule 2:10 prescribes the time in
close conformity with the present statute, with a change made necessary by the al:cl$....
tion of rule days. This .rule also abolishes all the technical confusion about how the
special appearance must be made. It also enables the defendant to have an order of
the trial court overruling such a plea reviewed on appeal.-(which could not have been
done before the adoption of these rules) where the defendant has contested the case
on the merits." And further, "I,aw Rule 3:6 removes the traps and pitfalls from the
plea in abatement. If the plea is overruled the point can be saved on appeal even
after a trial on the merits. At present(i.e. before the adoption of these rules) the
rules of procedure frequently take away important rights that the venue statutes give
because few lawyers have the nerve and cor~iden~e required to let final judgment go
against their client and then appeal from an ~der striking a plea in abatement.n
119. A makes B a deed to Blackacre and delivers it, B paying the price in full. B
loses the deed and A refuses to execute another. What · can B do, if anything?
File a bill in equity to set up lost deed making A and anyone else who appears to
have title the defendants. See 6 Digest 908.
120. A sues B for injuries caused by the latter's negligence, averring B•s negligence
sufficiently, but omitting to aver that he himself was not megligent. Is his motion
for judgment demurrable? Why?
No. Contributory negligence is a matter of defense to be proved by defendant, and
will not be presumed against the plaintiff since men ordinarily use due care for
their own self-preservation which is the first law of nature.
122. To suit by A, B pleads a special plea of equitable set-off. A wishes to defeat
the set-off by showing that it is barred by the statute of limitations. How does he
raise this issue in the pleading?
·
This is now governed by Rule 3:11. 11 If~'a plea, motion or affirmative defense sets
up new matter and contains words expressly requesting a reply, the adverse party
shall within 2l:days file a reply admitting or denying such new matter. If it does
not contain such words, the allegations of new matter shall be taken as denied or
avoided without further pleading." Take advantage of the statute of limitations by
instructions to the jury. See also question 39.
The Judicial Council has stated, "Rule 3:8 gets rid of the troublesome common law
and statutory differences between set-off and recoupment, and allows the defendant tt
assert them against the plaintiff,whether the counterclaim sounds in debt,assumpsit ~
trespass. Consequently it will no longer be possible for a non-resident to sue a
resident without submitting to the jurisdiction as to any cause of action which the
resident defendant may have against the non-resident plaintiff. Also a defendant who
carelessly runs over and injures his insolvent debtor will be allowed to deduct the
amount owed by the plaintiff from the damages assessed against the defendant. 11
123. On whom is the burden of proof in an action by a servant against a master for
personal injuries alleged to arise from negligence of defendant7Since negligence is
not ordinarily presumed the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.He who affirms must
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....... 125,. What is the statute of. limitations in the following cases: (a) A bond for ·'the
peyment of money? (b) A ·deed of trust eoouring same? (c) A vendor's lien? (d) Abo.
l):ven by an administrator? (e) How· is a judgmen~ lien kept alive?
..
(u) 10 years from date of maturity. (b) 26 years. See V=lf. 8-ll. · (c) 20 years.
(d) Goner ally 10 ye G.rs from accrual of the. right. (e) by succ.as.si:ve-TB"Vi vals by s c: :
fac ias or action.

127. (1) What is the doctrine as to the plea in abatement for too few defondo.nts whc
A brings the following actions: (a) against Otl,0 only of two joint m;Dcer:,> of a promis·
sory note , not negotiable; (b) o.gainst one oniy of two joint tort-fonsors? (2) I f A
get s judgment unde r (a) can he got judgment later against tho other joint maker? (3)
If judgrmmt is obtained under · (b) can A got ·judgment later against the other tortfens or?
(1) (a.) By statute no plea in abatement lies for non-joinder of parties. V# 8-96.
Proper remedy is a. :motion to .add tho parties improperly oroittdd unless they aro n on~
resi d ents, or hnve defenses of statuto of frauds, or statuto of limitations. (b)
Since joint tort-foasors llre jointly 6.nd severally liable plaintiff, both at common
law and now, cnn suo one only, all, or a~y intermediate number.
(2) Yes co V# 8-514, v/hioh' clinngos . tho ocomot.J. lav'• ren.ds, "Upon all contracts hor o.af t er mo.de by more· thnn ono person, whothor joint only cr joint and several, an a.cti c
or motion .may be maintnined and judgment rcnder~d against all liable thereon, or any
one · or any intermcdlate number, and ifl in an o.otion on any contract heretofore or
her eafter roado, more th~D one p8rson be sued n.nd process bo served only on u purt ' of
them, the plaintiff mo.y dismiss or pr.oceed to judgment as to any · $0 sor'ved, and oitlu
discontinue as to .the othe rs, or from time tc timo ns the prpcoss is served, proceed
t o judgment against them until ,judgment be obtn.irtGd against r:tll. Such dismissal or
disc.ontinuance of the ac tion c.s to ony d c fonda.nt shall not oporrtto as a bar to any
subsequent action which rn<:1y be brought against him for the s rune causo."
(3) Yes. V#= 8-368, which changes the common law, ro ads, 11 ll judgment against one of
sevoral joint wrongdoers shall not bo.r the pros o cutior.. of an action against a~y or ul
of the others, but the injured party mo.y bring separate a ctions against tho wrongdo0r
and proce ed to jud gment in each, or, if sued j o intly, he may proceed to judgment against them successively ur..til . judgrrwnt has bC:Jon r<md c red against, or the cause. has
been otherwise d isposed of a;> t o , all of the def enc',ants, · and no bnr . shall arise t\S t c
any of thom by reason of a ~udgme nt n.gainst another, or others, until tho ,judgment
has bo<:Jn satisfied. ·rf thoro bo sopar o.to judgme nts against different defendants for
a j oint wrong, _the pl a intiff shall elect which of them ho will prosecute .. but tho pey
ment or satisfacti::m of any one of · such judgments sho.ll bo a discharge of n.ll, except
as to the costs."
128. (1) Wh0n is a. bill multifarious? (2) Vthat is mou nt by subrogation? Give en insta.nc e .
(1) A bill is niultifo.rious (a.) when it unitos s Gvoral distinct and incongruous
matters b e tween the. s~e parti es • or (b) whon it uni tc s several matters, in all of
which th e plaintiffs on the ono sil!o , or all .tho de f e ndants on tho otho.r, do not have
a joint and c ommon intorost. ExrJnplo of (a.): X, ~n executor, brings a .bill against y
in the l'lrurlEl of the est ate, f(lr s pecific performa.nco o.nd jo~ns with this a. mutter on
his cvm account. Example of (b): A bill stating two alt0rnl'lti vo claims, somo of tho
plaintiff's. being inter este d in on e cle.im a.ncl sumo in tho othe r, but not all in both.
·· Note: Credit or's bills aro not multifarious :tn<.;rciy
bocauso uil of tho creditors
.
have diff erent int ere sts • .
(2) Where ono party pays monoy (not ~sa roor0 volunteer) which another pa.rty ' in
equity and goqd c o ns~icnce should have pn.id, the party so paying is entitled to. stop
into t.he shoes of the party paid a.s a r a.inst the party who should have paid provided
(a) h e the reby gains s ome a.r:l.vanta.g;o h0 wc.uld not othe rwis e hnvo (b) the party po.id
will not be injur ed or possibly injur ed.
Example: V.b cre general rul e applicn.ble . A, a. surety, pn.ys o. bond. running in favor
of tho u.s. Government which B shol,lld have paid. By law the u.s. Gove.rnment has a
pr ··~fe r ence in the distribution of B's assets.
A, by subr ogation, is entitled to that
pr ef e rence .
Example (b): A is tho principal debtor on a note for $1,000. B and C each go sure
ty f or $500. Aft er thG debt b e comes due B pays tr. e h older $ 500. He is not subrogat ed

.
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t o the ho l der 's rights to suo A on 't hG noto, bece.use the ho lder, in ca.so of
ins·.)lvoncy of A, mi ght be injur ed bJ" any sudh s u it.

50 .,
pa.rtitt ~t

"" l29.A c:o:mm:issione; is appointed hy a. deer e~ in o. cha.ncE: ry case t o soll l a nd, 1)1''1' , r. .
t o 2;ivo the bond r oguirod by the decr ee . · He sells the l und, collects the prico , ~ l ·
:i.t in bonk to his credit . as . commissioner. Bofor.e the I!'.a.kinf; of the doed of trus ~; t .
tl:w purchaser, tho bunk f a iled. · Co.n the purchaser be made t o pay ngain ? I f so , r.a·.
h ; n. r ome rly ove r r.tgc..inst anyone , and if . so, whom?
Since the commissioner· ho.d not given bond ho had no o.uthority to r ocoive th e moP"'
o.nd th0 .purcho.sor can be c;ompel;1ed . to pay o.go.in. He would huve a r emedy over ag'3.ir :.:
the C0:1J111issioner for breach of his . implied warr a nty of O.Utho rity .

130.

If the re is n.n orr or in final d ecree on the facts, what is tho remedy?
.An o.ppon.1. If inte rl o cutory instonG. of finul, n moti on t n rehear.

- 101. (a) What is a demurr er to tho p1oo.dings? (b) lffuo cnn d cmm:- to tho evidenc:') ·~
(c) Is it necessD.ry tho.t n demurr er :to ple a di r.gs , or to tho evid ence, b(;) in wr :i.t i ·1g ~
( o. ) A d13murrer t o tho pl ca.clin f~S udmi ts for th0 so.ke of.' ar gument only tho.t o.ll .:':,;c
:1ropor1y plea.dod ar o true~ ancl ra:Lses o.n issue o f l o.w as to their suffioiencyc (b)
Eithor party, but it is gonontlly the defendant"
( c ) V# 8-140 r equires a dernurr or
the ovidenco to bG in writing. By v=ffo 8 -99 nll domurr crs t o the pl ead ings oxcopt ir.
crimino.1 oo.ses must bu in ·writing . :::2:=
132. At a judicial sal o b.D nds with surotios o.r t. t r.,ker" by t he commissioner of. the
court for tho deforr ed paynwnt;s on l a nd. \'I:.1u.t r emedy or r emedi e s against the prir.tcJ. ·
and o.go.inst the sureties?
·
Moti on for judgme nt uncl or V# 8 -7J 7 · o.nct Rule 3:3. B0sic:~es , V/1= 8-664 provides f o r ,
simple and er:~.sy method . Defondo.nt ptJ,rcho.s'er or surety is give n at l e ast 15 days n ot .
ice by rulo from c ourt or clo!· k t o show c a us e why judgm ent shou1d not b e entered o.gains t him· f or wha.tevo r runount tho co urt sho.;i.l i'ind t o b e d uo .
1:33. What o,r e the ri ghts of [ t pu rcho.s or of lt:'.ncl_nt o. jud ici a l so.lo, when tit'l e prov(
defective, nnd his rel o.tion to do ctrine of cnvcat omptor: (o.) Before confirmo.tion?
(b) AftEJr confirmation ?
In go noral, the doctrine of cav o.::.t om:t-'t C' r applies o Tho purohEl.s cr knov1s ho is on l~
buying the debtor 's i nterest , El.nd sh(Juld nalcc inquiry. But in co.se of n on -n0gligent
mist alco or fr o.ud, and boforo t\ c cnf irma tim1 a c ourt of equity v.fill r e li ev e the pur.:.
cho.sor. Afte r. confirmati on tho rul e of' cc.v oO.t empto r is ()VOn mor o strictly· o.pplied.
Sf1e :55 c.J. 76.
134. ~ vTho.t o.re th~ usu o.l actions for th'o r o c overy of possessi on of · l Dndj when .does
va.ch lie; and whore a.ncl in whut court or tribun a l ·may end·, be bro u ght~ . Sto.t e: the p1c[
;i.n o a.ch .
..
( o. ) Ej e ctment. Pl o.intif' f must rooovor on th e strength of his own title a.nd not or
wea.khOSS · Of one in possession unless nn es t oppe l exis ts or whi l E:J in peo.coful possess:i
ho has been ousted. the rofrom. A plo.intiff with c.>c le1~a l titl e c o.n recover poss ess i on
...from ono with 0.n equit a.b l e tit.lo only , unl e ss (I) v endee is in possession under a
wril;ten contract, not in.. dofauH ~ hn.s fulfilled a.l:l ....conditio:oo pr e cedent to his righi
to a dobd, ~-<-w- .. _.. ~.;.~..,..••. ~J:· . . .... ,.. ··
. .. ... ·
·
·
or (II)
tho party ir! possession iG the mortg.ager, or gr nrn:;or; of t\ -. oe d 0 1. trust , the conditi ·
of which havo boon f111ly perforJncd , ~:~
.. .
To maintain ej oct,/mr;mt the plaintiff must bo out of ·j;:os s os si on o.nr~ rlofencfrmt e ithe r in or out • . This i .:
· ~ 1.,,~ o.n o.ction at ' law. ( b ) Unl a.•Nful d et c,inur.· This i s o statut•)ry r e a l action o.nd lie s
• t( 'Vq
ago.ins:t o. t ennnt who· cl•·- tain ~ ro f;sE.:ssb n 0f l ru:vl a ft (,r l·.:i s ri ght. ho.s expired , witho11t
tho consent of him viho is ontitl cd to th o possession . V# 55-225. "If any tenant or
l os see of premisEJ~ nnywhero usoJ. for r psidenti .:tl J.Wr posoc , nn'l not fo r fanning or nc·
rioulture, being; in ·clofo.u lt in th o r·n.ymcnt of' :r ;mt sh£:.1 1 so continuo for five days
o.ftor notice , in writing--such tE:nnnt shall thur oby fo:rf0it hi s ri ght to the possession •• • • " ·cc) I f o. po.l·ty who i s i n possos si t.m i s ')US t ed in r.ny them tho l ego. l manne:r
h e mo.y r egain possossi0n oven a.s a[~D.int :tho land owner hims e lf ( oven if . ho l d inc ov0r
, ,
o.nd not paying rvnt) i n lln acti on 0f' F'orciblo Entry . In o j odtmont title is in issu.e.
cl 1 'f'
In Forcible Entry only ri [!.ht t o poe; sos s i on. ·r hc s t ~tu to of U rr.i tat ions is 3 years.

v·"'"
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135. (a) Describo the ordinary procoodings in a suit to partition land from i 't s irlB·
t i t ution to !."1. fipal decree; and (b) st.ate hy who:n, whore' and undor what circttm:rcr·r~\, ,
o. suit to t,;ell an infa nt's land ma.y bo brou ght •. ·
.
(a) Partition is accomplishtid by a :b ill in equi-ty, If praoti c a.l, it is mad e b
k i :1u . If not, ·tho property is sol,:.'\. , o.nd tho proceeds dividod. It is instituted o.:.t'. :
n c:.tur cd n.s ').ny r)ther suit in equi.ty. A cons, rt d~?es not ho.ve to bCTj15"1ned·,-and__tho
i nohoate right of' dowor · or curtesy is lost where property is sold and procoods dividl
(b)(l) .By th\'• infant's guardian, or~ if held in trust by tho-trusteo, or by any
L1t orc~stocl p o.rty. Sao V# 8-675 o.nd 8-616
'( 2) In the Circuit Cou;t of tho county in which tho lttnd is · si tuntod on the e quit;\
s i rlo therGof.
( 3) Whero it will be for tho wo lfaro of tho infant •
Note 1. (a) A specia.l guardian o.d ·litorn must b0 appointed.
(b) If :!.nfwt is ovor 14 he sh0uld answer in person, but suit is not dof ~· o.to d by absolute refusal to so MSVlcr.
(c) 'Ihe bill must sot forth the property tho infant ho.s and the reasons
the sale will be for nJ.s benefit.
(d) 'l'hose who would be the infant's heirs were ho doa.d. must be joindd as
d e fendants.
(e) .Tho bill must be SV·TOrn to.
(f) Decree of reference is rnt1Jo, etc. ·, o.s in a ny oth,:r equity suit,
_ ......_1 37. {a) What aro plenclinr, s nnd thoir obj e ct? (b) Wh~t is process? Give an . illustrn
tion of process, original, r:10sno o.nd fino.l.
(o.) Pleo.dings o.re the ordorly o.nd loghlO..l sto.t0monts of tho pn.rti .;;;s to o. suit o f
their claims o.nd defenses. . Thoir ob,iects uro ( 1) to [ i Y0 reasonable notice to th0 . a ::l_
verse po.rties o.f the nc.t.urc of' tho cl a im or cloffmse, (2) t r) produce ,;m j,ssuo or issuo
(3) to prosorvo a record. (b) Process is a. writ r)r odor issued from a. court of c om··
potent jurisdiction ordering s c)mething t o bo dono. It is orig:ino.ll mesne or fin o.l.
A subpoena in chanc ery is o.n exo.mplc o.f ori{iino.l pr ocess, a subpoena. duces tecum of
mesne process, o.nd a fiori facias (fi. fu.) of th e .finnl proc<3 ss.
138. 1i'Jhen ID!1Y r:\ bill in equity b1.1 tukc-n fur c~mf G-SSOll nnd v. :'h JOr (Jo rondcr ed without
procf against tho d e fendant?
Rul e 2:8 reads, 11 If a rl. of on:.1 cnt f rdls t o file n plcorlinc; within 21 d o.ys o.fte r s orvic o on him o f th e subpo 0nn., tho cc'.us o is s ot fo r lvmring a n d docket ed a.s to such do~·
f' enclant upon tho bill t r\kon f or oonfossecl n.s t o hit'. In ,·suits for O.llllulling o norrirJ.C:c Gr for :il~orco~ hovr6'vcr•· th e bill is not taken f or confossed. 11
Note howev 0r th ~t Rul o 2:23 r oads in part, "Tho tirno allowed for filing answers an
othe r ple E~din g ~ mny b e ext0ndoG. (except p lc:1~' s in aho.toment) b;:,r' the court for 'good cn.u
showr- 1 a.nd such e:1t t ensi<'l1 mo.y bo grnnted thou gh tho time fixed. hfl.s alr 9a.dy expired."

.141. \ How many pl er. s t o a. notice of motion for jud gme nt con be plEJ t'..r'fod a.t conunon law,
o.nd how many unde r our statute ?
·only ·one ple o. of law or f' a.ct could bo mado to the snme count · o.t conunon lo.w, the ob·
ject of this rulo being to obt ~in singlonoss of issuo. Undor V-# 8-134 any number of
ple a.s of l c,w or fo.ct ma.y be_ pl c :.:.dod ~.t ·a.ny stag e of th0 pl o c,dint;s •
,___.142. .An ~:x;ecution goe s into tho hunrls of the sh eriff t o bo levied on tho prope rty of
D. At the s cune time e.n o.tto.cru~cnt is l e vied on o. chose in ctction pa.yablo to. D. .S ub·sc:;quently D ~ssigns th<J chos o in o.ction for v o. l110 and without n otice of eithor the ex·
ecution or the attachment. Which oft tht> thnw, tho ex ecution croditor, tho attsching
creditor, or tho a ssi gne e, h as priority?
As rogards the exocution cre:)di t (.)r tho lion or nated on i ntn.ngibl o property gives wa:l
in favor of o. bon a fid e purcha.s or unl os s o. lis pon<lcms h o.s b <Jc~ · filed. · Sef) vj{ 8-142.'
If thv intangible proporty is a. shar (; of' stock vff: 13-178"· [lppli ~ s, "No attachment ••••
upon sha res of stock ••• s h •11l b e v n. lid unles s such cortificn.t e be !:tctuo.lly sei.zed by
tho officer making the tltttt chrnent or l 0vy, o r b o surr enc\o r c. ·~. t o th.Fl GO!lporo.tion wh ~.c- h
issued it, or its tr cmsfor by tho ho ld or bo <mjoinod." 1'htj ·:-lo.;:trino of lis pend 0;-~ ~
ho.s no o.pplioation t o n EJ gotiabl c papor.
\

..........143. (a) 1rithin wh at timo :.J.nd how ma.y a judgment by defi:\Ult qo corr octod? (b) v.n:" G
d of ens e s mn.y be mo.do to a f orthc oming: bond t;ivon upo!'l a d istro.ss wa rrant for r E'~t / ', ~.
'Sh a t whe n it is g i ven on 11 fi eri fn.cj.f.l.s?
1
I

5 2~

( n. ) At any timo ·within throe yoDrs by mo t ion in the court that r end e red the· ju.d gr ';
:f 0r or r ors a ppar ont on th e f a c<J or th<.: rec ord • ., Thor e will bo n o :r oh 0".1.ring on the rr... j
it: s . B4rks #41 6 ( 4th Ed.). (b) Ront not due :i.n who l e or in part, or b ond othon vi :::.c
ill o1;a l. V://:~ -4 Q3 ~ Also any de f ens e a:vailo.ble on any bond a s . f~lrgo ry, cond i t i on::;
per f ormed , s et-oi'f, otc. (c ) F or ge ry, s atisfaction of ori g ino.l judgment a nd costs
since o.coruod, prope rty levi e d upon was ox empt, .tcncl <.: r of· pro perty as stipul ate d i n
t h ._; b ond , fr a ud in the procurement of th e bonrl, etc.

/~145.

/\~\~
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How a.:::- e o.tt a chmorit stututes interpr e t ed? ·
,
. ;,-t:;tr.J.chment st atut os o.ro c onstrued strictly boc.nus e th ey aro in d or r)gnti on of tho
cdtnnon low, ond provide f' or an exe cution by anticipn.tio~l , i. o . sD.tisfa ction o.t the
b ~<:girming of tho suit ro.ther than a.ft or the ri ght ·hr.l.S been deci d. od.

- -146. lr1 wha.t manne r may " ~urlici n.l lien bo obta.i.n0d upo11 t h o l nnds, and a.ls o. upon the
chuttols o f u d ebtor; frouwhat tioo would such lion l::o off'ectivo (a.) b ctweeo orodito
end d el?tor; (b ) as to other creditors wh~J mi ght be proc oeding in like manne r; a nd (c)
as to purchasers 4
·
A .judgment crea t es i pso facto a. lien on lands. fill exe cution creates a lien upon
the ch.r.ttels of a debtor as of t ho time o f its de liv0ry t o th ~:_, pr ope r · officer. ( o.)
From the moment it aris os ( b ) i·.s reg ards ln.nd Y# 8 -390 r e ads. "No .iudr;ment shall be a
lien on r e al est at e a.e against n pu!'ohuser th•.)r oof f .or ve'lua.blo oonsidoration wihltout
n otioe until and e:iccept from the t ime thP..t it is duly do cke t ed in the proper clerk's
offic e of the county· or city wh8ro in such real osta t e :r1ay be . V# 8-3 78 r oads: "Every
judgment shall, as s oon [ tS i t is d ock0t od , ba indoxo d by t he e l e rk in the name o f o e.c:
d e fendant--a nd s h 8.ll not b o r ocar dod ~ & dockotr:;d a s t o DJJ.y defe ndant in · whos e name it
is not s o indexod. " As b ct .ween cr odit ors .do cketinf£. is not n 0 ces sary . The first cr editor to get judgment as f a r as l and is c oncerne : has p riority ove r later onos unle ss
a:t tho 3 alll0 t erm of court o.nd other ~re clit o rs eoulrl have gotten judgment if the ir c as•
had boon heo.r.d fir.st. Other cred itor s mny i n pr oper cas e s i n stitute b (tnkruptcy procee dings a gains t the jud t~m0 nt debtor in whi ch c::ts e c.tll pr efo r onc e s obta.incd by l egal
proceodine;s ·w ith in f our months of th o filin g of the pe t:j.ti on i n l.Jo.hkruptcy a.ro vo id.
149. ( a ) 'Jilhat is pe rio d of limit~ti o ns uy,:>o n onf orc or'iont of.' ac c ounts b otw•3on merchant .
(b) What disabilitie s sto p t h ·J running of - tho s t (I.Ut G and fo r how long ?
. (a.) ~ pr ovBos thc.t an a. ction by ono pa.rtne r !lg n.i n st his co-p artn er f or the
settleme n of the p artn ~ rship 8.C count, or upo n nccou:nt s conc()rning t he tr n.de of me:rc h
andiso betwe e n morchro:.t o.nrl mt-Jr ch ~mt may bo brour:ht within five y e a.rs fr om: the c es s ution of the don.H n gs in· .w hich thoy ar e inter e s te d togethe r, b ut not aft er.
·
(b) . Infancy and inse.nity "oxis t in l; nt tho t in:e the s b 1tut e wo uld otherwise 'h ave c om
men cod runn in g ~ Note tha t int orven.in[ infa i1cy or insani,ty d oe s n ot stop tho st o.tut o
fr om running; . A p~'l.rty ia e;i von tho somo l en gth of timo n.ftor ter mination . of infancy
or i n sanity as ho ha.d a.t fir s t · ex oe pt t ho.t in no ot\so sha.ll the t ota.l time be mbr e
·bhon 20 years.
151. A is s uod in ~o nnoko co unty by th o Armour I<'or·t il i zor Work s ,· upon ~ j~dgment rond a r ed agains t him in the St o.t e of Nort h Cn.rolinno Upon th o t ri a l A pl eads, off ers to
pr ov o a.nd is allowed t o pr ov o. ove:r th o · obj Gcti on of t h e p l a i ntiff, tho.t the. judgment
o.~; ,.:tinst him in North ·co.r olin o. wn.s r cndor od without duo ootioa~ o.nd without s e rvi ce
pro ces s upon him. Wa s t ho rulin [S of th ;:~ tri a l co urt c orrect? Vfny ?
Yes • Such o. jude-.rnont would not b o vd V in N. c . a nd i f not valid ther fJ it i s not
v nlid anywhe r e . I!J ue ·pr oc E:s s of' l avr r e quir es pr o~ or noti ce nnd proper ~ e rvic :'l of proc e 1

of

154. D a.nd h~s wife ha.vo b oon clivor cocl , nn d D ·wc.s g:i.v 0n t he cus t ody of his infant sor
B, a b oy t e n ye o.r s ol d. . D' s v-r.l. fo live s i n Roa.noke·, wh ile D li voa i n Bedf or d coun t y,
Virftinin. DurinG D' s O.~)s o n co f r on1 hcmr; , h i s wi f e k i dmtps B o.nd carrie s him to her hor:
in o onoko , whe r e h o i s hvl r.l (\nd nr;t al l owod to communic11.t e with h i s f nthor. D con;..
sults you. Whc~t course wou l d yo u O.ilVi Go him t o pur s u.,; t o r o(~a in t h o cu st ody of h is
ohilrl, o.nd to wh o.t c uu:rts eo uld yo u r.:;p l y f or r oliof !l
Hn.bon.s corpus i s t h e pr opor rorr.edy . Tho Supr umo Co ur t of Ap.r-oo. ls has ori gi nal
juris diction o f cas e s of hqb r:J ~s eor pus , mo.ri.,1runos, ~n d pr ohi biti on . But thi s jurL 4'! ct
ion, whil o ori gin nL, i s not oxc l us i vo . Vjf 8- 596 r oa.ds , " ·J~he wr it of habe as c or pus o.s
s uhji oi ondum shall bo gr ant od b y uny circ u it cou rt or c or :;'Or '\ti on co ur t t o any pe r s on
who ·s hn.ll n.:Jl p l y fo r t he S !U"lO 1)y i_)G t it i ( n, s howin [~ by . aff i rl e.vits or oth0r evidon co 1·,· 01
a ble c ause to h 0 li o v ~; th e.t h0 i s d ot oi LlOd without l 11wf u l t:tut hori ty ." V# 8 · 59&
8 1:Th:,
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.PLEADING AND_J'Ri\CTIGE
vr...-i:t-..s..b.ult be directed to thE~ person in vvhoso custody the petitioner is dotuined 1 a:1•
':w.do .: 6:l'turnable us aoon as may be bofor0 tne couct; or judge ordering the sam<?. 11 Not ·~~
t hat if tho custody of the child had not alroagy beengrantod to one of the; parent&
a bil:C.in Gq uity~>. not habeas· corpus, is the proper remedy to determine custody.
c

.

.'
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155.. 1 'J'l'JO First No.tJonul Bank of Martinsville, Va., sues out an a.tto.chment o:go.inst ::'\
u.r on an o.ffidrwlt made o.nd si'gned by W as vice~pr es idont of tho bm1k, . without mon' •
.;I~· tl:.o (tt':t'ido.vit. in the case .s~ f~ic~e.nt ~o sustain the att~c~ent?
.
.
: ' YiLB-524 rl:lquJ.res o.ll pet~twns ln atta.chment to ·be v erlf~ed by o.ff1dav1t. V/1= 40
.:~ 7 pr ovides that an affidavit by or :''or 0. ·corporation may be made by its prosident,
.•'f'vioc-prosident, general manager, cashier, treasurer or director without any sp e cial
.., o.uthorizo.tion therefor. Hence, tho affidavit is sufficfuont.
·

156. M ovms o. mill on Goose Creek.t in Loudon county, 1.m d desiring to incroo.se his
wo.ter powor ro.~ses his dam eight feet.. This flCtion on · the part of M onuses the bC'.ck
wo.t.er to flood the lund of L, the proprietor above and . n.ls o rondors L's homo unfit
· fc·r ha.bitn.tion by renson of tho str~gnant wn.ter n.nd mosqui tL>s br od therein. Will n.
court of oquity interforo in ,a caso of this kind and H so. what remedy will it n:op l~
This act of M one13.t0s F.J. priiTnte nuisn.nco. L is entitled to o. mand.atory injunoti 01
:'..S he ho.s no ndoquute remedy o:t ln.w and tho injury is regnrdod o.s . lr.roparal;>le since
o.11 lo.nd ( and es pee i aUy n man's home) . is rop,; nrded in oqui ty as unique.
158. John J ones reco ve rs ag.::dnst Wil:l.io.."!l Smith n judgm<mt f or the sum of $200 on nn
oren account. At the: time of the rcc :)Vory of the judgment Smith wo.s. r.t singlr:! man
with no family, owning n. farm in Bedford County, vrorth $2,000. Aftor the rooovory
and docketinr, of tho judgment Smith marries_ nnd iHtrrte:.d iatoly filos o. homestead deed,
setting as ide the fo.r!!'1 a.s his hornoston.cJ . Is the clo.im of home~teo.d good against
Jones' judgment?
The present 1·ule i n Vir gi nb ( ctft or c onflictinG clecisio!lS) is thnt the h omestead
mo.y be clo.imed by o. householder agr,irwt a judgment obtdnEJ:l against him before he
·became r.. hcuschold or , Vi& 34-17: 11 The real or pc rs ernul c:;stc.to, which o. housoholcler,
his widow, or minor childr en o.ro entitled t o holJ. c.s exempt mey be set nside a.t any
time befor e the sumo is subj e: ctod by sr.tlo or othurwiso under judgment, decree, order,
execution, or other l ogol proccss'.u
160. A city council :;:nsses un ordir:onco r "'qu1r1nrr, a r a ilway compo.ny to station a.
flaf;mnn nt n atroot cr ossing. The ro.ilwo.y c ompany. r efuses t o c omp ly with the ordinance. What would be the legal J? r oceeding to com~: r:l l compliance?
Since this is a duty of a pu1:; lic nu.ture and ministerial in its nature m(\ndrunus
is t he ~r ope r re~e dy .
161. A decree of 'court orders· one of th0 parties ·~o the couso to execute a deed.
refuses. How, if at r:tll, co.n he be coMpe lled to obey?
If he refuses he is guilty -J i' contompt of court. Soe V# lSt-255 (Fifth).

He

~162. The limitation for contr a.cts n:j.t s 1ec,'ially . provided for is three ye:1rs. Tho
limitation for personal injuries is one ye::l.r. A ;:-urr-ho.f.e S a ro.ilroad tickot, nnd
while traveling on it is injur e,:! by the rnilrond' s nog li t~enc e . 'I\vo ye o.rs thereafter
he sues in as s umpsit on tho breach _->f contrnct to carry safely. Vllhich limitation
appli es . and why?
·
Burks =/f234 (4th Ed. )-"If tho injury sought to be r odresserl is merely personal,
whether resulting f r om broach CJf crmtr::tct or t od;, th0 n.ction dies with the person
o.nd tho tort limito.ti on applies." Where thr::ro would be no duty to use du e care but
f~r a contrnct then the contr nct limitati on w0u ld o.pplyn
163. A brings an a.ct:i,.on f0r 'lll c\sso.ult aguins t B. It tur ns out thut C nnd D po.rtioi
pated in the o.sso.ult. Can he sue B without j oining: tho others?
Yes. Tort liability is jcint m:d sevor o.l. Hence cne or ull could ho.ve been su~;;~d
at common law. Note: At common lnw jude;mont O.f:ainst one tort-feasor merged the c b:' m
o.nd hence resulted in tho dis char ge of' the o:taor joint tort-feasors, but by V-#8-368
the judgment must b~ s o.tisfied in order to· have this rEJsult •.
164. A bill in chnnc(lry.. charges that dvi'endant h0lds $1,000 in trust for oomplninnr.t.
that the trust is ended and said mnount n ow due, rend pr ~ys thc.t ho be compelled to pn;

PLE.ilDING A:i'JD PRACT I CE
it over. Is tho bill demurrable, o.nd if so, why?
T'he bi ll is n6t demurrablFJ. Equ :i.ty always h rd juris9-ic tion over the sottl omo!1t o
trusts • . . The fo:t::t that a court of · l c.w would now allov.r un adequate r enrod;y is irnm n.to~
t s oquity do0s not give up its judsdiction ~ecuuse law caurts later se o the li cht .
o.la o grant r ,o li ef unles s a statuto so · rc quires. . . .
-· 165. l'.n. answer in chancery is insuffici ont in la'i.'l •. . How do you mQke the point of i t
insuf ficir:nJ.cy2
Do not except as exceptions to answons f6r insufficiency al' <'J abo lished. Yi~ 8-122 .
Do· not demur, as a demurrer in equity li es only to of'f\:ms ivf!l pleadings. Move to set
down the ca.so for hearing on the bill and answer. The effect of this is to admit t he
truth of o.ll ma.ttors of f. net sufficiently ple~.~ ded in th f:J onswor, and to aubmi t t o t h-:
Ol':l\lX't tbfJ decision . of the question whether on the fncts · o.s they appear from the nnsvN
t1w decree. should not go
fo.vor of the plaintiff·. The result is decisive for one
or the . other of the p~U"ties.
A S·t ill . safer procedure would be to. mo~re to strike out th.:J P.nswer. V#S-122,. roa.df
in prlrt: 11 The test of sufficiency . (of nnswer) shnll be mn.cle by motion to strike out;
if found i nsufficient, but r..mendc~ble, tho court mn.y nllow amendment on terms • . If D.
Second OJlSWer is n.d judged insufficient, tho dofendr.mt moy. be OXQ..TJl.ined Upon interr og ~1.i
aries 'and cor~itted until he nnswo rs. thbm, cir,9n 1::1 otion of tho plointiff the court
moy strike out the F.~nswer arHi t uke the bill ·for · confosser:J.·. See Lile #228 tlu-ough 23 ~.
Equity Pl 0adin g and Prn..ctioe (Monde' s Ed .)

in

166. When will an uwa.rd in G.r bitr 'ltion proccoclin 1ss · bl; n good de fense t o a suhsequer.t
suit touching; tho s mno mf;\.ttor bot;woon th o sl',m0 p•1rt es ?
An wra.rd prop(~rly mo.cle b ar s 0.-ot:Lon on the ur i cin~ l cnuso. Unles s an award is expressly made a condition pr<;OoC',ont ho may brini~ an .action on tho original claim even
i f he has promis ed to submit!) tho othor ;,i:trty' s only r et!ledy being to bring an indepondcmt action for brE:lllC h of contract. Equity will mot ~ro.nt Sj)OCific porformatwe of
o.n r.l.grr~ero.ont to urbitr ato . Howuver, aft ,;r an nwurcl, or i f tho submission is unJ.er
rulo of .court thor o cun l1e no r r: ;vocation . Burks 4/;1 6, .#20.. (4th.J!;d .. )
168. B ·depos its with the First No.ti •:mD.l Bank ·for ~·,fo kooping ~~5 ,000 of Virginin.
Sto.to Bonds 1 p£Lyabl o to bD c~r c r. 1\.ft ~l:r B' s d.o~.1.th , C pr os erlt s to tho bnnk a.n order f ol
the do livory of the; bonds t o him duly si r;no~l by B. This orcl vr B's EJxocutor instruct:
the bunk not . to hon or on tho l.l.ll ogod t~r o un d that it W'\S obtn.ino<l by fraud . C then
su0s ·thu bank for possossion of th e- bon s. How shoul d tho biOlnk proceed in ord er t o
prot0ct itsoli"?
V#., B-2.2..6 (which f.l.pp lios on ly !7,ft ur
o.ction i s institut 0d ) pr ovir'J.os that upon
a.ffid~vit of' Q, d ofondo.nt in any e.ction th•.: . t h o cl11ims no tnc orost in the, subject mat·
of tho a. ction, but. th f: t some third: p ~;trty ho.s c. ol ~.ill1 thor oto, o.nn tho.t h e does J;l.Ot
e-:;llucle with s uch t hird p r.rty, but is rondy to . pay or disr,os8 of th e Gubject matter
of tho action as th e ctm·c t may d jroct, tho c ourt mr..y mo.krJ an or der r equiring such
third party t o appe o.r und r. t r.\,to tho rwturo o.r. his c lcdm, and ma.into.in or r .e linquish
it. This is called· statutory into-r p1ondor .

un

169. Motion for judf.Jl'.e nt for $~ 1,000 is ir!stituted in tho Cor po r ntion Court of Cha r,.
lottesville , Va ., ar.;ainst tho C & 0 RR Co. The r r ocess is served on the pr e sident O!
th6 comp!.Uly on Mn.y 25th a t h i s r(:)si d on ce in thEJ c ity of' Richmond just l:l.S he is l eo ve
the c!hty. He forr.;ets :.1.b out it , f' rli ls t o notify the ntt:)r ney f or tho company of the
:i.nstitutj.on of tho s uit , o.nd judt~mont 1; c.. CJ s flf:'.O.irw t tho comprm y by de~· o.u lt. Is the
judgment valid , nnd ror1e -:m ?
.Y-ff 8•59 provid e S tha:t if' tho CC1.S G bo. llCOi ~1s t ::1. domestic C Or j!Or ~tti o n pr o cess mo.y b.
served on its ·pr os id ent, vi c: o ;; r o::li·J.E.m t, c o.s1'd. or, t r oa.sur er, socr ...d.w.ry, gen0r a l mo.na.,
or·, gonor c\1 superinten dent , or r.my ono of its dir• otors, or <:~ny a.gent of such corpo r ·
a:tion, if o.ny such •J fficer or ar cmt b e f?und in th e city or county in which tho o.c ti•.
io corrmoncod, o.nd whether so f ound or not, it mr1y be sent t. o thEJ c ounty or city,i::
which is l o oo.ted the principal offi ce 0 f s uch comp::m y an.'\ b G thor e sorved on any off
icer or agor:t of such oomtH1l1Y found in s uch county or city . Assumin g; thn.t C & 0 is ·
dnrnu:>tic corporation w:ith its.. .Principal offic e i11 Hi c}unourt tho serviue would be good
and t ho jud[jm rant valid.

170.

A is tho p n.yeo of c.$·500 bond with · e;'ond iti c n a tta chod ex eoutod ~ P.

A i'ilos r

'5f-..
Pl.,E;illiNG AND -PRACTICE
1nr:-tio n for judgment· on ·the bond ·without alleging pe_rf.or;ma.nce of thEI condi t ·ion. P G. ·
not demur, but pleads set-off, issue is jol:ned on said· plea, and on that issue th:l ',
fi nd~:: for plaintiff.. W{iat can P do, :i,.f anythin:g, tp avoid the a.ffect of the verd:u.· ~. p should make a motion in arrest of judtlllen ·b _as. the error i s one ·that is appa.rer. ,.
,;n tho fac~ of the record and is one of substance not cured by tho s·taute of j oefa:'t :'
'l'he court would then o.llow A to amend setting; a.side all pleadings back to· e.nd,,J.nclur'
;ing the fa.ulty one a nd allow the parties to·f>lea.d over.
::1.:71. Willio.m JonEJs, brings a.n action for· $5,000 ' da.-nages a.gainst th0 N.& W. R .R.CO.• i'
porsonal injury. After the trial has b egun you, _as Jones' attorney, are informed th
the witness on whom you_ chiefly rely to estubliuh your clu:im ;is too Ul tQ attend t h
trial. What can you do to avoid losing your case?
Ask for a continuance. Under those circurnstanoes it woulC. probably be · nn r.1.b use o.
discrEltion for the court t.o r e fuse it., ·or I could take a volunto..ry non ... suit.
172. p r e cov ors judgment ::tgo.inst S for $500. Executi cm is s-u.es tho,roon and the sher
iff, without taking nn indemnifying bond, levies tho t:xeoution upon .n horse in th<:l
possession of S, ·but roa.lly the property of B. V\-na.t redre ss has B, and against whom
B may bring th e statutory ogui v-al ent 6:£ n.n action bf trr)ver against the sheriff, or
ho may levy o. j:lossess ory u.ction to ro co vor the pr operty from the oxeoution purch~ser.
By V:/f ~-22.9 the ,sl}oriff (if he- has reason t o suppose tho.t thoro is some question r-ts ~
the title of mc0cution debtor) ma;y r-o fuso t o make. a. levy un less the execution credit ·
will enter int c .~an ind urnnifying b ond.
173;, Where no s uit is . y et pending ( n. lth~ugh one may b e nnticipo.~ed)nnd thero is dnn·
gcr of losing the t es timo ny of _o. mo.toriul-witn0ss from do~th or absence, how may his
testimony be pr ose:rvcd f or subsequ~nt ur;c,) ? ·
V# 8-317: "11. pe rs on do sirou$ of p to: rp <Jtuating t he; t(Jst).mony of witne sses o.s to a .
matter in rosp Gct t o which there is no s uit, mo~,r file with a cmmnissi onf~r in chancer:>
of n. court wh er o i n , if thcro wore (1. bill t o porp0tuo.t0 tcstimon;y-, such bill might bo
f ilod, a. petiti on adrlressod, to such o orr.missi.on:.:.:r st ntin g s uch mu.ttor, and -what pors or
ma.:r bo affec ted b y the t es tir.10ny,
_., J-74, What is tho diff co ro nce b <.r';wo on th~:; m0thod s employed by o. court o f ln.w o.nd of
osuity, in t aking Of 0"!1dOnce 'lnJ th ~ dGt (l :rmino.tion of thfJ i SSUe S made by the plendi"
ros pect iv0ly?
In gonoro.l 0-vi donc o i n equity cas os is t r... lw r~ out of' oourt by de posi-t; i ons, and the
issues o.r o docidod by th~.. o,)urt, ur by u col7UlliBsion(; r in chru1cery subj oct to tho coni:
of tho court, wh ilo o.t l nw tho ov5.d e.rwo is genor~.~lly g ivon in opon court and the part
i e s ho.vo n right tc n jury trinl on tho issues.
·
Vfuo.t is tho e:f:foc t o f a f a ilure to swear t o ~l pler.t in 'lbo.t ement?
By _E,\l1o .5.: 14 obj octi0n t ho.t a. plou. r t!qu irod to bo sworn t o by statute has n'.ft b eE
swor n to !!lust be rno.de wi thi ~~ 7 d ays a ft ·Jr the pl onding is f ilod by p....motion to. strike
ot her wis e t ho ob j oct i on is_wo.ivod.

/ 175 .

----·

177. Sta.te briefly the p:r. esont ·I!odo ' f pl"oc<;d ur fJ
Burks #199 (4th Ed,): 11 App licu.t i on shall be on
po.rty ngo.ins t whom the writ is prvyed hns baen s u ··(
ith a Or,!.pY- .
~ a.nd
not ico of tho int cJ:1clod npp licatLm o. re as onable tirno b0forfl 3ueh ~p-p li cation is mado .
·The petition is t o st2to p J a. i1a l~ ~md con oi.a&l.Y- t :C.o gr ound for tht': o.p;1lice.ti on , and co,
e l~dc with a pr.Q..yor ~v r th:;; ~it ..
If no d0fons o is nl!ldo o.nd tho petiti on stat es n ca.
pr opu r !'or tho wr i t, n ~ er omr:to ry writ i s o.worded with cc,sts . If th e defendant o.ppea.·
and makes d o fonse, tho c.et'onso i s to t o by clerr.urr t~ r, or rmswer on oath , or both."
178. You des ire to insti tuto o.n o. ctin{l ut lo.w '-LC ~inst nn in sane ;Jcrs on for whom n o
c ommi tteo has been af poirJ.;od . 'WilG!:1 · .- ul.. ;{c'u s uc and. by whoru ioul d such nn action be
riofonded ?
Actions ag,Unst an i ns o.nv pGrson whe n no e olllr:J.itt oo hns boon appointod a.ro agains t
him pors ona.lly, but tho c oun; wi ll appo i nt rt f, U'l.r c i n.n ad J.i tum t o l ook out f or tho
inte r osts of the ins('.no pu rty.
180.

J ones brings 1:'. n a ction at 1 w; ugninst brovm in tho Circuit Court of tho City of
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Richmond. The court did not have jurisdiction of the ~ubject matter but neverthelm~"
Bj:-own appeared, demurred and filed several SIB cial pleas. The court overruled the
demurrer and struck out the pleas. After losing on the demurrer and special pleas,
Brown moved the court to dismiss the proceedings because of lack of juricdiotion.
What should be the court's ruling on the motion?
If the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of a suit not even consent
oan give jurisdiction. Thus a trial justice court has no jurisdiction to try a felony
case and consent cannot give it. Consent can waive venue but cannot give jurisdiction
using this term in ita technical sense. Hence the motion should be granted.
181. What are the exceptions to the householder's right to claim homestead against
execution?
,
Homestead exemptions cannot be claimed as against torts as it is allowed only against debts. It cannot be claimed against rent, or against a claim of a laboring
person or mechanic for services furnished. It cannot be claimed in property that has
been conveyed in fraud of creditot:s and the conveyance set aside, nor can it be
claimed in a shifting stock of merchandise, nor for the purchase price . of property
in the property so sold, or in property exchanged for such property. For complete
list see Burks #445(4th Ed.)
·
--182. Doctrine in Virginia as to breaking outer doors of dwelling houses to levy distress or execution?
This is allowed by statute after demand has been made for admittance. v~ •
.... 184. nA", of Buckingham, sues 11 B.,, of Richmond, in Buckingham county, upon a contract
made and to be performed, and breached, in Richmond. "·B11 files a plea in abatement,
stating that no part of the cause of action arose in Buckingham county, and also that
at the time of the service of the writ 11 B11 was in Buckingham solely for the purpose
of defending another suit brought against him by 11A11 , all of which was true. Is the
plea good?
.
Assuming that it is correct as to form, both contentions are sound and the plea is
bad far duplicity. Since the cause of action did not arise in Buckingham county the
action will not lie there, and even if it did the defendant was privileged from
service of process while attending court as a party to the proceedings. See headnote
8 of 28 s.E.910. Pleas in abatement are still subject to special demurrer for defeets
of form, although special demurrers have otherwise been abolished.
- 185. How long must the parties reside in Virginia before a suit for divorce can be
maintained?
At least one of the parties must have been dJomiciled in Virginia for one year·. V#

~

~·
lB6. John Jones, Thomas Brown and William Smith own, jointly, a tract of twenty acres

of land in Chesterfield county. Not being able to agree upon a division, Jones bring~
euit against Smith and Brown for partition. He does not make Mrs. Smith or Mrs. Brown
parties to the suit. The Court, ascertaining that the land cannot be conveniently
divided in kind, orders it sold for division. Does the purchaser get a good title as
against the dower rights of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Brown?
Yes. V#8-695t "A sale of land so made by order of the court shall operate to bar
the contingent right of dower of the wife in the share of her husband in the land so
sold, and to bar the right of curtesy of the hutlband in the share of the wife in the
land so sold, whether the said wife or husband be made party to the suit or not."
187. Can an administrator, as such, maintain a suit for the sale of his decedent's
lands for the payment of decedent's debts?
Harrison #460: "In Virginia a personal representative may not file a bill to sybjeot
the real estate to the payment of the debts of the decedent, unless he is specially
authorized by the will." The title to real estate vests in heirs or devisees and not
in the personal representatives. If the land must be taken to pay the debts the proper procedure is for the creditors to file a creditors' bill in equity.

- 188.

w,

a citizen of Franklin county, Virginia, gives

c,

of Henry county, his note,

PLEADING AND .Pl1ACTICE
Revised July 1956. 57 ,
rx.1;yable at a bank in Henry County. He fails to pay the note, and C brings action in
t h e Circuit Court of Henry, proceedir:g ·by notice under section $-717 f.~· _
t qe, Code. Th ,?.
notice was served on vl in Franklin liounty. Is the service good?
· •t• ··~ ~c.
i:Jo . vJhile the cause of action arose in Henry County, process w ill not issue out of
Henry County since this is not a tort, nor is the defendant a corporation, nor is it
a suit on an official bond, nor is it a case of joint liability where one of the
par·ties has been served in Franklin County.
- 189. John Brown, an engineer on an N.&w. train, engaged in interstate commerce, is

killed by an accident in Roanoke county, Virginia. His administratrix sues for damages under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, bringing her action in the Circuit
Court of Roanoke county. Ha,s the court jurisdiction, and, if so, how much may she
r ecover?
Congress has given State courts concurrent jurisdiction over .cases arising under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act. If plaintiff ir~titutes a suit in the State court
defendant (under this statute) cannot remove the case to the Federal court. The
·
Circuit Court of Roanoke county has jurisdiction. See h5 U.S.C.A.#51 et seq.
Under the Virginia death by wrongful act statute :~ 25,000 is the mrodmum amount recoverable but under the Federal Employer's ,L iability Act there is no maximum limitation. She may recover a reasonable compensation f or loss of hUsband's support, but if
her husband's death was due to _his contributory negligence that may be shown in mitigation of damages under the Federal Employer's Liability Act unless the injury was du1
to the railway's failure to comply with t he requt:::·ements of the Safety. Appliances Act,
in which case the employee's negligence in assum:i.ng the work cannot be shown at all.
190. A, of Charlotte, N.C., while passing through Vil~ginia in his automobile, neglegently runs into B 1 s car on the high,.Iay in Roanoke county and damages same to the
extent of ~500. Bat once sues out an attachment for this damage, which .is levied on
A's car before the car leaves Virginia. Can B maintain this attachment?
Yes, since -A is a non-resident. However if B wants an officer to take possession of
the car B will have to give bond conditioned upon his winning out when the case is
heard for trial.
191. A bill of exceptions i n the year 19L~9 shows that a prop3r question was asked by
the exceptor in the lower court and ruled out, but f ails to show what answer the exceptor expected in reply to the question. Will the Court of Appeals consider the exceptions?
In 41 S.E.(Va.)307 it is said: "~~~here a question is asked a witness and he is not
permitted to answer, and exception thereto is taken, th~ bill of exceptions must
show 'irhat the party asking the question expected to prove, else the appellate court
cannot tell whether or not the witness had any knowledge on the subject, or the -·
question was relevant or material.
Under the Rules, there is no need for a formal
bill of exceptions. Rule 5:1 1 s e~tion 3 ~ subparagraph (e) and (f) provide that oral
testimony and other inCident s of the trial transcribed by a reporter, and any wl"itten
statement of facts, testimony or other i ncidents of the case . become part of the recor:
when delivered to the cler k, if the transcript or statement is tendered to the judge
within 60 days and signed by him withi n 70 days after final judgment. In this case
the transcript or statement would be valueless unless it indicated what the witness'
answer would have been had he been permi tted to answer.
192. John Hardy, an employee of t he Blue Ridge Hica Co., a Delaware Corporation, having its chief of fice in Dover,D.e l., but operati ng a mine in Henry County,Va., is injured there by the company's negligenc e . There i s no off icer or director of the
company residing in Henry county . The company has a manag er t here who looks · after the
mine. ;{ou wish to sue for Hardy 's injury. Can you bring suit in Henry county, arxl
i f so,how would you serve t he process ?
Yes, Process can be served on the r~g i s t er ed agent of the fore i gn corporation, or on
any director, offi cer or agent, or, i f none can be f ound, on the clerk of the Corpora·
tion Commission. If such f oreign Corporation does business in Virginia without a
cer t ificat e of author ity it is deemed to have thereby appo:i.nted the clerk of the
Commission its attorney for service of process. Since the cause of action arose in
Henry County, t he acti on i s maintai nable t her e , and since the defendant is a corporation(also since t his i s an acti on f or a wrong)process will is sue out of Henry County
under V#f\-Lt 7 •

..
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What is the usual method of trying title to an office, or of removal of an
cff ic9r for malfeasance?
Headnote 16 to case of 96 S.E.819 reads: "The usual common-law method of contosti n~
title to an office is by writ of quo warranto or a writ in the nature of a writ of qu.o warranto, which procedure is available in Virginia."
Not.e: Headnote 17 reads: "'While generally the title to an office cannot be tried
indirectly by a writ of mandamus, the availability of such remedy is settled in Virginia as affording a simple, expeditious, adequate and complete remedy."
194. I·V.hat is a writ of procedendo? A writ of procedendo is a writ commanding an inferior court to proceed to judgment. See 50 C.J.424.

~ 195 • In -wh.a+;·cou.rt· aOO.._v.§nue( exclusive of the Supreme Court of Appeals )would you

bring prohibition?
·-- -··-- _ _
y#&.42: n Jurisdiction of writs oFma1'l.dCl1ll:t.lft";--pr.ohi.~j:.ion and certiorari(except such
as may be from the Supreme Court of Appeals) shall be in "'the- Gi.xc.ui~-..Cou.r1_ of the
county, or in the circuit or corporation court of the city. 11
----

196. Give an instance where consent can confer jurisdiction and one where it cannot.
Where jurisdiction is u.sed in the sense of venue consent gives jlj.risdiction as ven· ·
ue is merely the privilege of defendant to have the case tried in a certain county if
he desires to have it tried there. When the word 11 ju.risdiction" is used in its strict
sense(that is the po·wer to hear, decide and enforce its decision)jurisdiction is
given by law and not b<y consent,. Thus consant cannot give a trial justice jurisdiction over felony cases, nor State courts jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases.
197. Defendant moves to dismiss a bill-(l)For lack of proper service;(2)For lack of
equitable jurisdiction over the subject matter. Assuming that the first point, if
madt2l independently, is good, and the second bad, what should be the action of the
court?
A motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction w.here(as here)if such a motion is
granted it would be a bar to a further prosecution of the same case in any Virginia
court of equity amounts to a general appearance and hence would waive any irregularity as to service of process. However, under the Rules, the defendant could file a
plea in abatement within 21 days of the service of the subpoena in chancery upon him.
If this plea is not sustained he no longer waives any rights by contesting the case
on its merits. See Rule 2:10~
. 198. The return on a valid surmnons is defective. How should the defendant avail himself of this defense?
In 48 S.E. (Va. )899: "Where the matter relied upon to abate an action is a fact not
appearing on the record, or the retu.rn of an officer, it must be pleaded in abatemeni
so as to give the other party an opportunity to traverse and try it, but where all
facts relied upon appear by the record, including the return of the officer--there
the action may be dismissed on motion11 • Burks p.lOl(hth Ed.)
199. Robert Taylor files a bill in equ.ity in which he alleges that he is the owner of
Blackacre and has good legal title, that William Harris is in pc.ssession of said
land claiming title thereto under an invalid deed, and praying that the court establish the plaintiff's superior title, oust Harris, and put plaintiff in possession.
Is the bill demurrable and reason? The bill is demurrable as it shows on its face tha
plaintiff had an adequate remedy at ~aw,i.e.the pre ser~ equivalent of ejectment. But
V/18-138 provides that no cas e shall be dismissed simply because it ;,ras brought on
tne wrong side of the court,but whenever it shall appear that a plaintiff has proceeded at law when he should have proceeded in equity or in equity when he should
have proceeded at law,the court shall direct a tr81B.Sfer to the proper forum,and shall
order such change in,or amendment of,the pleadings as may be necessary to conform to
the proper practice.
200.0 recovers a judgment against B and execution iss u.es thereon within the year,returned "no effects" and B then dies.What are the proper proceedings to revive this
lfudgment against B's personal representaUve,and within what time must this proceeding be had in order to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations~

;

•
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lBurks p.66(4th Ed.) reads: i\lhere the scire facias or action is against the pers::>n
a L representative o.f .a-decedent:, it shall be brought within five .years from his
qua lification, thus cutting down the life of a judgment against a judgment debt-or vo.~:
dies to five years from the qualification of his personal representati~e unless wi"):
i n that time the judgment be revived by sci:pe facias, or action be brought · thereon. a

202. What are . the jurisdictions of the various lower courts in Virginia?
The ·lowest court.s are not cou ts o r
lr.d and have only the jurisdiction given /
them by statute. They are as ,follows: In cities over 4.5,000 by l ast census polic i
courts pres.ided over by .f'olice ~ustices, and c:l.vil courts presided over by civil
justices • .The former. have jurisdiction over misdemeanors, violation of municipal'
ordinances and preliminary hearings in felony cases but not the trial af the felony
1
case itself. The latter have jurisdiction over all civil matters fo~erl ,llen tp
justices of the pe~ , anq in addition have2 concurre t J~~ia~c~i~itlL the circuit
and city courts of a n~ claim t damages for a nY inj~r~ done to the P.erson
i
waul
be recove-raoi e . i n an action at law J i f such claims do not exceed $300; . hav-e- jurisdic
tion over att'aorunent s w ere the ~ount of the claim does not
c ea.
e general juri
diction of said JUS ~ce; and have ~nt ·· risdiction with the circuit courts ar.
city courts of general jurisdiction in actions at law where the amo
· co.ntrev er
sy doe not exceed .,l;2 000 exclusive o · nt er.est.,. costs an attorneys fees contracted
for, but if it exceeds ;ip300 the defendant may remove the case to the proper circuit
or city court. See VjtJ,6.1 ..::Z7 ~ ·
. ... ..
.
In towns from 10,000 to h.5,000 t here is a ci vil and police justice who combines tht:
two jurisdictions mentioned above. In all othe r loca lities there are trial justi ces.
The j urisdiction of t hese courts is in general the same as the combined jurisdictior
of Police Courts and Civil Courts in' c i ties of over 4.5,000 as described above. Ln
apP.eal lie
o all these courts where more than ,;i s · ~ad. exclusive of
interest;. costs, and ~ttorney's fees contracted for. V#-16.1-106.
The courts of record of general jurisdiction are t he circuit courts of the countieE
the corporation courts of the cities, and some s pecial courts as Husting Courts, an
Courts of Law arrl Equi t y . In their own special fi elds the Industrial Commission and
the State Corporati on Commission are on a par with these courts of e;eneral jurisdiction. If the
olved is ·'2D o
ess only cou.rts ot of rec ord have
j uri sdi ction.
Note: Since July 1, 1956 the. name of the trial just i. ce courts has been changed
to t .1at of County Courts. The Police courts, civil cChurts, arrl civil and police
courts are now also called municipal courts.
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200 Va.l79.
D ran into P, a pedeS'tr 1.an, while driving his car. The evidence was conflicting as
"\i') whether or not D was crossing at an intersection. The cour'11 instructed the jury
:·· tha.t the pedestrian's right of way extends from one side of the street to the ot her.
It does not begin at any point in the intersection or does it end at any particular
point. It begir~ on one side of the street ~~d extends until the pedestrian has
negotiated the crossing.n There was another instruction which stated that pedestrians
had the right of way at intersections. and motorists had it elsewhere. Verdict and
judgment were for P for $8500.
Held: Reversed and remanded. The instruction in quotes was taken from a Virginia
case out of context and is erroneous as given since it could reasonably be interpreted as always giving the pedestrian the right of way. It is not cured by a later
correct instruction as there is no way to tell whethe:r:-. the jury relied on the wrong
or right instruction. Only the jury knows that.
H;~;J\L I NG

A.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Criminal Procedure--Constitutional Law
200 Va.341.
A warrant which charged only unlawful and reckless driving was issued against D.r~~~~
As a matter of fact D had been convicted during the preceding twelve months of thel~
same of:fense. The County Court Judge could have amended the warrant so that it
would have charged a second offense(for which there is a greater penalty) but he · did
not. D appealed from the County Court and demanded a jury trial. Over objection
evidence was introduced of his prior conviction and instructions were given as to
the penalty for a second offense occurring within twelve months of the prior offense.
D was found guilty and fined, and also assessed with the costs of the jury.
He contended that he could not be tried as a second offender unless the warrant
stated that he was being tried for a second offense.
Held: This contention is correct. A man charged with a less serious offense cannot
be tried for a more serious offense whether the prosecution is by indictment or on a
warrant.
He contended that his right to a , jury trial is impaired if the costs of the jury
are to be born by him in the event of a conviction.
Held: This contention is wrong. The Oommonwealth is only being reimbursed its costs
which his wrongful act has caused, and V#l9-·296 which provides that the clerk shall
make up a "statement of all the expenses incident to the prosecution" and issue an
execution therefor is valid even though it includes the costs of the jury.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
106 S.E.2d 618, ·200 Va.597.
P filed a bill in equity for the specific performance of an oral contract to con0 1e- vey realty. By agreement of counsel·~ an i.ssue out of chancery on two questions was
t / 1ft 1 submitted to a jury who found the matters in favor of P. Despite this finding the .
o _.L#dYChancellor dismissed the suit on the ground that there was not sufficient part per~~·
formance referable to the oral contract that could not be adequately compensated in
money. p appealed on the ground that the Chancellor's decree was contrary to the
evidence, but he did not incorporate the evidence into the record on appeal.
Held: p failed to comply with Rule 5:3, #J(e) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Appeal{:! in that he did not incorporate into the printed record so much of the evidence as was necessary for the Supreme Court of Appeals to give full consideration
of the assignment of error. Under the circumstances it is impossible to pass on the
point that the decree is contrary to the e'Vidence. Since the decision below is presumed to be right it is binding on the Supreme Court of Appeals in this case.

J
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. r2 00 Va. 804e
P who was X's personal representative,. paid J $6,,000 for injuries .Jreceived in
an automobile wreck. Pis now suing D for contribution on the ground vhat D was,~
egligent joint tort feasor. D denied that he was 'negligent and that even if he
ere that his negligence was a proxunate cause of J's injuries. D moved the court
or summary judgment in his favor and the court granted the motion.
Held: Error. Summary judgment should not be granted where, as here, material facte
are genuinely in dispute. A motion for summary judgment is not a substitute for a
demurrer, nor should the court grant such a motion when pleadings can properly be
amended. Hence i f P fails to allege that D's negligence was a proximate cause of
J's injury the Court should not grant D1 s motion for summary judgment for that
reason for P may wish to amend.

~~~
~/~~'
~~\
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE Rule 5:1 section 3(f)
200 Va.850
atte~pting. to perfect an appeal ~ppellant 1 s counsel delivered to
0. ~,l appellee's counsel at h1s res1dence at 7 P.M. a not1ce that he would that day pre~
sent to the judge at his residence a narrative of the evidence. This was done 30
J~
~ minutes later. Eight days later the judge signed it. The judge stipulated that
;v
.I ~ppellee' s counsel had an opportunity to examine it. Appellee's counsel declined to
~amine it on the ground that thirty minutes' notice was not the reasonable notice
ur ~ ~ required by Rule 5:1, section 3(f), while appellant contended that appellee had
1 eight days to examine it.
Q~~
U
Held: Not sufficient notice. The rule reads "* * * Counsel tendering the transcript or statement sh•Jd g:i:,re fOpPosi:ng-e-e1:1.flsel r eas.onabl e written not1ce of' f:he_ time
and place of tendering it and a reasonable o o unit to examine the ori inal or a
trUe copy o
nee the ru e plainly requires counsel to give the notice it is
immaterial that ~he judge gave appelleeJs counsel a reasonable opportunity to examine the narrative of the evidence~ Appeal dismissed.

r · _,. . In the course of

R

1

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Adequacy of Damages
201 Va.348.
p suffered a quite severe whiplash injury to his neck and back when D negligently
ran into the rear of P 1 s car while P was stopped for a red light~ He suffered a
wage loss of $872, a hospital bill of $649, a doctor bill of $318 making a total
of about $18hO. He suffered great pain for many weeks and while now probably cured
he will be more susceptible to injury in the future. The jury awarded him $2500
Which the trial judge set aside as clearly inadequate. At the next trial the jury
awarded $8,000. What result on appeal?
Held: First verdict re-instated and judgment entered thereon. $2500 was not grossly inadequate. It even gave him over $600 for pain and possible future discomfortl
The damages are not subject to exact measurement. There is no evidence that the
verdict was the result of passion, prejudice, corruptj_on, or mistake. It does not
shock the conscience. Hence all proceedings subsequent to the erroneous setting
aside of the verdict should be treated as null and void.
·

l PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Constitutional Law-(
201 Va.448.
1\I(:F;._p obtained a judgment against D in 1932. At that time the judgment could be kept
J tD &" yi1 ~N:d,ive
by the issuance of successive writs of execution(fieri facias} within the
1
, 1 · >~l ~ btatutory period, but in 1948 the law(V#8-396) was changed so that judgments, past
yt
eA~~s well as future, could only be kept alive by scire facias or action within 20
\ "- f)(DL
years from the date of the judgment(5 years when against the personal prepresenta[) Un $5
tive of a decedent). P Continued to attempt to keep the 1932 judgment alive after
~~
1948 by the old procedure on the ground that the legislature could not deprive him
of his vested rights so far as judgments obtained before 1948 were concerned.
Held: Against p. How judgments are enforced is a mere matter of procedure. No one
has any vested rights in procedural rules ~s long as a reasonable time is given to
protect his procedural rights. An ordinary act of the legislature does not become
effective until 90 days after adjournment and the purpose of the 90 days is to give
everyone a chance to learn about the change and govern himself accordingly. Hence
the executions issued after the 1948 law took effect were inoperative for the
purpose desired.

!'/

~

.
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\ r~LEADING AND PRACTICE--Mandamus
589.
201· Va.$33.
. ~he. State Highway De~artment took possession of 30 feet of P's land mistakenly
,,\w·-~~~hiplung that it had tJ.tle thereto. P brought mandamus to compel the Commonwealth to
·
.~ ~ondemn the land. The Highway Commissioner defended on the merits. The latter now
· J fi
claims that mand~mus was not the proper remedy.
Held: While this contention is correct since the extraordinary remedy of mandamus
r~
does not lie when there is an ordinary remedy{such as by declaratory judgment or
motion for judgment in ejeotment)available, this is a purely procedural matter, and
when the defendant acquiesced in the mandamus proceedings and had the same opportunity there to develop his case as he would have had if a technically correct proceeding had been brought defendant has waived his rights and the error is cured.
, ~-~-d

~~~

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Criminal Procedure Former Jeopardy
201 Va.552.
D was tried before a police magistrate on a charge of reckless driving. He was
t/"\found guilty as charged. The magistrate then wrote on the back of the warrant 11 - - { /r 1educed to fail to give right of way". D appealed to the Circuit Court of the City
rb
o Hampton where he had a trial de novo. He was again convicted of reckless driving.
By V#19.:.154 and 19-158 no plea is necessary in a misdemeanor case. D was granted a
r.
writ of error. He now contends that a conviction before the magistrate of a "failure
to yield right of way" was an acquittal of the charge of. reckless driving, and hence
the Circuit Court should have dismissed the case against him as he could not be
tried for an offense of which he had been acquitted.
Held: D is wrong for two reasons. First, he failed to plead the special defense of
former jeopardy in the Circuit Court. While he did not have to plead, a failure to
plead is not a special plea, and when he made no such plea he waived any such defense. He cannot make such a plea above when he failed to make it below •. Secondly,
he was not acquitted a£ tbe charge of reckless driving. Failure to ;vield rigbt of
W!J.Y when the lives of others were endangered is a s~fic.a.tion.-o£..__the-t.ype-o£ reck11 The question on appeal is not whether
1~~ drivinji for which h.e-Was_rumvic.ted.
the judgment of the trial justice is correct; but whether the accused is guilty of
the offense charged."

{e--D

201 Va.693
\ PLEADING AND PRACTICE
I. In the case of P v D the court directed a verdict for P. It later decided that it
t;\. K should not have done this, and granted D a new trial. If the court was correct in the
, \~'
first place, is P entitled to a writ of error?
V
Held: No. writs of error lie only to final judgments. There has not been any final
judgment as yet.
II. Assume that P made out a good case and D a poor one. What action must the court
take oefore directing a verdict for P?
Held: By CPEz B-~8 a verdict should no
· cted unless the court has first
stricken the evidence in ro u
a_par.t_.y: against who!ll hl
die ~-to be

b"•J

t~

o.._·

LEADING AND PRACTICE
201 Va.699
p brought ejectment to enforce the power of termination provisions in a deed where~\'
y he had conveyed a site for a church to the trustees of the G Church. He alleged
C.,~ -0 \ in his motion for judgment that since 1958 said real estat? had not been used as a
. / b' place of worship by the members of the church, and that saJ.d real estate is now in
(J_- \\ \ ..!(?the possession of a congregation whose beliefs are foreign to those of the G Church,
~J'
r both of which violated the conditions of the deed. Defendants asked for a bill of
~~
particulars with reference to the latter allegation only. The bill of particulars,
~
when filed, failed to support P 1 s contentions so summary judgment was entered for
defendants.
Held: Error. The bill of particulars need not state a cause of action. The first
allegation was still to be disposed of, and no issue has yet been joined on it. No
summary judgment should be entered wh ere any material fact is genuinely in dispute.
If the bill of particulars was insuff icient, the court should require a sufficient
statement rather than entering judgment on the insufficient one.

\

590.

J:'L:1ADING AND PRACTICE-Equity--Venue
201 Va~ 747.
C?mplainants, who were beneficiaries under a second deed of trust executed-. by the
X Corporation on land owned by it in N County, bought the land for $25,000 when the
f i r st deed of trust was foreclosed. According to complainants the trustee of the
first deed of trust. is about to make an immediate settlement under an accounting
t hat is improper and excessive, and that if this were done numerous suits would have
to be brought to recover the improper payments from the persons so paid some of whom
were probably insolvent. Complainar1ts seek to enjoin the settlement. They brought
this suit in N_County though none of the defendants resided therein.
Held: (l)Equity has jurisdictio
s tlement o
ooant.J? whsm
co
an s
~~uat~~~e fact that the legislature has
provided another remed b settin up a commissioner of accounts before whom obje_ tiona may be made does not
Lt.._e_q~1
o
rent urisdic ·
,hat
t tute does not expressl
de rive courts of e uit of jurisdict!gn. If equity once
obta1ns ur1sdiction it keeps jurisdiction notwithstandi ng the fact that other
bodies may also be given jurisdiction unless the legislature expressly deprives
ourts oT equity of their old jurisdiction.(2)Since the land was situated in N
County, that county was a proper venue despite the fact that none of the defendants
were residents of that county. The real estate in question was situated there and
the trustees' accounts could only be settled in that jurisdiction.

~

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Final or interlocutory?
201 Va.934.
J
or Pursuant to contract D const,ructed a sewer. P, a Sanitation Authority, filed a
r~~ . ~~JEill in equity to requireD to convey' the sewer toP. The trial court adjudged that

r-

./
~~~ ~he ownership of the sewer line was in P, and directed D to execute a deed to P
~ ~ ~1 therefor. The decree provided that if D refused to execute the deed by a specified
./'(
date, a special commissioner would be appointed to execute it •. After more than four
• ~JY' months had elapsed D appealed. P claimed that under Rule 5:4 and V#8-489 it was too
late to appeal.
Held: Not too late. Rule 5:4 and V#8-489 set a time limit on appeals from a final
decree and have no application to interlocutory decrees. The present decree adjudic~d the principles of the case, so it is a 2~alable, but _.since the ase was .rataineq or possible further action of a discretionary:_natur.a..by_the_
it \oras not a
:t.:inal decree.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Rule of Couxt
202 Va.40
D was sued by P, a 20.... months old infant, who was struck by D's car while toddling
acros~ Ocean View Ave. unattended in fairly heavy traffic. The jury found for D and
p appealed. During the trial improper instructions were given without objection and
J. ·c-1'7 p failed to make a motion to strike D's evidence. Within 21 days after judgment was
~~~·
entered on the verdict P moved the court to set aside the verdict because of the
I.V'
erroneous instructions, and he also asked that the verdict be set aside as contrary
to the evidence. He also failed to designate the instructions to be printed as part
of the record which he considered erroneous, but such instructions appeared as
\ addenda in the briefs.
Qb~&
Held: Under Rule 3:21 all judgments are in the breast of the court for 21 days,
and since the first two matters set forth above were presented to the court within
that period they were presented within time for the lower court's consideration and
hence not waived. While P could have made a motion to strike the evidence~ch a
mo:tion is opti ollal ,"' and -1 ll 1 j eu. thereof h9 may, if-he_w.ishe~it. and ;~ve that
the v
·ct if a ainst him)be set aside as contrary to the ev~~e. Rule 5:1#6(f)
(which rule deals wrtfi e es1gna 10n
tne par s of the record to be printed on
appeal)reads, "'However, t his court may, at the instance of counsel or of its own
motion, consider other parts of the record" not printed. Since the instructions
were in the briefs as addenda thereto and were erroneous it was proper to consider
them even though they were not designated as pru·ts of the record to be printed.

tv

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Partition-Necessary Parties
591.
2:02 Va.22J.
A O'Vmed a third undivided interest in Blackacre. She died testate, and after mak\ _~.r:'~.n.g some bequest~·., she provided that all the rest of her property should be used
t \\" 1 1' as· a fund to aid. Salvation Army". Partition proceedings were instituted. by the
\~'
0ther owners but the Salvation Army was not made a party thereto. Blackacre wa.s not.
su&ceptible to partition in kind. The Salvation Army petitioned the Court to be
allovJed. to become a party defendant • . The other parties to the partition suit demurred.
Held: Demurrer sustained. The Salvation Army was not a co-owner of the land nor
did it have a lien thereon. Its only interest is one in a fund(if there is such a
fund)afte!' debts, expenses of administration, taxes, and legacies have all been paid .
It has no interest in Blackacre and hence is not a necessary party to the partition
proceedings.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE Rule 5:1 #6(.a)
202 Va •. 260.
In the suit of P v D judgment was rendered in favor of P on June 2,1959. Within
&J days thereof(Ju.ly 31) D filed notice of appeal and assignment of errors. On
the same date a narrative ttstatement of the facts" was presented to and signed by
the trial judge which statement was filed in the office of the clerk of the trial
court on Augu"t 5. On Sept. 9 D filed with the clerk a. designation of the parts of
the record he wished printed as per Rule 5:1,#6(a). He designated only the motion
~or judgment, the judgment o~der, the order overruling his motion to vacate or
\,~thodify the judgment, his notice of appeal and assignment of errors. Twenty five
·~~
days later D asked that the record be transmitted to the clerk of the Supreme Court
e?'\ ~of Appeals.
The assignment of errors relied upon was that the judgment was contrary
~
\to the law and the evidence. Note that neither the narr&tive statement nor any
~
t.~fportion of the evidence was designated to be printed. After the designated portions
/ ~.~· of the record had been printed and while the case was being argued new counsel
'i:.t·,..,
moved the Supreme Court of Appeals to pez:mit ·(,he statement of facts to be printed
~
and received as a portion of the record.
Held: Motion denied. Rule 5:1 #6(a) requires that, a designation of the parts of
the record to be printed bemade not less than twenty days before the transmittal.
"This is mandatory and jurisdictional. Compliance with it is necessary for the
orderly, fair and expeditious adminictration of justice." Since there is no evidence in the record, the Supreme Court of Appeals has no way of telling whether the
judgment below was contrary to the evidence so it must be affirmed as it is presumed
to be right. ·

~

PLEADING AND PRACTICE Mandamus
202 Va~335 .
A,D,C and D contested an election for four county offices pursuant to the prOYisions of Vh-24-419 et seq. A special three judge court i s provided for, and no appeal
lies. V#24-434 provides that a complaint shall be filed in the clerk's office and
a copy served M a notice is served under V#8- 51 within ten days after the election,
on the person whose election is contested. V#24-436 provides that llin judging of
such election the court shall proceed on the merits t hereof and decide the same
according to the constitution and laws." The copy of t he complaint was served on
A,B,C and D in the morning of th~ ninth day and the complaint was filed in the
clerk's office on the afternoon of that day. The special court held that a copy of
the complaint could not be s erved before the complai nt itself was filed and dismissed the proceedings. What r emedy, if any, have A,B,C and D?
Held: This is the type of c ~se for which mandamus clearly lies. It was immaterial
that the copy of the complaint was served before t he compl aint was filed. V#24-436
requires a determinati on on the merits and not on a technicality. This is not
granti ng the writ of mandamus to control dis cretion but, to force the special three
judge court to exerc i se t he discr et i on t hat the members t hereof alone can exercise.
Si nce by statute, no appeal l i es ther e i s no other r emedy. Writ granted.

f7
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.P:U.ADING AND PRACTICE--Statute of
592" · Limitations
202 Va.~5l.!.3 "
n:Jte: Bef'ore reading this case surmnary., ~ad 195 Va.82.7 as summarized on page 573A
of these notes as the instant case relies on that case and follows it.
P' took out sprinkler damage insurance in 1954 through D, an agent of X J.nsur~nce
Co. D told P that he would be protected from any loss by water escapL~ from the
f~ prin!cler system. However, tho policy containoci an express exclusion i f the water
es ~ap<:~d as a result of a hurricane. La·lier in 1954 Hurricane Hazel blew off the roof
of p1 s bu.ilding and activated the sprinkler systerri causing great damage. P sued D
for these damages on the th3Qry that he negligently misrepresented the terms of the
policy. This action was instituted more than four years after the drunage.
Held: ' Barred by the one year statute of limitation~ because this action would not
survive, and there is no other statute of limitations applicable. V#8-24 and 64-135.
Since the pr.operty injury by D was an indirect one it would not survive. Had it been
a direct injury to property the five year statute would have been applicable. But
here D did not cause the hurricane which was the direct cause of the sp~inkler leakageo

J
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Waiver of Service of Process
119 S.E.2d 337,202 Va.
P was entitled to certain righ*s under the Virginia Uninsured Motorists Law against
his insurance company, D. Before this policy expired the legislature modifieu the
Uninsured Motorists Law by requiring process to bG served on the plaintiffs 1 insurance companies as though they were defendants whenever suit was brought against uninsured motorists. After this modifica.tion of the lm-r became effective P was damaged by an uninsured motorist e~nd brought suit a.gainst him. D actually knew of the ·case
and sent one of its lawyers to the trial as an otserver. P recovered judgment against
the uninsured motorist, and, not being able to collect it, sued D who relied on the
defense that it had not been served as i f it were a defendant.
Held: Defense is valid. The provisions of the statute are mandatory. P has not been
deprived of any vested rights he had under his policy as the changes made in the la.1-w
are mere matters of procedure. The fact that D had a~tual notice of the proceedings
and had an observer in court is not a waiver of se:n.rice of process. To be a waiver,
it . would have been necessary for it to have taken part in the proceedings. fresence
and observation al O~Q B::l"e ne'b enottgh-.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--I~urance--StatutG of Limitations 119 S.E.2d 497 1 202 Va.
~
A fire insurance policy was not worded as per the actual contract due to fault of
Insurbr. A loss occurred and Insured in good faith brought an action at law on the
policy as it should have read. This action was commenced within the 12 months allowed by the policy. When the case came on for trial the co~t told Insured if he want·
ed to collect at law, he would have to bring his case on the policy as it was
actually written, and that i f he didn't want to do that, he should ask for reforms- .
tion in e uity. So Insured dropped the law case and proceeded in equity. When he did
this, the twelve month period had expired. Insurer claimed that the suit .was barred.
Held: Not barred. Where the Insurer was to blame for the defects in the policy,and
there has been no decision on the merits, the equity case for reformation is, in
reality, a continuation of the original case, and since that case was instituted in
time, proceedings were comme~ced within the 12 months as required.

593n
202 Va. 753n
'lhe jtt<iga of the Circuit Court of Fra..."lklin Co11nty gave an erroneous instruction
-~.-) the jury. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiff in accordance with the
nx·:c·bneous i!lstruction. Defendant. moved the Court to .::;et aside the verdict as being
·Yn;t-ud.ry to lalf. The Court sa•: its error, and rendered judgment for the dofGndad,.
Plaintiff now claims that an erroneous instruction is binding on the trial court and
i .s t.he law of that case and that defendant's only remedy is an appeal. Is Plaintiff
-;r.lrrer.t.?
Held: No. l'l'hile attorneys are not permitted to argue before a jury that the in. are._~~~~~*-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~==--~~
.s,t_1·ucbons
vrrong, that prinCJ1p1 e has no a.ppllcat:ton to tfl.e thai jUdge. As soon
as he realizes that he has erred he should correct his mistake.
?.LEADING AND PRACTICE

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Evidence--Rule 1:8
202 Va.835.
P was injured when she slipped on some grapes on the floor of an A&P store. The
attorney for the defendant called its manager as a witness and asked him "during the
~~~ear preceding P's fall how many people fell in your store on any debris?" pas
G~oR
!3-ttorney then said, nyour Honor, I object, I don't see what relevancy there is to
· \j
the issue. There is no doubt P fell". 'r.he court overruled the obje~tion and the
trial proceeded without any further action on P 1 s part with reference to the admissibility of such evidence. On appeal P now claims the evidence was erroneously
admitted a
Held: Unless P not only gave his grounds of objection, but also, when these
grounds were overruled, said, "I f.X;!ept 11 or 11 I wish to save t..he point." or something
similar, he is -deemed to have a~quiesced in the court's ruling. In the instant case
P did not object to the ruHng of the ·.;ourt, but only to tr..e proffer of the testimony. Hence he hasfo.iledto-satisfyRule 1:8 which requires that thegroundOfobjec tion to the ruling of the cour.t be stated wi t.h reasonable certainty.
PLEADING AND

PRACTICE--Mr:mt~~on

of Amount Sued for in L1st::1)\3t.ions. 121 S.E.2d 379
202 Va.926 •
• .,- 'b
If. P sues D(say for $50,000) is an instruction t~lling the jury that in no event
bshall they find damages in ex~Bea of $50,000 proper? The Sup:t•t)me Court of Appeals
l'' t-.u!' ~tate~ t~at the:e nis a · }onfl~c:t of authorit.y on this point, and that trial courts
t..j, ~" ~n th~s uta te d~fr er anong tt;.:.!Jrr.s Gl.vee.
l'''(
Held~ This should not be done ( a::~cept where the amount. of recovery is limited by
'· ~
statut.e as is presently done in de ~th by wrongful act case['). Since the :i.nstructions
come f::om the court the ,jury are apt t0 attach too mu~h importance to a plaintiff's
extra-...ragant claim. Rather. the jury should be told that they should restrict recover ~ if any, to the"o.mount claimed in the leadings. Some states do not even
allo~
e event the verdict exceeds the amount sued
for.,
~

J\J ·

PLEADING AND PRACTICE Venue
12:!. S.E,2d 817 ,2CJ Va.
X w.bile driving a car negligently injured P. X -vms hurt, too, and died from his
injuries. D qualified in Montgomery county as X' s per·sonal r9presenta tive. Subse~quently D moved to Roanoke and P sued D in Ro~noke. D filed a plea in abatement on
p,#IJ-e../ the ground that the suit should have bee n instituted i n the count.y where D qualified.
The statutes rflad 11.#8-38 ~ Venue gent-'.."ally.-:·Any action at l aw or. suit in equi ty,ex0 ~'cept where it is otherwlSe especially prond ed, may bs b:-ought ~n any county or
Veh· V corporation:
"(1) Wherein any of the defef'dants mc:.~r r esicl a ;
"(5) If it be a S'lit ~(-~(-*or action against a personal representative*** or
other fiduciary, in the c-ounty or corporation wherein the will was admitted to probate, or such fiduciary qualified. 11
p contended that the Yenue statut·3 above was cumulative and hence he could sue •
either in Montgom0ry County or in Roanoke. D cor1te nded that (5) above notherwise
especially providedn and heP.ce t hat Montgomery County was tM only proper County
under #8-33 although both sides a~itted that. u.nde~ V#S-39 the action was maintainable in the county or city in which th ~ cause of a c tio n arose.

J

f

594o
He ld: Plea in abatement sustained. "In the case of an administrator of an esta.te
Gi' a deceased person, the most convenient and fa:nilia.r jurisdiction is, logical ly
ar;d legally, that in vihich the admini:.>trator qualifies, since i t is a fortiori t he
place of last residence of the deceased, in whose place and stead, f-;;r thepurr>ose
of actions or suits a eainst the estate, the administrator stands, and is at the sam8
-Lime t he source of the administrator's aut.~ority
~<-. His official residence for
purposes of venue, is in that county or city.
11 \rJe are of the opinion that it was the plain legislative intent that /18-38(1)
s h,ou.ld apply to an action or suit against the defendant solely in his individual
capacity, and that in enacting V#8-38(5) the legislature has otherwise especially
provided for the venue of an action or suit against an administrator in his official
capacity. 11

**

, ~LEADING AND PRACTICE--Rule 3:2 amended Advance Shee t
203 Va.43
The second paragraph of Rule 3:2 has been amended(effective Jan.l,l962)by adding
thereto the underlined words below so that the second paragraph now reads:
11 A wr i t returnable to rules under any statute shall be returnable in the clerk's
office to any day within the time allowed by statute: and, i f the time within which
any writ shall be returnable is not provided by statute,thensuch writ shall bereturnable within ninety days - ·a fter its date ..r-- -

Cl \t_.i'"J).
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE Reopening cco.se after resting
203 VaQ86
p sued D for personal inj uries suffC;red by P when he came into contset with a live
uninsulated wire left o.n his premises wh en D dismantled a r::om pressor. P proved t hat
he was injured, but through an oversight, failed to s how that D had any connection
- Awith the wire. After P had. rested his case D moved to strike his evidence on the
\;round that P had failed to sho1-1 tl::at D 1-ms re sponsible f or the wire. P then requested that he be allowed to re-o pen the case. The Court r efused the reque st and
1
r~e;
P exce pted.
V'
Held: Exception sustained. While the re-opening of a c ase after the party has
rested is within the sC'und dj_scr·etion of the cour t, this discretion must be exercised in a reasonable maru ,er and not arb i trarily. If the re~opBning will result in
undue dela;y or in surprise to the other side the court need not re-open. But here
P's witnesses were present and D was surprised, not by t he fact that P wished to
re .. open, but by the fact that he had overlooked present ing such evidence. It was
an abuse of discretion for the court to reftlse the r equest to reopen for a mere
inadvertent error under the above c ircwns tanc es .

J:JI"'
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE·~-Summ ary J udgme nt
203 Va.275
S, ~ fugitive from justice, wished to buy a second hand car from X, a dealer in
cars. He did not tell X he was a fugitive from justice nor was he asked. X showed
him a car and S said he would t ake i L He further stated that he did not have
s ufficient money on him and asked permission to drive t he car to a friend's house
where he would borrow the balance needed. S left the car he had been driving with X.
This car had been obtained by S by a t.rie;k. S r1egligently injured P who obtained a
judgment a gainst him which was uncollectible. P then sued D who was X1 s insurance
carrier. P relied on the omnibus clause i n X1 s insurance policy. The evidence was
in conflict as to whethe r or not S obtained the u s e of the ca r fraudulently from X.
The trial court granted D's moti on for summary judgment .
Held: Reversed and remanded. The evidence [lhould be vi ewed as favorably as
possible for the person agai ns t w~1om summary judgment was entered o When so viewed
ther e was a jury questio n as to whetner or not S secured the car fraudulently.
Note 1: S was under no duty to v olunte er the information that he was a fugitive from
justice . Note 2: If S did pro c ure t he us e of the car by fraud, then fraud vitiated
cons ent and S became a conver ter and D would nut be liable .

V
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::Lc.;ADI NG AND fi\ACTICE Mandamus
595.
203 Va.316.
The State Highway Department and E both claimed ownership of a piece of land needecl
,.,7 ':c. r highway purposes. P filed an original petition for a vll'i t of mandamus in the
:u:fJr;eme Court of Appeals to compel the State Jiighway Commissioner to institute conu.emnation proceedings for the taking of his property.
Held: Mandamus denied. Mandamus ·will not lie to determine the title to realty. The
::JG.preme Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction to try land titles.
Besides P has an ordinary remedy at law namely a declaratory judgment, and an extraordinary remedy will not lie where there is an adequate or·dinary one.

PLEADING AND FRACTICE--AHernative Pleading
.. 203 Va.382.
D agreed to be responsible for the delivery of deeds to l a nd made by P, a real
estate development company, to the purchasers of land, and to account for the proceeds whether they were paid to him or to the X Corporation i-Jhich v;as P 1 s sales
a gent. The deeds in question were s ent to D, c/ o the X Corporation. The money received therefor was not paid to P who does not know whether this dereliction was the
X Corporation's or D•s. P alleged that the money was received either by the X Corporation or by D. The latter demurred on the ground that the facts should be stated
directly and positively and not in the alternative.
Held: Demurrer overruled. While the general rul~s as claimed by D there is an
excegtion to that rule when the plaintiff does not know wt
alternative
or-the-other ·
·
an
1e e en ant would be liable in either event.
The above case clearly falls within this excep J.on.
PLEADING AND PRAC'riCE Variance
203 Va.. 40J.
P sought a declaratory judg:nent to the effect t hat D owed him one half of the
~ount of certain notes. D counterclaimed alleging that P who was a joint payee of
~ the notes had obtained the status of joint payee by fraud. D prayed that the Court
cancel pIs name as a joint payee. Disputed questions 1/ITero submitted to a jury and
leave was given to the trial judge to enter whatever judgment he should think proper.
The evidence off ered by D did not show fraud, but it did show damages to D as E.
result of P's breach of !ontract to allow D a certain drawing account while D was
employed by P. No object.i.on to this evidence was offe red. Th e trial judge entered
judgment for D.
Held: I•'or D. Failure to object to D's evidence •wa s a waiver of the variance. If
timely ob,jection had been made D could have amended. P cannot deprive D of the right
to amend by remaining silent thereby d.efeating the ends of justice.

,J .
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE

203 Vao461.
(1) When. P appealed on the ground tba t the judgment below was contr~ry. to the law
tl'OS.nd the ev~dence, he designated only those parts of the re0ord for n .ntlng that
\..vJ~'f.. were favorable to him_. He omitted all cros s examination of his witness es. Rule 5:1,
¥
sub-section 6 states that as much evidence shall be designated as is "necessary and
0.
materi al to allow the court to determine the i ssue involved." Should P's appeal be
,_:
dismissed?
Held: No. If D was not satisfied with P's designation t he Rule permits D to designate any omitted evidence he thought material and if he had this opportunity and
failed to take advantage of it, he cannot be heard to complain that P's designation
was insufficient.
(2) In the above c ase A and B were counsel for P, a nd C 1/ITas counsel for D. The
Rules provide that if all counsel request it, the r ecord may be transmitted in less
than 20 days to the clerk of the Supreme Court of Appeals. A and C r eques ted it, but
B did not. The record and the designations of the p arties >-Tere sent up ahead of time.
Shouls the appeal be dismissed for this r eason?
Held: No. "All counselll does not mean every lawyer involved , but counsel on each
side- A signed on one side for all couns el on that side , and C signed for the other
side.

in

!:L.:_•;.li.DING AND PF..ACTICE--Reference to Amount Sued For
596.
203 Va.543.
In 202 Va.at p.932 it wa.s held that instructions given by the court should not
L~ntion the amount sued for, because, ncoming from the court itself it is likeJ.y t:J
~'iv e the jury the impression that the amount sued for is significant---". In the
~ns tant case plaintiff's counsel made several references to the amount sued for.
Is thj_s ground for reversal?
Held: No o It is illogical and absurd to inform the jury that plaintiff cannot re··
cover for more than he is asking, and yet not let the jury know for how much he is
asking. Coming from the attorney, it has far less weight than if it came from the
court. Defendru1t is entitled to an instruction that the amount being sued for has
no bearing on the amountll if any, that should be awarded to plaintiff.
PLEADING ANTI PRACTICE--Petition for Perpetuation of Test:i.mony
203 Va.665.
V#8-317 provides a simple way in which to perpetuate the testimony of witnesses.
Q \r~.-.~ Und ~ the provJ.aions the person desiring to perpetuate the testimony files a peti.friion with a commissioner in chancery of a court wherein, if there were a formal b).ll
~~ in equity to perpetuate the testimony, such bill might be filed. The testimony is
~ ).l~.f"\aken and placed with the clerk of the court by which the commissioner was appointed.
eY,. ~e court, on motion of any party in interest 9 shall, if it appears that proper and
~ \
sufficient grounds therefor ezist, enter a decree or order directing that the testimony so taken be perpetuated and preserved~
P, ~ ~ ~ posit~ t~ brin~ suit at ~~' filed su.ch a petition with the
proper commissioner in c:hancery. D, who would have been responsible for the payment
of any judgrr.ent obtained against its insured sought to enjoin P from any further
proceedings with reference to the petition, and the injunction was granted. P appealed.
Held: Affirmed. The injunction was properly issued. The st~tqtoqr pr~eeding outlined above CC-!1 9nly be taken if there are ~roupds for a hi 11 ±.a perpetuate testi~ One of these
rounds is inabilitv of the o ·· ·· · ·· hin to er etuate
:1mony
to ros •
into. V#.S·-·317
is n?t meant to be used for purposes of discovery or to ajd the I,~etitioner in the
pr.ew,ration of his case _, but unly as a substitute for the common law formal bill in
equity to perpetuate te;; timon,'r when and if such a bill would lie •

't}

<f"
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. lPLEADING AND PRACTICE--Appellate Procedure
203 Va.755.
In this case it was held that V#S - 489 and Rule 5:4 are jurisdictional, and that
~ .;.-tunder them the record in an appeal must be filed wi t;h the Clerk or Justice of the
\'); - ~
Supreme Court of Appeals within four months from the date of final judgment, that it
/(v!'
was not enough that the petition for appeal was filed within that time, and that the
J
fault for not producing the record was that of the clerk of the trial court. The
clerk cannot change the law by neglecting his duties. Notion to dismiss the writ of
error sustained.

\ t;'/1

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Discowery --Federal Procedure
203 Va.810 •
P insured his truck against loss by fire with D. Th~:re nas such a loss at a place
\\.$()1"' ~eyond a 50 mile radius from .,1here tl'1e truck was pr.-iJ'icipally garaged. There was a
bona fide dispute as to the amount of the loss ru1d as to whether or not a rider
;e:,9rfimiting insurer's coverage to use within fifty miles .,1as in effect at the time of
~
the loss. In its answer and g rounds of defense D denied any liability, and especially
denied liability for the sum claimed which included loss of the contents of the
burned truck. After the pre-trial confe.rence P, pursuant to V-#'8-111~ 1, requested D
to admit by not later than May 29,1961 (l)that the 50 nales ria er limitation had
never been sent to P and, (2) that there was no dispute about the $'1 ,000 damages
claimed by P. This request was i gnored, so the trial court entered swnmary judgment
f or P. Vl/8-111.1 provides that each of trw matters of vlhich an admission is requested
shall be deemed admitted unless the party to vJhom the r equest is directed serves upon
the party requesting the admission either a sto~orn statement denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or s etting f orth in detail the reasons why
he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or that the matters requested are
privileged or irrelevant. This s ection of the Code was copied verbatim from Section
36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Was P entitled to summary judgment?

....U'1

V' /

597

0

Held= No. When the legislature enacted W/0:-lll.l it knew how Federal Rule #36 hac'l.
·ceen interpreted, and it impliedly adopted· the interpretations which were to T.he
eff ect that the Rl\[le ;;tpplied only as to matters not in di.spute and was meant mel'e ly
to expedite proceedings as to such matte:cs. Sin~e the two things about which ad-missions were sought wt:re in dispute and P knew they wore in dispute, he had no
right to an ans\.;er. Reversed and remanded •
.PLEADING AND PRACTICE Res Adjudicata--Domestic Relations
203 Va4880
H·' a Filipino, and W, a white l-JOman were legally married in New Jersey while
domiciled ther~. They moved to Virginia. H sought a divorce for cruelty. The divorce
was denied on the grou.nd that as far as Virginia was concerned the parties were
never married since the marriage violated our fundamental public policy against miscegenation as set out in V#20"·5h. After the time for an a ppeal had gone by, W sued H
for a divorce on the grou.nd of desertion. H did not plead "res adjudicata". The
matter was referred to a commissioner who reported that the marriage was void and
had already been so declared in the prior suit. Wfil ed exceptiona to the report on
the theory· that the marriage was valid because of the full faith and credit clause
of the United States Constitution and she vouched the record in the former suit in
support of her contentions.
·
Held: (l) Whether or not the marriag e is valid in Virginia has already been litigated. It is the same issue .:md the sam8 parties. It is im.'Tlaterial that there are
additional issues. (2) Res ad,iudici ·~a need not be affirmatively pleaded where that
fact is shown, as here, on the face of t he pleadings of the party against whom
tha·t principle is to be applied.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE~-Statute of J..imi tations
203 Va.90I.j..
P bought a deep freeze refj:·igarator from D for $h50 and paid for it by check on
August 1, 1951. A week later he inadventontly sent D a second check for the same
amount. This check was drawn on th<'l s ame bank. A few mo:J.ths later both checks ~vere
returned to p by the bank a long wi ~h some L.O other cancelled checks. P then l ocked
them over to see if th -;re were any forgerj_es but did not notice that two of these
checks were for the de :p freeze refrigerator. Nine years l a J.:;cr P discovered w~at had
happened and demanded that D _r:ay him $h50 . D r eli ed on the statute of limitations.
Is this a good defense?
Held: Yes . VJL8-..l.U provides t hat "The ri ght to recover money paid under fraud or
mistal<:e sh(~. ll be deemed to accrue bot.h c;.t law and in equ.ity, at the time such fraud
or mistake is di ocover ,:;d, or by the Exercise of due diligence ought to have been
discovered. The burden was on P to p!'ove that nc a cted wj.th due diligen~e within
the period of the statute·--three y~r·.:r.s on a contract express or i mplied and not in
writing. Here the facts clearly sho w that he did not use due diligence. He should
have, as a matter of l avl, canght the m:Lstake when he examined his returned canc·e lled
checks. He failed to offer any plaus ible expla.nation for not having done so. Hence
the statute has long since run.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Rule 5:1, S ::.,~ tio n J.O
203 Va.9L.6.
In the suit of P v. D t he trial co urt found f or P . Fifty ei ght days later D subLf'"1Tlitted c. 11 Stat.F-)me nt of Testimony" i n narrative form to the judge for his signature
,. }-,\ .c.i~' after duly notifyi ng p who objected to it on t he g•;ound that it was not accurate
\JJ" ~
or complete. p did not s u bmit hls vernion of t he tEJstimony. The trial judge refused
~ .-'\to sign the statement. As a re 3ult the Supr~":Jrfle Cou.rt of Ap peals found it impossible
/ ~\./" \to pass on the mGrits of the case.
.
/ ( e;
Held: Reversed and remanded. Under Rule 5: l, section 10 P shou.ld have f.ubmitted
his version in writing 9 and th 3!1 the judg.:l sllould have resolved any differences
thrU ·l consultation with coun.se:L. If the judge cannot :io this because of lapse of
time ~r forgetfulness, he should grant a new tri8.1_, so that he can certify to the
testimony. Otherwise the losing party would for 1'ei t hi s right thl-1; no fault on his
part to have the case decided on its merits by the Suprflme Court of Appeals on
perfection of a pro per appe:al .
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rLSAD:CNG AND PRACTICE Unautl'for ized Vie'j1 by Juro~!t"
203 Va.?65.
J !s car, driven by D, struck P, a ten year old girl, while she was riding a
~.:.ic ycle in an interseetion. There vlaS a conflict in the evidence as to whether 0,
\ befor e enter ing the intersection, was riding in the st-.·cet, or on the sidev.ralkn
~ J ~ one of the jurors, made a solo 6:30 a.m ~ visit to the scene of the accident., and
~ a ske tt~h showing a certain tree that had been referred to in the evidence. 1'his
\. ~:
c;~e kh also shm~ed cars parked on the street. t.hat interfered vrith visibiH·;;.y. He
1\\f \
also exp8rimented to see in ~hat distance he could stop his car under circumstances
\\;Jl" tha t had been described in the evidence. He showed this sketch to the ::>ther jurymen
\J
and told them of his findings. When the trial judge fcund this out he summoned. t."l.ll
the jurors and asked them if J's actions had influenced their Yerdict for the de··
fendant. Despite the fact that their replies showed that they might have been so
influenced.!) the judge refused to grant a new trial.
Held: While an unauthorized view by a juror is improper, it is not ground for a
new trial unless the verdict was affected thereby, and while the determination o:f
this question lies within the sound discretion of tho trial court, there was an
abuse of such discretion in the instant case since the evidence clearly showed that
at leas t J, and pr obably the rest of the jurors, had been influenced by J's actions.
All evidence should be given in open court so t hat there ean be cross examination
and an opp~rtunity to make it part of the recordo Reversed and remanded.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Ruling on Demurrer as a Final 0::-der
203 Va. 991.
, ,\.
P's land all lay to the nort h of D's r ailwa.y o By V/f.S6-16 i f D's railway passed
G-.yi' '\through Pis land D was under a dut,y to construct a cert.ain private roadway acl·oss
\~n
e t r acks, but there is no such duty if it merely adjoins P?s land~ P, in his
_, L It
titian, which was otherwise valid, alleged that D's railway pas sed through P's
~ ~
and. D demurred to the petit ion . The demurrer was properly overruled. After more
than 21 days had passed sin::!e the entry of the orde::- oven·uling the demurrer, D
f iled exceptions to a commissioner s ' report on the gro und that the evidence clearly
showed that its railroad did no t p2.ss through P' s land and hence fuis petition should
be dismissed on the merits. The tri al j udge held tha t t he order overruling the demurrer had become fina: . and refused to dismiss the petition,
Held~ Error. "An order mere:!.y s~.wtaining or overruling a demurrer---is not final."
In order to be final vli thin the meaning of V# 8 -·L~62 it must go further and dismiss
the case. The exceptions to the c ommi s sioners 1 report should have been sustained. It
is not enough to allege a good case. The allegatio ns must als~ be proved.. Reversed
and di smi s sed.
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PLEADI NG AND FRACTICE-~Evidence
201~ Va.4 •
l. If a res ponsive pleading i n equ.ity is des i gnated 11 Answ::.~r and Cross Claim" defendant cannot treat it as a plea, and 1 i nsist on a jury t r ial on the theory that
it is a plea.
2. Since a plea i n equity raises a single is s ue of f act which operates as a bar
to complainant's bi ll, a cross claim which asserts a co:mt erclaim cannot be a plea.
). If a cross claim relies on br each of an ora l warranty made in connection Hith
the sale of a truck, and the oral warrant y was superseded b y a written warranty,
there can be no recovery on t he Sllpe:roeded or al warranty, nor on an implied warranty
of fitness since the cros s c l aimant did not r ely oq the latter, and the parol evide nce rule prevents the s howing of the forme r ( llnles~ a sui t in equi ty for reformatio n).
)

PLEADING- Jurisdict i onal Amount- ·~Venue Une!n.ployment Comp., Cases.
204 Va.l8.
P, whose last j ob was i n 1/Ja::Jhj_ngt.on, D. C., but who lived i n Virginia, was laid off.
He sought unemployment <~or:tp s ns a ticn in the c:mou.nt of $~~]_) . A deputy of the Commission
dis allowed his claim. An appe al t o an appeals ex.8miner rr1as unsucces sful. An appeal
to t he full C-:lrr.mi ssion resul ted in a denial on t he ground tha t P had not liileen a vailable for work during the p eriod f er t-Jhich he cJ_,'::.im'3d compensat ion. P then a ppealed
t o t he Corporation Court of the Cit y 0f Alexandria whi~h found that he had been
ava ilable for work a nd r eversed the Conuniss lon. The ComJniss:i. on appealed to the
Supreme Cc urt of Appeals. P urged t hat ~ 300 Has not i nvolved and hence that Court

t:;99o
b'-'.d no jurisdiction. The Cormrd.nsl.on clnim3d that the Corporation Court had hacl no
j·.crisdiction since the statute provides t.hat the action must be brought in the cou!Tcy
or c i ty in lvhich the cJ.a.iman'G last wo!'lced.
He1d :(l) As to jurisdictional amount, it waG held as per P's contention in 177 Va.
at p .,,258 but; since that time Vf-160--S';) was amended to read, 11 -:<-:H~ the Supreme Court of
1\.p.pe.;:LJ.s shall ha:'Te jurisdiction to review 8uch decisions regardless of the amount
involved." (2) As to venue the statute means 01 wherc P was last employed I N VIRGINL4. 11
"Nhere his Virginia work record is available. In the inst.?.nt case that was not tn
Alexandria but since the Commission failed to file a plea in abatement the right to
have the matter passed on by a proper court hc.:.s been waived. (3) It was also held
that whethe:r P had been available for work was a question of fact on which question
the decision of the Commission was final i f based on evidcr:~e. The Supreme Court of
Appeals concluded that the evidence was such that reasonaole men could have differed
and henoe the decision of the Commission was .final on that point.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
204 Va.96.
P suGd. D who was visiting in Florida from Seotember S to No-v0mb13r S. ~ervice was
ha.d on October 20th by tacking same to D's front door(sincr:l no one cou:F be found
at D's usual place of abode) pursuant to V//8··51.
Held: This was proper service since D had not changed his residence but was only
temporarily away.
When the above case ce.rnE·. t.o trial P int:.oduced his evidence. D then moved to
strike P's evidence on the ground tha·t it failed to s how any negligence en D1 s part.
The motion was overruled. D then introduced evidence of his own. On appeal D now
claims that the trial court er:r. 3d i n overruling his motion to strike P's evidence.
Held: This contention is i nvalid. When D int:r-oduc e::l e~ndemce oi his own, he
waived his right to hav~ the case considered only on P 's evidence. It must now be
considered on the whole record ;:md not on P' s evidf\nce alon8 .
PI.EADING AND PRACTICE !1ay Jury Tal'.e Pleadings to Ju::.-y R.oom?
204 Va.ll5
P sued D for negliger tly causinF; her ~.njuries. They 1·mre r-~ 3mbers of a car pool.
~~
Each member of J.:.~1e poo:::. used her car for a weok to go to wor!<: some 27 miles away.
Th~ motion for j•J.d.grnent contained a.ll:'gations of ex trsmel? serious inj~ries most of
i /
wh1.ch we1:-e not proved. At the conclus1.on of the pre.:Hmtat1.on of the ev1.dence the
\.. -J..JJ''1 Court gave instructions to the jury, and told therr: tc wri t c their ve:~.·dict upon the
"f
7moticn for judgment. D's attorney vbj ~ cted to th~~ Jury's taking the motion for
t-.l)'f1"""' • judgment to the jury r c•)i!l ar.d asked ',.rby the ve1·di ct couldn't be written on a piece
of paper. 1'he Cc urt replied, "They a· ·e entitled to read the pleadings. I hate to be
made a fool of . What are tho plead:i r,;:;; s for tf t he jury can't read them? Do you 1·Jant
me to read them to them right here? 11 D' s attorney replied, '; ~~o sir. I object to
them being sant into the jury room. 11 The Court then said) "You want to hide something
from them?" D's at..t.orney objected ami except~1d.
Held: Reversed and remandod. The pl 8adings contained un.proved a llegations. The
jury could reasonably suppose that the Uou:;:-1.; thought these allegations perfectly
valid for he has told the111 t lv~y c cm ld take them to the jury room and read them.
"Under the ci:r(:ums tanc es of this c.:!se the pleadings Here improperly permitted to be
taken by the jury to th3ir r oom . 11
~ It wa s also held that pqrconn ,.i di ng ·j n a ca r p?ol are ~+ 1:guec;ts without
p,fl;yment", and hence ar c owed a dut,y of ordin::1.:·y care by t he driver.

O)uP'4S
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE Rt1S adjudtcate. Insurance
204 Va.292
H and W were husband and wife. lt[nile W was driving H's ce1.r she became involved in
an sccident with B, the driver of :.:.not.her C.:J. r. \v sued B and B sued W for personal
injuries. The attorney for H' s Im!Ur ;u ..r;e Comp ~ny 1 wittout W s consent , compromised
the case brou ght by B by paying B ~!;400. The pending case of B v. VJ was dismissed
a greed. Despite all this, W prus s0d her claim against B who relied on the defense
of r es adjudicata.
Held for W. The attorney f or H' s I m:;urance Company hacl a right to settle tl-te claim
of B against W, but he had no r ight to compr omlses ~l's rights against B, if any,
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._,.: t~1o u.t :b.er consent. He had no authorit,y to agree to th0 entry of an order, the rg-

.:.: v:!_t, cf which would be to bar the prosecution of an action in whicn hiE company hu.d
.1o interes·(, or standing.

0

7 i:.EA.CING AND PRACTICE Failure to File Timely Responsive Pleading
204 Va.297
r,.; a;:: ser·ved properly not later than Fevruary J$,1961. He did nothing until Mai'f~h
~· ? , 1961 uhe.n he filed a petition for removal of the case to the federal courts. On
Sept. 26,1961 the Federal court remanded the case to the St2.te court. On Octobe!' 9SJ
-;1~61 the state court on the motion of the plaintiff, P, entered its orC.:er a~.varding
e.
judgment by d~fault, and appointing a date for hearing evidence and fixing the
mount of damages. D did nothing whatever until October 18 ,1961 when he moved the
court. to set aside the default judgment. D was not given a ny notice of the date on
which the court would hea+ the evidence with reference to the amount of damages. The
~ourt refused to hear thi case on its merits. What errors, if any, has the trial
court committed?
Held: None. When D violated Rule 3:5 he was in default and by the express language
of' 3:19 he was not entitled to any further notice. While D could have mov ed for an
extension of the 21 day period provi ded for by Rule J:S. a s per Rule 3:13 even though
the 21 day period had expired he failed to do so. "D's efforts to remove the case
to the Federal court cannot r estore to him a right already lost to file pleadings
in the State court.n
ttRuleG J ;5 and 3:19 were adopted i n the int,e:rest of E-xpediting the matur·ing and
hearing of cases. A de f endant is >-Ja~ned W:"len he i s 3erved wi t.h process as to the time
within which he must make his re~::ponst!. He may have a.n ext ens ion of ·that time if he
makes proper applta1tion and shows reaeonable cause ther efor o Otherwise the Rules
are to be applied according to their t erms ,."
... ;- <.J)
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE
Jur:i.sdictio n and Vtmue
204 Vao309
p sued D for injuries received in an automobile acc i dent. There was nothing on the
._)JJt'>- face of the pleadings to indicate t~at, the trial court did not have jurisdiction nor
{"
did D file any plea in abat er.E nt wi ·i~hin the requir ed 21 day period which under
o ]rule 3:6 is not to be extende.i in any case. V# S-133 r eads : 11 \r.Jr.ere the motion for
~judgment or bill t;hows on its fa~ e pr oper matt er for the jurisdiction of the Court
(as it did in this case)no excepi;ion for want of such jurisdiction shall be allowed
unless it. be taken by plea in aba t ement." The evidence showed that at the time of the
injury D was trans porting P home f:~o:n Hork, th a t :-he employe r paid D for such
tra nsportation, and ::,ha ·:~ the emplo yor came und.e:- the t'llor krne n 1 s Compensat.-i.on Act. D
sought to have t '.1e case di,.:'3mis ~ed f o."' lack of j .l:>:>isdiction. ~he trial cc :J.~.· t refus ed
to dismiss it bL~ d.l'.Se nr, !pY..~ :i.n aba ~, .-.,nent had b:::-c;n or now c o. •ld be f i led ,
H e ld~ Feversed and db'Ir.iss ed. V#B --~ .33 and Rul :l 3 : 6 a ppl y onJ.y to juris -.:Li.ction in
th e s ens e of venue .. Hher e a court l ac.lcs jud.sdic t.ion to he<>.r a nd decide t he Bllbj ec t
matter of a case it should be d i s missed . as soon a s this f act is called to the cour t's
attention in any ma nner, o:;:· by t~1~ court on i ts own initiative , even on appeal when
t he question of jurisdiction was no+, r ai sed belou . In this c a se P' s only remedy is
under the Workmen's Gomp8!1.sation Ac t sinGe the ac cicle!'l·~ was a n industria l one
occuring during and a:t-iRi ng out of the em~lo ymen t . Thus J0he I ndustr ial C.. : ;nmission
has exclusive j ur i sdi ction of the ~ub joct matter in controversy.
/

U

599 (\2
204 Va.347 o
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Estoppel--Res Judicata-Wills
In 203 Vaco246 Nephews contended that their ma.iden Aunt was incompetent to make a
t·r.Lll, and hence they inherited her land as her heirs. It was brought out in that
ca~:e that Aunt had conveyed her real estate to Nephews, and that after a falling 0 1 ~.t.,.
she demanded a reconveyance. The matter was compromised as follows: Nephews re-conV9yed in return for Aunt's promise to will them the land. A little later Aunt demanded a release from this promise and one was given her. Nephews lost the will
contest case. They later(this case)filed a bill in equity for specific performance
of the Aunt's promise to will the land to them claiming that the release of this
promise was void. Defendants claim .that the whole thing was settled for all time
in the 203 Va.246 case, and the Chancellor so held.
Held: Not res judicata. Under V#66-74 "the sole issue is whether the paper offered
for probate is or is not the will of the decedent. When this question is decided the
function of the proceeding is exhausted and the court should not decide other
questions not connected \-Tith that issue." Whether or not the release of their Aunt
by the Nephews from her agreement to will the land to her Nephews was valid or not,
had no bearing on her competency to make a will, and hence the matter of the
validity of the release had not been passed on. Whether Nephews are estopped by the
assumption of different positions has not been passed on either. Revers.e d and
remanded.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Torts Apportion~ent of Damages
204 Vao353.
A, while in the employment of B, and while acting in the scope of his employment
committed an assault and battery on P. She sued A and B for both compensatory and
.• Jhpun'itive damages. The jury returned a verdict as follows: "Compensatory against B
~l"\' for 'the sum of $4500. Compensatory and punitive against A, for $5500".
~HeJrl: Reversed and remanded. The jury had no right to apportion the compensa.tory
damages as between A and B. Besides it is impossible to tell from the verdict
whether the jury meant a total of ~P4500 compensa·~ory damages plus $1000 punitive
damages, or whether it meant a total of $ 10,000.~ An employer is not liable in
Virginia for punitive damages unless he ordered, participated in personally, or
ratified the wrongful ac ·~ of his employee.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE ApReal from Interlocutory Decrees
204 Va.399~
H and W, husband and wife, entered into a contract with S, a son of H by a prior
marriage, whereby S received stock in a corporation and land for a great deal less
than they were worth. H and W then went to Florida. Soon thereafter H died in a
mental institution in Floridab W qualified in Florida as H1 s executrix and A
qualified in Virginia as an ancillary administrator. A commenced a suit in equity
in Virginia against S to avoid the contract for lack of capacity on H1 s part to
make such a contract. S filed a special plea alleging that A was not the real pa. .··:;y
in interest and asking tha.t vJ be joined. The Chancellor refused the request since:
W was a non~resident. S appealed and the appeal was granted.
Held: The appeal must be dismissed as having been improvidently awarded. The decree
was an interlocutory one not adjudicating the principles of the cause within the
intent of V#8-462(2)(c) and hence non-appealable. (No interlocutory decrees are
appealable except as allowed by statute). vfuen s•s epecial plea was overruled he
was given an opportunity to plead to the merits. The phrase "adjudicating the
principles of the cause" means "1'he principles which affect the subject matter of
the litigation and the r ules by whi ch the ri ghts of the parties are to be finally
determined.n
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Interes t on Unliquidat€d Claim
204 Va.443
1 performed legal services for C over a period of years without any agreement as to
the amount of his fee. L claimed ~~3 9 000 and C claimed $150 were proper amounts. L
sued c. Expert witnesses testified in favor of L that $3,000 w·as a reasonable sum.
The Court submitted the matter to the jury under proper instructions , and it returned a verdict in favor of L for ~~1 ~ 500 with interest from July 24, 1943, the date
of the last ser vices performed. The Court approved the verdict for $1500 principal,
but overturned it with respect to interest on the ground that no interest is allow-
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on unliquidated sums until they become liquidated by judgment or otherwise.
Helci: (1) The jury was not bound to return a verdict for $3,000 because all the
ex;lert.s testified that ~~3 ,000 was a x-easonable sum. Since the jury was prr~perly
ins tructed and $1,500 was not clearly too much or too little, the Court acted
cor reetly when it sustained that portion of the verdict. But(2), it acted erroneousl~'
~ ith r espect to the interest and in the teeth of V#S-223 which reads in part as
follmJs, ttin any action whether on contract or for tort, the jury may allow interest
on the sum found by the verdict, or any part thereof, and fix the period at '.vhich
the interest shall eormnenee. 11 Note that the statute does not state that the jury
has such power only when the damages are liquidated,, In fact in most tort cases,
they are unliquidated. It certainly was not an abuse of discretion to fix the period
from which interest would start at the time the last work was performed.
e; ·::Jl ~

PLEADING AND PRACTICE Tendered within 60 days and Signed within 70 days.204Va.533.
Final judgment in this case was entered on June 25yl962. On July 25 plaintiff
,\,tf'- filed -v1ith the cle:o.·k of the trial court her notice of appeal and assignments of
~ if.rror. On August 27 counsel for defendant accepted service of a notice that the
~~~). f transcript of the evidence and other incident,s of the trial would be presented to
the trial court for certification on August 28. When the trial judge signed the
""
transcript on August 30, he changed the language from "tendered and signed within
60 days from the entry of final judgment" to 11 tendered and signed(by him)within 70
days after final judgment 11 o
Held: The record shows on its face that the mandatory provisions of Rules 5:1,
#3(c) and 5:1,#3(f) were not complied with as the transcript was not tende~ to
the trial judge wH,hin 60 days from the entry of final judgment ao required thereby.
Writ of Error dismissed.
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PJ ,EhDING AND PRACTICE Waiver cf defense
205 Va,.J6
(i , while driving C•s car, negligently injured P.
Notice of the accident was give.2
·~o I who was C ' s insurer 73 days later~
I then inves ti gated and later di~ r.; laimed
L:Lao:i.lity on the sole ground that S waa not dri·ving the car l'Ji~h crs p€rmission.
(;l_ obta~ned a judgment of ~~9,000 against. S which S could not pay.
P then sued I and
,ll c t :nal court gave summary judgment for I, who defended on the sole ground that S
-:ii.:) no·t.; ha·re cv s permission to drive the car. On appeal the case vras raverscd and
:::- wnanded br:>e.g:u.se the Supreme Court of Appeals was of the opinion that whether or not
.-) had G1 s pe:'l:lission was a jury question. On a retrial and at the eleventh hour
l asked permission to amend its pleading so as to rely on the defense that the
condition of prur.tpt notice of the accident had not been given as required by the
poliuy. 'rhis permission 1vas refused, and the jury foW1d in favor of P on the issue
·Jf permission.
Held: I had wa.iYed the right to rely on that defense by insisting all this time
tha·t its defense was laclc of C 's consent. A last minute amendment would now change
the whole complexion of the case and defeat the overaJ_l policy of the law that
responsive pleading should give the opposite party timely notice of the nature of
the defense.
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE Statute of U.mitati_o ns
205 Va..43
P furnished D with fuel oil through Feb.9,l959~ On or about Harch 7, 8, 9 or lOth
\\ , P sent D a sta.tement dated February 28, 19)9. This statement bore the notation,
'") \ r-" "All bills due on receipt. 11 P instituted an c:ction for the amount due on March 8,
1962. D relied on the statut,e of li.mi ta·tions but offered m evidence as to date the
statement ~-;as received. D contended the three year statute started to run on
February 28, 1959.
Held for P. The statute starts ru~ning when the account i s due, ~amely on receipt.
The burden of proving that the ntatute has run is on the party s~ alleging. In the
absence of any proof that the bLLl r.' as received before Narch 8, 1962 judgment should
be for the plaintiff.

~

\.A
~-

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Ejnimmt PSlWr'n J:*"?CAdl~e--Interroga'Lories
205 Vao50
I. V#8-321 defining the scope -of interrogatories provides that answers may be compelled to those int.,rrogatories whicn are "relevant, and such as the persons to
whom they are propounded .would be bound to ans-vmr upon a bill for discovery.u The
J9ltate Highway Commissione~· in~t.ituted eminent domain ~roceerii~gs. to condemn certain
land owned by Po At the hearJ.ng before the c.ondemnat1on comnus:n.oners P sought to
p~ove that the State High1.!ay Commissioner had had mo~e ~han o~e ap~raisal made of
ln.s property. He served 1.nterrogaton.es on the Connn ss~oner J.n wh1ch he sought
arls'l.-ers as to hm'T many appraisals had been made _, the amoW1t of these appraisals, and
who had made them. The Commissioner moved to quash the interrogatories.
Held: Motion to quash granted. Int
. atories may be Llsed to compel an adversa.:cy
to disclose under oath facts essen· ·j:·
o t e
ec 1 n o
e r
ts of his
o~
ent w g
. :J.C"S lS o
be unable to produce. Neither of
these requiremen s exist in this c ase. Tt e sum a w. J. _
-property has been
appraised is an opinion of its vaLle--not a fact as to its value; and P is perfectly
free to call experts of his own to t.est,i.fy as to the value of his property. The
number of appr·aisals made and wl'1o made tl:lem are irrelevant on the question of the
fair value of the property.
II. Rule 3:23(c) provides for dis~overy b~ urder of court of the names and addresses of witnesses. Held: The Rules of CO\,l,.rt have RO a.a}:ll:iee:tion t.o eminent domain
procedure.
'The trial co urt refused to admit eviden~e that. more than one appraisal had
been made. Held: No error. T-:> permit. such evicence would be to open the door to
conjecture and cor...fuaion as all the commisl'li.Nlers \Wuld be told would be that ariother
appraiser had made a different appra.isal wh:i_ch was p-robably hj_gher.
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE Mandamus
599oS .
205 Va.99.
P sought a writ of m~damus against the .st-ate Highway Commissioner to compel him
to institute condemnat1on proceeding~ as a result of alleged damage to P's cinder
17
block building some 240 feet away tram a fEfO~ntl:y constructed underpass. A number
of cracks developed in this building. P claiMs that these cracks were caused by
pile driving or by continuous pumping operatiqris which lbwered the water .level under
his building or, possibly, by some of ~~ sari~ Cl~ silt theteuhd& being carried away
by the water that was pumped out. Tiler~ ~~t:J i~m'* evidence that the cracks started
before the eoccavation was commenced.
Held: Mandamus was properly refused. What caused the cracks is not knoWn• Guess
work and conjecture are no substitutes for evidence. "It is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that the legal right of the plaintiff or the ~lator
to the performance of the particular act, sought to be compelled, be clear, specific
and complete."
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Transfer to Equity Side
205 Va.l76
D agreed to pay P $103,.3.3.3 as a commission if he sold Blackacre for a certain
price. P alleged in his pleadings at law that he had found a purchaser able and
willing to pay the price agreed upon, and that he was entitled to his commission.
This thus appeared to be an ordinary action at law. D in his grounds of defense
stated that the original agreement had been superseded by a signed written contract
to the effect that if P were successful D would convey his interest in Whiteacre to
p instead of paying him his commission in money. P had signed this agreement and
then sent it to D for his signature. D had signed it but failed to notify P of that
fact so that P did not know of the existence of this agreement until after his suit
for his commission had been instituted. Over objection the trial court allowed p
to transfer his law suit to the equity side of the court as now being one for
specific performance of a contract to sell land. V#B-1.38 reads in part, "Whenever
it shall appear that a plaintiff has proceeded at law when he should have proceeded
in equity(or vice versa) the court shall direct a transfer to the proper forum, and
shall order such change in, or amendment of the pleadings as shall be necessary to
make them conform to the proper practice." D contends that this statute applies
only to the institution of the suit, and not to its later stages, and claims that
he will be deprived of his right to a jury trial.
Held: D is wrong on both of his contentions. The statute is a remedial one and
should be interpreted liberally to fulfill its purpose of saving time and expense.
As soon as it became apparent that this was a bill for specific performance it was
the duty of the court to transfer it to the proper side thereof on request. And,
if on D's affidavit it appears that the case will be rendered doubtful by conflicting evidence, D may ask for a trial of the issue out of chancery, and thus submit
the question to a jury as per V#8-214.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Criminal Procedure
205 Va.205
D was indicted, and tried by the Court with his consent, that of the judge, and
that of the commonwealth's Attorney pursuant to Section 8 of the State Constitution.
This section requires that the consent of the Commonwealth's Attorney be entered
of record. D was convicted and sentenced.
Held: The record referred to is the court's order book and henoe a notation
written on the back of the indictment is not a compliance with the constitutional
mandate. Prisoner released from the penitentiary to the custody of the trial court
to be dealt with as the Commonwealth's Attorney may be advised.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Appeal and Error(Rule 5:1 #6(f))
205 Va.223.
Appellant objected to the refusal of the Court to give certain instructions. These
instructions were printed in the briefs on appeal, but were not designated for
printing in the record as required by Rule 5:1 #6(f).
Heldt Since they had not been designated for pri nting in the record they should
not be considered by the Supreme Court of Appeals. The case of Gabbard v. Knight
was held not applicable, "It is true that the instructions in that case were not in
the pri nted record, but there we said the case was submitted to the jury on
erroneous principles of law and we would consider the instructions furnished to us
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addendla to the briefs in order t,o meet the ends of justice .n But in the . instant
0ase all instructions actually given correctly and adequately stated the law.

<::t. B

PLEADING AND PRACTICE Declaratory Judgments
20.5 Va.227
P, a tax payer, of the City of Fairfax, believed that a certain ordinance with
:r eference to the powers of the Board of Zoning Appeals is invalid. He sought and
obtained a declaratory judgment to that effect. At that time there was no specific
case pendj.ng. The City -appealed.
·
Heldc Reversed and dismi$sed. If the litigation was not brought with ref~rence to
eome specific c~se there was no actual controversy and the trial court had no
jurisdiction to render an advisory opinion based solely on speculation and theory.
~

PLEADING AND PRACTICE Criminal Procedure Constitutional Law
20.5 Va.2.51.
F was arrested when he was caught in the act of breaking into an automobile and
stealing theretrom. A proper e~arch of his premises revealed other stolen property.
He confessed to various laroeniea and robberies and signed the confessions. He was
an illiterate man who could not· read or write other than his name. He was indicted
for various offenses and Attorney X, a competent lawyer, was appointed to defend
him as F was without funds. X spent less than an hour in the preparation of the
case, did not ask for a continuance to enable himself to better prepare the case,
did not interview the police officers or the persons whose property was taken. F
was convicted and sentenced to serve many years. He now challenges the legality
of the conviction.
,
Heldt Under these circumstances F was denied the right of "effective legal assistance" which is g~aranteed to him by both the Virginia and United State Constitutions .
Prisoner ordered returned to 'the custody-.of the trial court for retrial.

-·

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Rule 3r9--Cross Claims against other defendants 20,5 Va.lJ4.
The City of R let out a contract to A for the construction of a lateral sewer
along X Street. A su~bc acted to B. After B had completed his work and filled
r \~-lin the ditch R placedo . d rock on top, roll:'ed it, and put asphalt on top of the
Lh v · crushed rock and roll ,.· · • After a hard rain the fill in the ditch settled in a
( .,. 0• ·
certain place by almost a !qot. P was injured ·when the wheel of his oar went into
V'
the depr·ession which was not lighted or guarded in any manner. P sued R, A and B.
Rule 3:9 reads in part, "A defendant may, at his option, plead as a cross-claim
any cause of action that he ha&., against one or more other defendants growing out of
any matter pleaded in the notic~f motion for judgment." The City of R sought to
file cross claims against A and B. Should it be allowed to do so?
Held: No. Rt s claim is by way of indemnity. It has no possible claim for
indemnity until it has paid P. It cannot force P to wait for an adjudication of P's
claim against it until R's rights, if any, against A and B are determined. R'e
Claim for indemnity must be fitigated in a later suit.

.r
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE Liability Insurance Companies as parties
205 Va.49.5
Guest (G) was injured u the result of the gross negligence of Host(H) and the
- diepu ted negligence of another (A) • H' a insurance Co. (HI) paid G $15 1 000. The
propriety of this payment is not questioned. H then sued A and Ata insurance
company (AI) in equity for $7,.500 contribution. AI contended (l)that A had not been
negligent;(2) that its name should be stricken as a party defendant;()) that the
caption of the suit should be H for the use of HI v. A. The court at the request
of one of the parties transferred the case .flrom the equity side to the law side of
the Court.
Helda(l) Whether or not A was negligent under the facts of the ease was a question
upon which reasonable people might differ. In such a case the matter is traditionally passed on by a jury. While an action for contribution was originally in
equity such actions can now be brought either in law or in equity. It was not an
abuse of discretion to transfer the case to the ~ side where the question of
negligence could be heard by a jury under proper instructions in the usual way. (2)
AI's name should be stricken as a party defendant. The action for contribution is
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AI does not come int.o the picture as a defendant u:1less H obta:.ns a jnC£5""
·u·c :J.ti against A which Al refuses ·to pay. (3) Sinca the ent.ire r€c:overy, if any: 'ue·Jongs to HI and it. is the real par'.-y in interest as the plaintiff the st.y:l0 of the
;.>uit should be chang ad to H for the use of HI v. A.
FC~;\DT HG A:t-JD

PRACT:LCE Timeliness of motion for non-suit
205 Va .. .516.
P e.;1 administr·ator su~d D under the death by wrongful act statute. She contended
\' /that ~~·hilc D was driving a school bus loaded with children he drove far on the left
~ · -\'b' side as her de.ceascd husband, H, wc-~s approaching in the opposite direction with a
~ ,ll"load of lumber., that in doing so H was forced off the road into a deep ditch and
· 2\killed when the lumber shifted. D denied liability and claimed that the accident
1 ~ was due t.o H1 s negligence. After P~s evidence was in D mo,,oed to strike it on the
~
ground that if failed to prove any negligence on D's part. J, the trial judge,then
said that P was a poor widow with four little children but th~t he couldn't decide
"
the case on sympathy, whereupon P's attorney requested J to :!)OStpone his ruling on
the motion to strike until he could study the evidence. J i;J.dicated that v1as unnecessary as he hadJ already heard the e-vidence.. and J askar:l pis attorney how he
could ever decide the case if he kept interrupting, whereupon P 1 s attorney moved
the court for a non-suit. J ruled that the motion for a non-suit was too late, and
then sustained the motion to st.rike P 1 s evidence.
Held: E:r.ror. 'i'he motion . for a nc:nsuit Has not too late. Under V#8-220 such a
motion car.not be made a:ter the cour~ h3.S sustained a moti.Qn to st:rike. An indication oy the trial jud~a that he is probably going to grant a motion to strike is r..ot
yet a ruling on the motion to strike; Hence the ;·,1 otion for a nonsuit was made irL
time(but it cer·i:,ainly was jvst. in the nick of time),,

~

~

PLEADING AND PRACTICE
20.5 Va.5?9
p bought a tr~c tor from D on the ~onditional sales plan. D warranted that he
'-;1 o. 1 ~ \-lOuld repair or replaee defective parts Hit.hjn certain time and mileage limitatior:9.,
.L)- f\ p thought that D had broken the wa::·ranties and th~t as a proximate result of such
p
breach he had suffered mo:::-e damage than the bala.'1ce he owed, 1::0 he stopped making
any further paymen~s whereupon D repo~s8ss~d. P then sued D,(l)for damages for
breach of warra~Ti:,y J a:-;.d (2) for d2.ma6es lor -w:::-ongful repossession. D demurred on
j
the grounJ that P ~ould not join a contract and a tort cause of action.
Held: Demurrer sustainedo Causes of action ::.n tort and in contract cannot be
joineci(except actions for brr.aeh of uc..rr-:lnty and deceit as they historieally have
a common or1gin), and this duspi te the fa . .~t that if one is sued in tort or in
contract he may counter'l:lle.im f::Jr either.

rJ
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE

20.5 Va .. 834
his support payments
l.,. 1f'\o his minor c~ildren from $255 to $17.5 per month. W ignored the proceeding. Ofl
l / Sept. 4, 1963 an order w2.s entered grant.i.n3 H1 13 p:cayer: but no draft of this order
was endorsed by \']'?s caunoel mr W!:l.::J he or Tfl notified of t.h"l time and place of the
presentation fo;:- entry o TiPs counsel notified H' s co1ms8l on Sept.20th that he
would move the <.;Ourt to VCl.cate the order as ha.-dng been impx·ovidently ent-ared slac e
~le 2:18 requ:!.res drafts of orderG ar:d decreer: to be endors &d by counsel of
. \ "\.t tftrecord or notice to be given of the time and place of presentation for entry. This
~d j) motion was overruled on Nov~ 6, 1963. f.n appeal was taken therefrom later than
allowed after Sept~ 4, bnt Nithin tb.e requireJ time f:rom Nov. 6.
Held: The order of Sep·::.. 4 was ·vo!..d sir:~e Rule 2:18 h~d nut been complied with,
and the rights o.f infant.;;; were involved. The ·time allovred for appeal should be
figured from No·v.6th Nhcn the chanc ellor ref ust:.:d to vac.;!.t0 the void order. A void .
decree or order is a nullity and ma y on proper applic.s.tion be vacated at any time.

rJ
~

Domestic RcJations

Rule 2:18

r1 In a re-opened divorce case H petHionea the Conrt to

rec1u-~e

S99c8
AND PRACTICE Common Law Recoupment.
205 V3..,9l9
City of Ri~:b.mond, suecl D, the C&P Telephone Coo; for $128,000 due p by
-drtue of a .30 year franchise ordinance under which D agreed to pay P J% of its groF:·~
:~· f.C ei pts fl·om loc:al telephone s ervicc.
This arr1oU.n·t wa,s clearly due P. The franchi:::-;.-,
o:·:-dinance wv.s not under seal but it w·a s recogriizod 'by D in an instrument to which D
':1ac: c.fflxetl its corporate seal. The ~128;000 for which P was suing was 3% of nva
g.:.·css receipts for local service from Jan. 1, 1962 to Hay 12, 1962 on which latter
d:ite tho 30 year franchise expired. During this 30 years P had erroneously e;h?.rg3cl
b sor,le ~~85Lt;.OOO ren·~als for use of the streets by D for its poles, wires an::l conduits. D attempted to avoid payment of the $128,000 it owed by relying on corr.:non
~ la1..r recoupment of the $854,000 rerr::als it paid through error (The 3% franehiEe tax
was in lieu of rentals).
P contended that common law re~oupment could not be used
aga.inst a sealed obligation and that the statute of limitations had run on any right
to rcco~er most of ·~he rental payments.
Held:tl) While common law recoupment cannot be used against a claim arising from a
sealed contract, the franchise ordinanee contract was not under seal and recognition
of the existenee of such a contract by an instrument under seal did not make the
contract so recognized a contract unde~ seal. (2) The statute of limitations will
not bar matters of recoupment(which must arise out of' ti1e same transaction--th~
franchise in this case) as long as the suit against which recoupment is desired has
been timely instituted. Here P has instituted its suit prcmptly. (3) In common law
recoupment there can be no recovery of any excess. So the final result is that
neither P norD is entitled to anything. (All that work .for nothing1)
F~LADING
.P.~ th::J

~
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE Credi+.ors Rights
20) Va.927
X owned 506 acres of land whi.0!1 wc.s subjec·~. (1) to two deeds of trust. (2) to
$242,000 mechanical liens on th-1 improvements and on as much of the land as was
necessary to the reason~ble enjoyment thereof, and (3) t..o P 1 s subsequent judgment
against X. A compromise &greernent b8t.ween the h0lders of the mechanics' liens was
effected by the term& of whir.h the ::.and was to bH oold to Y fo r ~t>135,000 subject to
the deede of trust condition<:d on tl:e chancellor's approval thereof. After the
~chancellor ascertained that the ourn due the mechanics' lien holders was more than
~t t.he value of X •a equity in the land thf-l chcmce;llor entered a decree confirming the
~\P· sale to Y and extinguishing pts lien forever . P was not made a party to the
. ~'< mechanics' lien sui'.:;, but one of X' s creditors wrote P to the effect that the
me~hani~G' lien hold~rs ~ere requestiP..g a d~cree ao p8r the one that was entered,
and if he had any obJectwn thereto he should make th8m known to the chancellor on
Sept.. 8.~ 1961 on which day the matter would be presented to him. P made no appearance on that da·te, and did not seek to set aside the fina.l decree of the chancellor
aa above set forth until after the expiration of tv1elve months from its confirmation.
Y/!8-673 provides that if a sale of prvperty be made under a decree of court and !a
confirmed, the title of the purehaser s hall not be dist.ur'oed.r unless within twelve
months of the confirmation, the ca.le is set aeide by the trial court, or an appeal is
allowed.
Have P's right!:l, if any, been extir:gu:i.shed by the chaneellor's decree and the passing of more than 12 months f:;,~orn the confirmation of the sale to Y?
Held: No, they ha-.re not been extinguishec. He has not had due notice. The letter
from one of xvs creditors was that person's voluntary act. It was not directed or
authori.zed by the court. It c.ould not give the court jurisdiction over
"Judgments*!~ without. service of p:rocGss in 8. manner not authorized by lc:.w, are void
judgments, and may be so treated in aay pro~eeding, direct or collateral." HeP..ce
the decree, in so far as P was conce rned, is void. V//8-673 (supra) has no application
to ·void decrees, and hence it is j.mm&terial thc.t more than 12 months have passed
since the confirmation of the sale ~ithout it8 having been set aside or an appeal
allowed.

f
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE--One Account or Six--Res· Adjudicata-206 Va.57
P was a fuel oil dealer. He sold oil to D for D's residence. D's place of business and to four rental properties. At D's request separate accounts were kept as
to each of the above units, but when bills were rendered the accounts were totaled.
Payments were allocated among these accounts by P's accountant. D refused to pay for
some of the oil delivered, and P sued D in the ~nicipal Court in separate actions
for balance due on each of the six accounts. Fi~e of these actions were removed by
D to the Hustings Court. The other one was for an amount too small to permit removal
Judgment was rendered for P on this account, and the judgment became final before the
other actions were tried. At the trial in the Hustings Court D moved for a separate
trial on each of the accounts and the motion was granted and trial was had on record.
number 5903 and judgment thereon was rendered for ~ despite a plea of res adjudicatan
The other four cases were consolidated and judgment therein was rendered for P
despite a plea of res adjudicata. D contended there was one running account, and
that a cause of action on the one account could not be split. P contended there were
six separate account. ,The Court submitted this issue to a jury, and it found that
there were six separate accounts. D was granted a writ of error.
Held: For P. While it is true that a defendant may not be harrassed twice for the
same debt, this rule is one made for his benefit, and can be waived by him. In the
instant case D requested separate accounts, tax considerations made separate accoun~r
desirable, and D himself- requested separate trials on each of the accounts, and a
jury has decided the issue of one or six accounts tn favor of P.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Mandamus
206 Va.l59.
The P Railroad Co. filed a petition against A County and the State Highway Commissioner praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus under the courts original
jurisdiction to compel the defendants to institute condemnation proceedings against
7it for damage done and contemplated as a result of the county's diversion of a
~ stream and the Highway's proposed construction of certain interchanges. P contends
that as a result of these acta it will have to expand $165,000 to enlarge its
·
culvert flow under its tracks.
Held: Mandamus denied. There are complicated and disputed facts which the Supreme
Court of Appeals is not equipped to ascertain. Nor will mandamus lie where there is
an adequate remedy at law. The County can be sued for any damages caused by it. P
can also proceed under V#8-578 et seq to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the
amount of damages caused or probably to be 9aused by the County and by the State.

)
~

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Statute of Limitations
206 Va.539.
P, a resident of North Carolina, was involved in an automobile accident with D, a
resident of Virginia, in Botetourt County on May 30, 1959. Five months later D
moved from the state and became a resident of Washington, D.C. On August 22',1963
p instituted a suit based on this accident in the Circuit Court of Botetourt County
· end caused process to be served on D under the non-resident motorist statute
(8-67.1) D filed a special plea ~f the statute of limitations on the ground that P
had not instituted suit within two years after his cause of action had acoruedl as
required by Code 8-24. P'a reply alleged that Code 8-33 tolled the running of the
statute as long as D resided outside of the state of Virginia. Code 8-33 provides
in part: nWhen any such right as is mentioned in this chapter shall accrue against
a person who had before resided in this State, i f such person shall, ~ departing
without the same*** or by any other indirect way or means obstruct the prosecution
of such right, the time that such obstruction may have continued-eihiii not be
computed as any part of the time within which such right might or ought to have
been prosecuted ••• n(Italics by the Court).
Held: Judgment for defendant affirmed. The purposes of provisions tolling the
running of tht statute of limitations during the absence or nonresidence of the
defendant is tt prevent the defendant from defeating the plaintiff's claim by merely
absenting himsetf from the state or by establishing residence elsewhere for the
period of limitation. However(quoting from 17 ALR 2d p.516) '~ere provision ie
made by statute for substituted service of process upon a state official in cases
arising out of motor accidents within the state, the majority of the courts have
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hel~ that such a provision has the effeet of nullifying any statute suspending the

per1od of limitations."· To hold that the statute of limitations does not run when
Substituted service of process is available would allow suits to be postponed indefinttely and permit a plaintiff to await a propitious time when defense wHut:~ses
would be unavailable, thereby depriving a defendant of any defense he may have as
well as preventing him from knowing until years have passed that he is charged with
negligence. Such delay could well lead to the equivalent of fraud.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-Lack of in personam jurisdiction
206 Va.$89~
H and W were husband ~d wife. In 1922 W instituted suit against H and a final
decree was entered in 1924 awarding W a divorce, child support and alimony. In April
1961 W instituted the present action to recover alimony payments for the period May
1941 to date. H's personal representative moved to dismiss the proceeding on the
ground that the decree of divorce was void on its face for lack of jurisdiction of
the court to enter a judgment in personam, in that it appeared on the face of the
decree that the only process against H was an order of publication. Wadmits that
the record does not show that H was personally served with process or that he had
made a general appearance but argues that there is a presumption in favor of the
jurisdiction of that court to enter the judgment complained of because it "did not ,
and would not, enter a decree which would be other: ? the right and proper, which
presumption attests the honesty and intelligence of the court rendering sarne.rt
The trial court granted H•s personal representative motion.
Held Judgment for Husband's personal representative affirmed. It is true that a
presumption is liberally indulged in favor of a court of competent jurisdiction
that the proper party is before the court. There is, however, no place for presumption where the want of jurisdiction appears affirmatively on the face of the
·proceedings. The record is presumed to speak the truth and can be tried by inspectr.·
ion only; extrinsic evidence not being allowed to impeach the veracity of the record.
In this case, lack of jurisdiction to enter an !2 personam judgment affirmatively
appears Gn the record. Where thAt fact so appears, presurnptigns cannot be indulged
in to supply the lack of averments respecting the jurisdiction.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Request for Admissions
206 Va.602.
In an action for damages f ar wrongful payment of insurance prGceeds the ultimate
question was who the decedent's wife was at the time of his death. Before the case
carne to trial P served the D insurance company with a request for admissions which
contained forty statements of fact. D's reply to a number of these statements was:
"The fact requested to be admitted is not within the knowledge of the defendant."
Code 8-111.1 provides in part that each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless the party served specifically denies or sets
forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny these matters.
P'a motion to strike these answers of D was denied.
Helds Judgment affirmed.(l)The decisions are split as to whether a party should b»
required to admit or deny facts which are not within his knowledge. The better rule,
and the one followed in the federal courts.(Code 8-111.1 is identical to Rule 36
F.R.C.P.), is that the party is required to answer ttif the means of information are
reasonably within his power . " However, in this case the court was "convinced that it
would have worked an undue hardship upon defendant to have required it to obtain the
information it needed in order to admit or deny the requests. The 'means of information• were not reasonably within its power.»· (2) As to the statements that decedent
never filed a suit for divorce against P and vice versa, it is manifest that, i f D
had been required to admit the truth of these statements, it would have admitted the
ultimate fact in issue. The intention of the legislature in creating 8-111.1 was to
create a procedure to force admissions of fact about which there is no real dispute
in order to expidite the trial and not to obtain admissions of controverted facta.

PLEADING AND PRACTICE-Motion to Strike' 599.11
206 Va. 792.
Defendant's truck was stopped in the' inside or passing lane of a dual-lane highway after dark, waiting to make a turn; when X's car struck it in the rear,killing
X and injuring plaintiff, his wife. According to defendant's version, the running
lights and turn signals were functioning properly before, at, and after the accident
Plaintiff was aaleep at the time of the accident but testified that no lights were
visible on the rear of the truck when $he awoke shortly after the crash. Both
parties introduced positive e;orroborativo testiinony on the question of wbether the
lights were on shortly after the cr~sh~ The trial eourt sustained defendant's
motion to strike plaintiff's evidence.~·.
Held: Judgment for defendant reversed. The evidence on a motion to str:tke is to be
considered very much as on a demurrer 'to the evidence. All inferences which a jury
might fairly draw from plaintiff's evidence must be drawn in plaintiff's favor,
unless they are strained, forced, or contrary to reason. It is a general principal
of law that a subsequent condition is evidential of an earlier one and the principle
has been spoken of by some as a presumption. Thus when there is evidence that the
lights on a motor vehicle were not burning immediately after an accident, this
evidence is competent as tending to show that the lights were not burning at the
time of the accident. At least, it is evidence constituting more than a scintilla
and it was error to strike plaintiff's evidence. Notet It was also held that a
statute requiring trailers to have reflectors, passed in 1960, was applicable to
trailers manufactured before that date.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE•Rule 5:1, Section 3(e,f)mandatory and jurisdictional.
206 Va.880.
Requirements of Rule 5:1 of the Supreme Court of Appeals , that oral testimony and
other incidents of trial, after beooming a part of the record, shall be presented
to the trial judge within 60 days and signed by him within 70 days after final
judgment are mandatory and jurisdictional, and failure to comply with them is fatal
to appeal.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
153 S.E.(2d)209.
Rule 5:1 sec.)(!) (dealing with the presentation of transcripts to judges)provides
in part that "Counsel tendering the transcript or statement shall give opposing
counsel reasonable written notice of hae time and place of tendering it and a
reasonable opportunity to examine the original or true copy of it." On Oct.l5, D's
counsel notified P's counsel that he intended to present a statement of the evidence
and incidents of their trial to the judge on Oot.20. On Oct. 19, P's counsel requested and received a copy of the statement. In the afternoon of the 19th both
counsel went over the statement and agreed to certain corrections and additions. At
the hearing on Oct.20, P's counsel objected to the judge's certification because
he had not been given a reasonable opportunity to examine the statement. P's
counsel suggested numerous changes, and the judge ordered that the statement be
amended as suggested by him. The revised statement was signed the following day.
Held: Affinned. What constitutes a reasonable opportunity to examine a narrative
of the evidence to be tendered the trial judge must be determined by the facts of
each case. In the instant case the statement consisted of only twelve pages. It
was amended to meet the suggested changes of P 1 s counsel. He conceded that it was
factually correct. Under the facta of this case, Pta counsel was gi~en a reasonable
opportuni. ty to examine the statement.

1

PLEADING AND FID.!CTICE
$99 ·.-12
154 S.Ed 121,
207Vao933
.
/:
Caplan V. Stant
.. /{ In an action to recover rental from D as a surety of c, the corporate lessee, p
\ \W#"' ~lleg8S in h~s c~mpla~nt that.Dts signa:i:.ur~ at. the end of the lease without reference
·'.J
... o the l.}apac:l ty 1n wh1ch he ngned makes h1m a surety of C. D demurs, has he admitted
by tt~.i~ semurrer that he signed as a su:cety of C'?
No.> the allegation amounts to a legal conclusion, the correctness of which is not
adm~. t t.::d by a demurrer.
t'~I.EADJ.NG/.AND

C, 1,#:1f'

tr'A1

" Jl

PRACTICE
Paytan v .. Rowland
l$5 S.,E.2d 36
a tenant 1 sued D for injuries received in a fall through rotten porch on leased
premiseso P ra:i..sed fact question in deposition as to whether or not she had exclusiYe possession of porch or held it in common with co-tenants upstairs• lower
court entered summary judgment for D.
Held g For Po-reversed and remanded. P's deposition raising question of fact ~• to
whether or not she had exclusive possession of porch was jury question. Once a
question of trial nature is raised, summary judgment cannot be entered.
\P !:

LEADING AND PRACTICE
1$5 S.Eo2d $6.
P . , who was both executr1.1t and sole distributee under the will of decedent, brought
an a.r~tion as executrix for a sum allegly owed decedent by D for nursery work done on
~
D?s prcperty. D moved to quash on the ground that P, as executrix, had no interest
~· ·
in the claim because she had made a final settlement of her accounts before the
•
Commissioner of Accounts. P 1 s motion that she individually be substituted as plaintif f was denied~
O.,,Ai"-' Held: Error. According to the general r~le, s~ long as the cause of action remains
~~the same~ a plaintiff may amend h~s actionAo as to chau~e the capacity In wntch he
sq9s from represept.at.iye to irldiJTjdnOJl. Here the cause of action would have remained
the same; D was the real party in interest as the sole distribut~e of any recovery;
D was before the court and would suffer no prejudice from the requested ohange.
~ ~also had a ri ht to maintain the suit in her re resentat·
a a~it
as
ttle.e o
ment of accounts, but continue indefinitely. This rule is unique to Virginia.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Chappel v. Smith
156 SsE~2d $72
In an action arising out of a motor vehicle aocident defendant defaulted by failing
to file responsbre pleadings within the statutory time period~ In the trial on the
q ntum of damages. The trial judge limited the defense counsel's participation to
ss examination of plaintiffs witnesses. Was this correct under Rule 3.19 Rules
-or _9;>urt?
e~~J in a case where unliquidated damages are sought, a defendant in default may not
~~
only cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses, but may also introduce his own witnesses
I
and evidence in mitigation of damageso

~

156 ScEo2d $98
PLEADING AND PRACTICE Wimbrow v~ Wimbrow
In a divorce action the trial judge prevented W from introducing into evidence a
3 year old bank statement showing her husband's worth at $277,000 when H said his
current worth was ;j~2o,ooo. W appeals,.
Heldt For Wo The bank statement was not privileged information and was pertiment
to H~ a present worth in that w~s counsel should have been permitted to ask H what
dispositions had been made of the assets listed in the fmnancial statement.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
207 Va o795.
p brought suit for construction of a lease o A commis sioner in chancery heard the
testimony and found largely for the lesseej Po D appealed. P now seeks to have the
appeal dismis sed because D did not give P adequate written notic e and time to examine the transcript prior to being certified by the trial judge for appeal. The
commissioner had certified the r ecord to the judge one day prior saying it contained
11 depositions of witnesses sworn before metto

Pleading and Practice
. 599.13
Held for D the lessor. Though under the Virginia rules 5:1 & 3(f) the judge's
signature is final. Here the signature of the trial judge for appeal was not required. The commissioner heard the depositions and could certify them to the clerk
without further action by the trial jqdge who had not heard the testimony.
;

PLEADING AND PRACTICE

159 S.Eo2d 623.
D was . convicted of first degree murqer. The testimony showed that the victim's
death occurred in the course of a robqery in which defendant participated as a
principal in the second degree. D's cqunsel offered jury instructions that every
murder is presumed to be in the second degree and the state has the burden of establishing the elements of first degree ~der. These instructions were refused.
Held for Commonwealth. The facts did not support a finding of second degree murder~
Under the evidence the jury could only have properly returned a verdict of guilty
or not guilty of first degree murder.

PLEABING & PRACTICE

158 S.E.2d 663
(Grover C. ) Brown v. Commonwealth
Facts: Defendant charged and convicted with incest relating to sexual intercourse
with his 21-year-old daughter. Defendant objected to the attempted use of his wif e
by the state as a prosecution witness and his objection was sustained. However,
defendant did not move for a mistrial. At the close of the trial defendant's
counsel moved for a mistrial based on the calling of the wife which forced the
defendant to object and put him in a bad light in the jury's eyes.
Held: Conviction affirmed-this conduct was grounds for a mistrial, but not ·unless
the motion was made immediately. The Court of Appeals said the objection was
waived i f not made immediately.

Pl.,& Pr.,
599 "13
He1c for D the les sor. Though under the Virginia rules 5:1 & 3(f) the ju.dge ' o
zigna·ture is final. Here the signature of the trial jndge for appeal was not rec;_uired. The commissioner heard the depositions and could certify them to the clerk
-vd:i.~hout further a~tion by the trial judge who had not heard the testimony.
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2 LE:iDING AND PRACTICE Federal Procedul;" e
337 ·u.S. 582-.
X o f the District of Columbia wished to sue - Y 6f Virginia in a Federal distriDt
c0urt on the .gro.und--of-d::i:-vernty of citizenship. An flct of Con{;r es s 28 u.s.c. 1 :~ 32
provi de s that the· word " State" as u sed i::J. that section includes th e t e rritori e s and
t h 0 Dis tri ct of Columbi a . It wap argued tha t Congr ess could not mak e the District ~
St:J.t o by l egislative fiat.
fie l d: ( 4 judge s dissenting) that the act is valid. C_zrigr <:: s s h as tho power to a llow
a G ~ izen of th~ Ui~txiQt__tQ br~ng_div.ers ity suits as ~ r Basonablo exor c is e of its
power, confe rred by Article I, to
l egislate for th o Dis trict of Columbia .
.
~

~

189 Va 982
PLEADING Mm PRACTICE
Th ,~ re was a t errific gas explosion in the bo.s ement of u. building owned by M.
PP a·
empl oyee of X who ope rated a bea uty s l: 0p ir, the building j\'"1\3 killed . P' s pe rsonal
r epr esentative sued M nnd also the Go.s Company. V4f- 8-96 ron.ds in pM't, 11 Now parties
dofondant ~ be added upon the a.f'fido.vit and mot::on of nny dofond::.:.nt where it appo' '
that such parties ar e or nw.y be lio.blc to such pla intiff f or c.ll or part of plaintif
claim." M movvd the court t o add X as X h t::.d ~~a s fixtures from which g as might h av e
esc aped , ancl a lso to add th o City s.s the City maintc.ine d a gas inspe ction forc e . Th
tri a l court r efus od to n.dd those parti e s when P's por sonal r e pr e s e ntative obj e c-ted
thereto and this writ of e rror was a llovved. 'Whn.t r es ult'?
Hol d : Affirmed. Pl ni nt iff c~1n..'iot b o madE: t o S:l0 pa rti es he do c s not want to sue.
Even the Federal Hule s (S ec Rule. 14 i r, Q, . 59 on p. 8 of F 0 der:1 l Proc edur e ) do n ot go
that f ar. To ho ld so wou l cl. bo t o c onvert j oit'lt nnd scvur al li nb ility in to something
e ls e and chru1g0 other s t ntutes by implication . I r,sucs as to thE: li ability of the
City and of tho omp l oy~::' r woul d vastly comp lic:::.to P' s pors on0 l r <J pr eso nt ative ' s suit
or eve n ove rshadow it. The stGtute is cxtrem0ly fr n.bmentnry--only a skeleton rule
gove rning t hir d party pre.ct1ce. Under the se circumstu:-:r;os tho court conc luded that
the wo rd "mav" in th e st':ltut o did not moun "must", but th~.t t such po.rti os sho uld bo
a dd ed on l y if the tri r.tl ~ourt thou.ght it bes t. NOT.£;. Ru.l e 3: 9 .1 abo lishes third
.rwrty pro.eti co ot J "'w st_o.tJ.n~r.:uls:Lf:'..Qndilll_t sho.l! be r·Jrmi tt od to bring in a n ew
po.r ·ty. "
PLEADING .fJ'JD PRAC TI ~E
Crininn.l Proc odur o
190 Vo.. 134
Dwn.s i ndicted for breaking i nb the C So..l~s Co .,Inc . with intent t o commit larc cn
end f or l arce_ny of a car th e rein all i n on e Q0unt . i'b0 Court f! ll owed the indi ctment
t o be r.unondoC. by inserting the f o llowing wo:rd.s l;J Gfor C:J C Sulc:;s Co 1 11 Ford Garage Buildin g b e l ong i ng t o". Tiw jury f ound D guilty aud Gen t er. cod h i m t o three yenrs in the
penit ontiory for bre r.. king and onteri n~ in the ni ght time (e. s t at1;1t or y f e l ony) and
to three yea.rs fo r l n.r ceny of the cor . D;i..s cuss po i nts involv(xl.
He l d : (1) The tunendJnent was pr op or. V# 19..-150 provid e:;; thnt a dofoc tiw~ indictment
mn.Jr be amondod n.t o.ny timo b . :.: f o e · '' ' ~ da.n:L p l L'ods_ if Uw amcndmQnt:ct:oo.s norGh ange
t.bo ch Qr O.Qter of the of.'f onso cha.r;.,ed, (2) The v erdict i s b nd . Tho s ettl od law in
'~'ir gJnia. i s that i f t v.ro of.fons os o.r o ch[-'.I'[,Od i n one e;o.unt the jury can convict of
oi,t hc r on() or the othor___Qut not of' botli Wh01'c tho mfJ.tt Gr charged -is one continuous
aff air
howe'IZor ther e nrc twt> so nrnt e counts then the 2.c c.us od cnn bo convict e'
PLEADING AND pi~;,C TI CE
Bi ll of RGvi c.JlN
190 Vn 145
B o.nd £ wer e br othror o.nd siste r ar. cl co - own ers of a. s in gl e froni ly dwelling. S fi l ,
u bill in e quity fo r PL\rt;it i on o.ll c ging th n.t s he wa;; :.: b l e nr1d wi lling t o t alee the
pr opE.; rty f or h er se lf puying: B fo r hi s i nt e rest , nn:.l thc.t B wn.s not )).b l e and willing
t o tuke the property f c,r h iT!'u'le lf p ~ yi Eg her for hor int e re st . 13 fil ed an answe r
pr ayi n[s tha.t tho p!.' porty bo s0ld '.\t public Ltucti rm e.nd c1 onying t ho.t h e was not abl r.
and willi.ng t o tnko th e pr operty hi:m.a 0 lf. At this point B lost inter est in tho co.s<
pai d n <) attent i on t o thu r1o pN;itionc tha.t s t nol;: UJ:.<.cl u i sc!1a r ged his ntto rney. The
c r, urt r e ferred the rnnttc r to a Cornrni sc i onor in 'Ch ~.nc ery who f our.d th e value of t h e
pr r)po rty t o bo $3500 . 'rha c '1ur ~·. onte :r orl. d€lcr oe in which it stot od that B was not
!J.b l c and

555A,.
"'-·Uling to purchase the property, that S W3.s, and that S should pay B ~jil,:t50 and
;· :1(mld receive a deed from the commissioner in chancery of B's interes·t . This decree
" as , entered July 30,1947 o On Sept.3,1947 defendant B came to life and fileda pet5_ti.on
for a rehearing. The chancellor refused to entertain such a petition on the gro,.md
t~at the decree was a final ono no longer in the breast of the court, but treated
·+t.ha
n;:;tit.ion to rehear as a bill of review. Was this proper?
·
0
.J ' ~
Held: Yes. A: et,ition to rehear comes too late after a decree has become final. In
f~. c.- .~S '.lC~ a case i
is p;ro:Qer to treat a etition -to rehear as a petition for a bill .of
revJ..ew.
· In the above case could the trial court allow the bill. of review on the ground that
the evidence failed to support the conclusion of fact set forth in the decree that
the brother was not able to buy the property?
Held: No. Except in the case o
r di§cove:red e_yig_~nce a bill of review lies
only: for error_ o ;Ll~w apparent on the face of the recordc In this case there- is
nothing on the face of the decree to show that the conclusion of fact set forth above
was an error of law. If the errors complained of be errors of judgment in the determina~ion of facts such errors can be corrected only by appeal,

fJ;

PLEADING AND PRACTICE
E~ity Pleading
190 Va.380.
P had a judgment agains D which he claimed was a lien on certain realty and filed .
bill in equity to enforce the lien. D had transferred some of this land before the
judgment had been obtained but P cJ.aimed these transfers l'Tere fraudulent. P's counsel
without having presented any evidence, tenrlered and asked the court to enter a deere
referring the case to a commissioner vrith directions to report, among other things,
"what real estate was transferred by the defendant without any consideration as set
out in the bill of complaint." The trial court refus ed to enter such a decree. Was
this -error?
Held: No. "An order of. .eferen.c e is not to be awarded to enCl..bJ& a .Qlainti.ff to
make out his case. It should not -be made. for the purpos e of furnishing evidence in
support of tha .allegations ·of the bill, nor until he has the right to demand it."
Before P .is entitled to an order of reference he must show by depositions or by
evidence ore tenus that there was fraud or lack of consideration so it might first
be determined by the court whether the properties were in fact subject to the lien
of the judgment, P was not entitled to shift to the court's commissioner the burden
of taking evidence
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APD PRACTICE
9ontriOlJ,;t j un Q.P-9:-?tl brog::.tiqn . .
190 Va. 851 .
D·tJ.o tc tho j cdnt ::le;gli,c;:o:;:·.co of P and D, X uc~s sor ic-u sJ.7 injurod. P prope r J.~r coB;:-.::.·:~~··: is ..)C:. tho cc..sc:; f or .>10, 000 c.r.d _n::i d so.r1o to X. P c arri e d l inbiJ.i t ;}' im:11..~r <.•.Pe c :.l~1Cl
I , ·!~:-,o i nsurer, r c imbm·sccl. P . Arter mc ro t.h8.n a y o:cr from the d c.te of t he :Lllj m~y ;-,l:.s
·r:Lti1::.n c. y0~.'-r fr c'l~ tho d ate of tho pnyrcnt P sued D f c•r tho usc of I f er ~15 , 000
c :ntr:lbutirm . It vJOS c nnto:xkc~ , ( l )tJ)o.t the st<.' .t1:te of limUc.tions k1.d rm1. Hol(1: ~·T o .
'['[:.c :.: tc.tuto of liB-! tc.t·; ons.-did-.no.t ~st :.:n-:t t o ru:1 until P had pr:dd mcro t~m: his shc,rc
c.i' tho ~\>1 0 000~ [:nd sinco c ontrl ' ·i llL i.s_ f.m.lm;losl_Ol1. . . .et. . . c_cntr..:::Lc_t _inpliod _in .J.<:>_-,,_ tho
pcr icd iG thr.uO-y.oars. (2 ) It \1ets c c:1t ond c d tbc.t since o.n I nsur,:>.:nco C!l. •. .rn.s ,,_ot a.
t ortf cnsor tho str-.tuto c.lJ.c·"lrTing ccntributj en h1 ·i:.0rts cf ;·,'cn:J n,~g lj_r_;o nco ne-t h;volvi:
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PLEADmG AND PrlACTICE Ros 1\.d.iudic:-:,tc. Docl:L ratr;r~r Judr;:••c nt~
190 V2. . 873.
H nnd i·J were hush['.,1cl ~u~0. 1.Jii c. l"Faiod C'i.lC d cvis,;d B1::-,ckc.c r-e t o H m1til his dc~1.th or
ror:tr.trri .",go , ::.nd then to P \:hen he b o cnne;s 25 yc~'.r:s (:>f ~'.30 . H romo..rr:i.ccl befor e P b e-c nno 25 yc c:.rs of :c.zo. P :-•<::~ ·g~"lt nnd :::e:c,_~ ·: ::;--:1 a de:cJ.~.r · . i"/ •ry ,ind~;r"cnt t o tho offcct th:..::t
ho, P, \-JIJ.S ont i tl.of;_ tr' ·l;l·\c r-o·:.,_ ts rc:·~ ;:··,· c f .i.ts :.:1.J.t1::.r~.11?;h ho F'.'.:-.; D 0t ~' C: t 25, 2.nd H
v a cated tho promise :>. ·~Tto:l P suod H f c.r the rr.:". s : :~ ;::.hJ.o v o. JJ;;r.:; ,_,f tho rent<.1 l s for tbo
pcric1d fr or:J. his ror' :..crr:i. ,·~HC t o his v :::.c::>.: " .-;,c d t~;s prc:.1i.sos. l-l c ontcr.d ,Jd tho nnttcr
\ill s r os ndjudicc.tl:'. Z1.!:( U .:::.t l:,o c ol..I ~L£:1 . . c'~ bo h -1i co v ·,x:j1_ f c;r tho srJ;le thing.
Ho ld : Cont enti on lli"\8'~;1.nc/~ . Tho dGcl:. ">.r ::·C. : r~y ju:.l'r.~ .1c.,nt. c~·. (::~; d c cillud thu abstr:..::.ct
rights of t ho n&rtios.
It U:i.. d ~-~ ·.:;t cL:d..-Ie =~·or purD. ,....ort t o c~ <:cj_r}o tho 2.i::ntmt duo P for
tho occupc:::. t ic·n o f Blo.c: ~:t.crc , or to c r -::·.nt c.. ay c·: ..c:Z~f-,rc relief. lfol!Cc the ~.ssu0s ':J CTc
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C,

n nech:o nics lion in the su;:J c::f /), OCO. D ;:~1l z_,,., ~; -] ·i,}·~o c~~['" ~I; o f.;c- by .le fr".ul t. Tho CCl~r
d ocroe('t cJn A1~guo t S'tl 1 ·t:2~·.t C rc'c ovor c;f D ·:~<; , (;CD, LJ,;·.t ·c.l•c; C ". ~':.: ~jo r ofo:;:rod t o a
;:1.1.s t or c crunissicnor •.r >o H C. S r:'l.iroc tu·l to ~·.r~c crtc.:in ~· :ll: ru·t_~c,rt ·th e l i0ns _:'..i.1c1 tho order
c-f th·:: ir priority c•: D ' s J ::.1~d c :.-::.1. 1.11.;:J .J.d :l.ng . S>Jrrt J::,.- ·i:.l-;c; :r;, ~ fto :;:' t h e: · :.~'. sto r cor-'.:· ~i .s:-; :i c,_,
fil ed his r oprTt -::.o 1-J';ic> :w oxc cmt i ·. :·;s Here; tr.:1 n:.,, ··.r,d en :S cy.rc. :Z l,l9/~8 n decree <n.w
en to r od c onfir;:d.ng th :i r:: rct r~ rt ~:1c\ c·r'::.ol'i ~g th :.~ pr c-pu·t~,r tr·~ l-: ~J s c1d t o s c. tisf:;· t~-,o
liens thereon. At tll:..: r~o::<t tcr :::\ :·f C•c h t D f5l o;i :_ ·~·~· ·L:i t~.<./t c<llq;j nb· th;:-t s ::ncc C.ho
c;ntr~: of t,;1e ,Jecroo s ·..:o"~t:i·. :·wcl ::~h -~ Nc he J-E·~d disc nvr)!'0t'l ;~k·.t U!cl'o •~ oro r: or ·i.c.us do-·
f octs ir: the c oas t 1:rc ·c5.cn n::' t. >o buil cl.:Lcg ru·,d t Lu 1.::.::w ::f j.i~,·~ ·.r c.Jx'r n;::.t .)ri::.ls, c;·~ J tl' ~
such d of cJcts c 0uld :·.:ot k~vc b cor -Jj sc 0V·)r<x1 bJ~ t.l e oxu~ cis e of ;_l_l}C; diligence. It b e ·
c ,::.;:c !lnt:.r:i.a J. to clocir."!.c Hl':cYG)'c r r: ' !YJ"t. +.lJc.; ." b<::vc r:oc :r-ccs 1rnr c finc.l d ocro <).S •J I'

intorlocut.or :yr ckcr8cs . 1·n1 :i ch ~·.rc J.;~:oy?
Hold: They c. r o intor:tcc1:·:_,_-,r~' 'J.o cr c~: s ;".n:' :\'> onc e m;.bj c ct t c, pot:i.t:i. o'1 fer rcbo::cr in;:;, 1
r· l " r.::ub j oct
n·J· •V'......' \.,_;r.: (,.,
'"'·1··f). ll' ·· 1 ( l0 CI' '", '"rr·'t +··•• · i ;.,., ·. i~ ,.~J . .,.. -~ q r·,rc 1 1 v11i.~,_;,:.;.;;,.c-c><• ·f -~ 1,,.., ,,.1-.
:j.;.,:... -6
b
1
th e r oli --; f th c:.t vl f.'..[~ ~ - J 'tc:··.-r; l~ ·.t:Jr.1 , - - ·<.:C1d ] .c:-,1V ~,s ·Jf.i:.Linu tr· lx, cJ • no in tho e a u sc s".V(~
t osupc r i nt cnd r':in"r. ~:t(Jr:i. :c JJ.'/ t i.;- .Jxccnt:i_r'r! r' f tL~ ·lv:::."cc:11 • 1!U.l o th::-. t portion pf the
decree f i :;c.i.n[; D 1 s peTs·~·,)::-. } 1~ ·:b~_ : .. :• f.'j- ls f Jl~ ':1 t > .0 ,,._::; n• t t be s ourc e of oq11.itQblo
jurisdi cti on \..Jhicl1 E:e>l~n·c ~; ·.r ~·<i.: t he. d ::;>t ·i~c- 1. ·. r ,_;e J. .. Ec ·'.:;,> L!;;n i n oqui ty . The cc1.P1l o·(
re lie f srmght b~,. the li -:.: n c::-•;r'l__;_-:,r,r , C, ~ c PL: ' j r t 1">.:; :.~c c · :-T· ,]_:; nho'l tmt .i 1 the property
h.-:.cl 1•oon sc-l cl, tJ:1o n<.>.J.. <J c·~ pfir;· ,ucJ r:1:-.l :~.h :: ;:;r c c cv1s c:t:i.s t r:; ht.~.tccL Thus n furtbm: clo crc
w:>.s nocess::-.ry f or ti~c; o cc ·-!-;Db G1'!· 01:t d ' tho s1. 2 ·;·~ c.ncl l". 1. · ~i. s l"''.;q1:;.ir cd judici:;: l r:. s
disti ngu i shed fr cn r:D.n::..~;·krl~:J. ·:'.c-r.~·:-'•;! by t}.u c: t ,;~t.
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Pl;'.inti f £' sued dofondo.nt f 0r d~~r.':-:gos n r u:ing out of c.n c. uto colHsion ::'. nd r ccovOTCd
:J. '!~15 00 verdict. On ~·. ppoo.l tho judg::ont vTo.s rcvor sod bc ccn.lcc of i111propor in;:;trlJ ct:;_r;;y;
--u .•c~ -a new tri;·~J. grc.nted . Upon t ho snc ond tri a l ;_Jl nintiff >W.s ''' mrd ed a v er dict c-.f
:~;? , OOO .S o vero.l days thor o0.ftor d of ond.:t2·1t nhd his counsc:l discov enJd for tho first
tir:;o th~.t.t one of tho jm·ors on tho sec ond trial had c..l so s orvr;d as a juror on tl-:o
f~ .r;o i·, trio.l. They O.SDic;n thi s QS r e ve r s ible Ol'ror.
Before thinl t ho defense at;l:,crr: e: ·:
:·,·:.d r.. skod :_;.}]_ jurors if ttwy he.r:l cxp1'e~Jsod any opinioJ.!. in tho c-J.sc r:.ncl '·Tn.S tv1d. n:.l . ·
The ro c or cl Hh ich \v ets two.iJ.~blc t o cotmsc l disclos ed tho previous se:rvico of tho ju:r· or,
but 1:0 one discove red i t until c. ft e r _tho trial. Should o.' no:1 t ri ~·. l be gr~mtccl?
Hol d : No. It i s t oo l o..tc c,ft.;:;r the vo rdict~bj c ct to tl:.e conpotcmcy of c. ju:cor
unlcsc one is o.blc to s : ·m1 thr.t c r.m;;o for chn llcugo oxistcd u ld tho:t in the e:x·J rc~ co
ofdilOaili[<;cnco thc:t t c::t'sc: cm1 lcl not hc.vo boo n disc ovoruc~ bcf or o t ho jury \ 't..'. S m1nrn
L~Qd a lso t hnt he ho.s boer: :lnj ured . In t he imJto.n,t c:1so n oi·;Lot> c-no of t hose t'ro
()~_;s;mtj_c~ J.s ~tms shovm. Dof ol-:!.do.nt ocn-:1ot sny thc.:t h o hc.s b ee n prc ,judicod h~{ tho j 1.1rcr I s
htcving sorve:d t'.gd.n r:c:r ::.~ J.y b ocD.u sc: he cUd no·t:. h:mg tho jury i:::J C'. cf ond o.nt 1 s f c-.vor .
The qi.LOst ion o.:Jlwr.t t ho ~ur ors nor;.:lR-lly "'ould indicc.t o n probe f r.r p os sible p~~rt io. lJt~r
r~·.thor tAK1Xt t ho poooibi1~.t3· of cno uf thor.. l:.c.vinr; rondc~r:, cl. t. ~)rovi ou s jury vc rc~i c ·C. .
~-zoz r ends, 11 l'J o irrO[:;ul a rit y· i c:-1 ---thc er.lp:~nolin:; 0f jurors r>hrtll b o suffici ) P.t t()
sot a side a. vord ic~ vnlos ~; t l1o p.::'. rty nnLi.ne; tho cb:J () Ct::.en '.· r.:·.::; i"·Jj urod ~r tho
irregul o.ri ty or unlocs c.n o1j c ct ion spo cificL:.liy p 0int i j11?; n~t such irr ogul;".ri t ics
w:cs r.1c.dc befor e th o suor~ri.:-:G d ' t.l-)o j ury; - n .
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Plctintiff o.llogo-d in hi::; :-c:l:.ic0 of nfJt:i.on thz::l 1-:o "~- s t ot::lly l1iSt:blod .:--.s ;::. rost~lt
of em nccidcnt on Av.c;u,~t 26 9 191,.9 , : nd U·· ~~t :.bfc~1d::'.~1t i nsurLt"r'c:-) c onpo..ny h~'..cl fai l cc. to
m;_:c ko Ponthly po.y;:!;·;,,-(;::; ·v :15.i ~ the:J.'o c.f t r.:.:r .~. G i +, ,,r: .r;· oLJ i e;: t c~~ ·:; c· ci.o un-::1e r pl o..intiff ' s
c ontr.:;.ct of incu.r :-·.nco dtll dof'ontlo.nt. Dc f om1ant fil od p J. ;::;c.s of tho gcmc r i'..l is suo,
rolonsc, c.nd c.c cord (--.:2c1 s:~ ti s:fn cti o;'\, i,t th'J hog:i.nr:~ ng of t;·,.::: cr ±c.l , -1urj_ ng tho
cxo..ninat:i en of thu first H:i.t:1oss, t he court ~: Jlmwd plc5ntif:f' t n <.'. >·c:xl. h~cs '!ot ico of
noti on so D.s to c~ llcp;e; t~:::>.t tho <2G t o of c G; .2 ;or.co~ ·.ont of hi s tc-t:.:l di s ::,bili t ;;· 1:m. s
Augus t 15 instcrd of Jmr:t <>t-, :2 ~1 . Pl ::1.intiff 1 s oxp l:~~l:.t:i 0~1 of t!1o c:::- it:,in::·~ l orr·c:r >Jo..s
t h:.'.t his r;:d. lr• !=. ~d f c rc.i ·[.'.n J·::.CI. c.:.r r:i.ccl hj;·.l e:n th:J po..::roll p;:,til tl~o l ;c.tcr d(Cto , so
pla intiff h~·. d thought cf tre e, r ::.:t hor tL::'.::l t he r].~:tc cf tho -::. ccic1o~Jt, o.s bdnr; ti-~o
rln t o cf his dic>nbili i~.'.r . Dci\md·:·.nt c-b.j octcd to t h r.: :'.r ·.c:K1;-\.::~1t, but r ofusod tc tc.~ cc
ndvnnt c-.r~c of :;.n offer 1);:' c l·.-nt:i.m.:_,~ncc redo by l;0 tl ~ pJ..c..intiff ,· :·.d th e c 0ur t . The re u c.s
s one quo sticn c.s to 1·!hcn l:.hc ::cccidont r~c tt<j.. l:i· clid •:,ccu r. Sh •:t:l'~ tho o......,onclr.en t lv'.Vo
hewn t,llowod?
H old : Yes. Bet h co.
. w.~ ."'.l\c1 s t.:_t,:·t.o lm: .::. l loH Sl.l.!)st~mti:-·.1 c· ;·:on.c. T!ont s -in t}:c.: olo".L~in·::s
..._,
for tho pr_ouoti.oJ.1-CJ· ' '.u: ·t .ico.. Til;.; cc::cncl:·:()nt w:.s r.·onJ.::.;!o t0 ~'- r:J.-;. tori~'-1 fc..c t in con- ·
t:r: o~.:n·s.y:,
· a_.clut l: of tJ1Y ;·.c_, :LC'. ont >-r!! ich C['..Uscd tho dis "..bj li ty . The chccngoV:'~. s o.llowx~
b0fcro c.ny but a snc. ll 0-~: ·.ouni:. c.f o v i r~.cr'!c :: h:2cl h r)on S1 'h. .it-Gd.• It '-res s till pos:J i blo
f or d c fondm~t t o introcb ccv r;v.l.( cm c c th: .t th o 1~ 0\ J c1:·•. i,.:) H" s vr -:-ng , •-. nc~ dofonrlc..nt H <J.G
off orr.:cl t:'.. c;:-.ntinWJ.nc ~ ~/l rH'UP<'.t'O his c ~so bu t r ofv...;cc1 it or; the gr.:.unds it Houlc1 be
of no bc!lcfit to h:i : ··. st~c·t. t •:r,~c inv·.:: lvo~~- ~-~C V/!8--119 , 3- 21'1' .:-.ncl. G-532.
-~
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Quiclloy n.nd CJnnton \J :··•··o c e;:wictc,l in PoJi.c• ) C(-·urt cf ;n·c-;:>ntj :1g i.l. "nun1x;rs retcLot 11
in t ho City of Norfcllc . Sc.vcr::J. ,1_oy:::: J.,~.-t·~ r th(J Co>T:: ~C'·D'.Je: n }::J~1 1 S Att.ornoy fDoc]. L'.n
infornc.ti on ~g;.: inst C'. !I'L~C~f.J..:n ~jc.Jn.n j_n Hhicl' +,1~·. c pc:.:L r ho..d b oc~l ·:1r :Lving c-:t. tho t :i.no of
o.rrc s t and <~163. ') !,. il'. fcc:~0l"Cl Cl: :,:'r01JC7 ~-rl ~ir:.~~ H C.s i•; t 1<d:c pc·c ~ ~.:; ·:,s r. t tho ·ci:le: , c.slcint;
C0ndunnn ti on o..nd f~T.f.'c·i.:tt•.l'u ':'l r.hu :.;r•.' i )O rt~· t( thu St :·-.to . Qu.:Lc:lo;y· nnd Clo..nt on Cl.l1311Cl'"'· ·' ....._. ..
,,,·,·t
· .--r,!·•l--,]_i
''. r;
'"~ 'Jh
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.
t.:. ·tll"·"
...... v -!- ' o T-Itt'
,
u
.
..... --·r l r:,
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fo rfr:; i.tu r o s t .:l'tu t c , ,. ,_ m1 ti :~':i: +,h,;ru 'r:.s n c· o v ~_ :' .cr>c o t c c t'c~:-·o ct t:1c i:\C; l10j' in their
p ockr;ts -.,Jith Lb.-.ir uu.nb.. n·s .:--.ct·v:;_t _!J; s . At th e V _l,c c-f .c.. r :'Gr~:~ ';)137 . 68, cv :.r ::>20 of it
:i.n chnneo , v! 0..0 f ounrl in Qu~clr;y ' s pocl~;) t s . li\:.rt}-,c r cr·r~t. cn tJ.(·p ·-. ms nc:do that u.rKlor
Va l 9-2J2 ,.· Hhicb. prcLil)it;: t>ro:::c CL'. t. :;__ , •11 w:·1or Pc ru tl::.·;1 r::rJi.! r.Jc·:~t~ .~-:-. • ) C·r 0rdin:1nco "\Th er e
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558 (nel·l) 573 (ole~)
a violation of more than one stc tute or ordinance , t he r;r esen ·.
;,·~ ~:.t 'l ~:~s bar:'ed by tho Police CoFrt conviction . Also ·ap:t::J ear:~ n;:; in t he proceed in:_::D u:.~; .·
,:_ ,;~od.u. t e s Discount Corpbrat:i on, Hhich cla:.i1:1ed th2.t it ho.d a vc.lid lien on th 3 c :T i:"
. ~-,) O~:ou::1t of '~S7 8 6 , i3J, tlmt :i_t hc.d 110 lmoHledge of the USC to Hhicb th8 c ~:.r bac1 !xl nc'!
:··~ L~t
~~.:nd tfi.:J.t its lie:~ sllo~·ld 1)8 s;:;.t.isfied before t. J1c state condcj~m ed the cr2r •.
Euic.: (1)Code 19-]..-"8 is 11pplic::tbl e only ~~2.:..s r tm:inal. p.:;~oc..e.ed :i.ng::; . __Tho pr oceocLi.n::_~ j~ o
tcr.Ccit oron:;:ct is Hho-: 1 -'l ·in re~~ It is a civiJ. cc:.se, net <;c cdrainn.l proce()_dlin g .
2 'I': .o st~;:~.t·o.to(Vtil8- 302 o.llous for feiture to the st :~t e of 11 2.ll .-. pe rson~:.l propcrt '/ of :::tny kind or cho.ro.cter, 11secl in c onnection Hit}; the r :'ol~lot i on, operatior~, o:c
c c-:xh:ei;. O'~ ~'.ny l ottc2:·y1t. C1occrl :r i t cover s both n cr.:::.~ u soC lly those colloctjng
m."':Jbor s slips and ·l~>o money 1.~secl by thoril i n 1:1aking co ll ect~ . ons o.nd pa ying ,.J'5 .nner s .•
(3) QuicUey offe red x1o r;xplo..nation for his havin;~ 0vor ~::aoo in h i s po sso s~1:!. on,
:: · ~uc:1 of it in c ~H:tr! :~o . The t r ial judgo couJ_d fine~ th.:>.t t he 1:wncy wc1s used in r•c:.ld~1r::
c0lle ctions .
(L~) Tho Jgn or c.n c ,;_J)f o'w e~.g_nn_;i.nterost in tho m·orJor:lz· th::tt i~ i s bo:l.ng ns ~d
fq,r_ i11') 2:1ll pur posos i~>, ~:1:dc.:)r t h o Virp:ini.o. st:•.tl;t o , n o d ofc~1 s o to tho f or foi b-.ro proceedings _. Thoro is no "._,:Orit .to the ~i0i1or 1 s contention t '..:ci:. Hs lion shot:J.-1 b :3
:ttL"Gls"fj_od ·bofor •-:3 tho Stc. ::.o ::; l"ould t.o <~ J. l ovo cl to ccl:dor:r:". the cc.r .
Tho t a ct of liG.biJj_ '(:,~ : :.; tho guilty net of tb o on e h:.v:i ng cln.rgo of t ho property.
an ::.ct in

s imultanem~sly
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Pl c. intiff and five othc:c L'.nd m.mcr o ob,jcctod to tl1e vc, l:id i t~,r of n tax nssescod to
c over cost of gnrbc.. &::o co l le c t~ on i ;1 tho county . All or::i.n3 -i:.l! ~'. t c l~Jve n thousc.nc1 other
t n:;.']_)aye rs 1.;e:rc simiJDrl~'.~ s :!J~1 'L.'.t od, they p lr;d c. h:i11 i n o qui ~y to en join c olloct :i.on
of tho tc.x , ba sjnc; o<;ll.i ·l:.? ,j m·isd:i.ction up on c.. voicLnc c o~L' a i;mJ.tiplicity of suits .
Held: Equit:r hL\S no ju::c isdj_cti.oJ:J bc cc.v.so V{58- J.l58 providos tl'.::'ct no suit to r ostr,:d.n
tho o.ssossmoiJt or colle c·c5.o't a: o..r;y tnx shJ.lJ. lx.l n c h:to.:bod in any c ourt in tho
Cor.1J.lom1enlth oxc c:,Jt >·r:·; cn. tl ~c ro is :10 ('doquett G r o~ody .::t t l~·.H . Pl1'1.inti ffs hero h.:~.d n.t
l oC!.st thr oe r er1od t cs o.t 1 ,· .\·T; ( l )1bdc r V#58- 1145 t hrwe;h 58-11 51 of the Tax Code t llcy
c ould ho.ve appli ed t o <'- c cmrt of l e.H for c. n ardor of oxo:-lor.-·.t :ion r estraining tl:o t:.:.x
collector fr om c olloct :i_c"lg :m~r ;:T:'oneous c:.m3u s.s:~~o nt :r!.nc. cUn:c.:t :Ln<; hin1 to r·otv.rn. w1y
nmount a l ready p::-~ id . (2) U:1.oor V/1 58-841 of tho Tax Co<Je 1 ::'.ny Dix l:~rdounors of ·the
county coul d h:.1vo f er cod t ho Cor;r.:. onwoC!.lth 1 s At torfl.oy tv c ~.;'TG o ct Jhc vc.'..]~id i ty of the
"" · ss'·lont J.'1 i·v l•e;
...,1.trJ..
'-') 'T"..,.
,,_. co·
), ~ v L
" _'""~
d t1...l!U"' t·-~,-,~.~
n.rll0o 88ot11 co-.
,..1,··1
u..:;,SQ
. . . . . . ci·~cn
. . . . .l
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. u c~-.~
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.· u lo'
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l c.H princip l es f e-r r ·J c ov ...T~· af the c..;:wt.mt p <'. icl . T:-nw o q ,_~:i.t·.-· h·.cs no jurisdi ct ion to
cnj oh-1 a sscssG·:mt n:c· c o lloc·~, ~ c.n of n s t ::.to or loc:.:.l to.x 1.n Virgin:L'J. .
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PLE..<i DING fdrD PHS.CT I CE D c cr ~ os Dro confes so
The bi ll ('f coupl~·.il1':; in n c:oncr ,-::1 cr;:;di'C. or 1 n s uit in oq_<.J.:i ty ::tll ce~x1 t hat 11 fr on
\-Jh,n. t he ( plc. i ntiff ) h~.s 11:;~·.1·r1 oT j _,3 l ed t <J [).-)lj_cvc.l 11 dc-i'cndo.nt Oi~n ::: d .:'.n int or ost in n
Lynchburg n; rcc.ntiJ. c o oncc:n. DcfOlld:'..nt. f c'.iJ.oC. to ~·.r:m!()].' th o bil l , ::-.nd it H O.S t;'.~ :e 'l
for c cmfosscd :·~s t r) ) o5.~ : f.~ TK1 J.; lw c::msc r ef e rred t o :'. c O? •lL::i. :w ~; on cr t o c'.scertn:in tho
oxtc:1t of dcfcndo.nt 1 s cut.:·:~·,~, . L~~tor tho pnJc c.:di,l;;s '.J ~; r (; 8EGp(; ndocl " t tho r oqnust •Jf
dofondc. l·lt t o cnc:·.bl-:; hir. ~o :::ctU.o Hith }d~; cr.:cU.torn. j_ft ~l r f :ivo yo:'..rs passod vr i th •10
fu r ther nct :ton bc~.n~. t r. ~ :on in tho suit , it H : .s di::;r,::i.:J[>;;· ' fr c1,; th :: d 0clcct undor tho
fi v c _;re;r·.;· rule; . I ~.l -~hn p:c:~~s.:mt :su.:i.·c. oYer -~; h~~ mmDroh:i.p of -~.!1 o Ly11chbt<
.r,s concern , :Lt
is contonct od by pl:_-1. 2.:1.tiffr;, 1·h r) '.'r;ro C(r t k1\:m.c1c~.nt:::; in tho !.'l r0v · ' YLL.'3 rmit, th:-.t tho
r_locr oo pro C,...·11ft;sc n j_~~ t !'O pr~y·.,r~1.~:·1.1EJ :Jtj: t·, Js C t:~:.-.: cJ..u. s :i VC t."?<f -~:.:he (lllCf:'t i c::J. Of C:hrncrsl1i1)
i 11t c ru~t in t ho ~. 1~;::.-~c ~~~~ -~-~-~ - lc.~ 83 t c.CJ.i0 >::·.:ur.t .
llold : Tho ducrue J.):C'o c o"1fce:::o h'-' c.:; 3.s nc·t cr:.:Jc J.u::::_: ·:r.-) . T>c 1. :iJ.J.. (~~1ly c..llc ;:,;e::cJ. tlt::t·:; on
i nf or n.:J.tion ~mel 1: ·di::':~· tl!\~ ir:i·, ,;J:'03 t i<T.':'. S <'.i3 ;::t:·~tor~.• rt':1 c :~>.et ·l:,i::'t the C2.US C \h1S ref erred t o t}1c c cnd.fJr>:·· . ·~;K r ;;l;ou:; L:.c t. :·.ht:: ' :. .t ·;·,, ,y' u. -. f, .-~ 0 t ·:: :cc. ·.-i; od c·. :c:.: scttlod . riot onl;y
thc.t , but if the clccrco :·!l'C· C O''J :i:\:.:f.i~:;c, :1,·.~ d put tl1 c i .:.~t';cx t c ::· _):Tt 1 J.·~. HouJ.c't l":c.vc i1 ccn
b0t\-TC011 plaintiff ~'.lcC1 clc:!.'c~~C~C.D.t , 2.:1Cl :1ct 1.~otvv~r; cr>.. ·'\JfC; ::r: · ~cnk: >:".:·1d th e dcfc;:cb~-:!t. .
\
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PLEADING AriD PR.ACTICE-Incorp orn:t ion of Ev~dco1 co_ir.l tQ Re c or<;l
191 Vc. • 73.
Virginia is not enforcing the crinl1n<::.l l~cH · of o.ncth er stntc 1r1he r o tho Commissioner
'Y;~ Mot or Vehicles r ov olcos tho dri v or ' s license of a. Virgini n -res ident wh o has boo;!.
. c orni:i.cted of drunken driving in a :tviary1e.nd court. Purpose of the Virginia stah1te
2:J.a.king revocation mn.ndCLtory in such a case is to protect Virg inia citizens in their
~we of the highways.
The court on appeal Hill not consider petitioner's cantent :io;1 tr11t the Ha:rylu.nd
c onviction vms void for l ack of jurisdiction Hhere the certificate of exceptions r,ays
only tha t pet:Ltioner was held for 39 hours \oTithout 8.rra i gnment or the opportlm'.ity fo:r
medical examination but d oe s not shm1 evidence of any kind to supnort tha t c ontent ion.
!Petit ion e r : should_have objecte~ to exclusion of hi~ e'?-dence in _the lov:er c our t ;:>..L1C~
had the e v ldenc e 2ncorporated mto :the .re cord. As 1 t lS, t here lS notlung t o shou
\oJhc.t type of evidortce he Jmd, if"'" .nny~ or whether it 1.-ms lr;g:1l or admissible. I f ther e
were e rrors in the 'tvh!'ylani1 proceedings petitione r :::~auld have apprJa1 od.
,

~..

II'

""

..

PLEADING ~iJ:D PHACTICE-Doin ?; Business. for So_:ryi c e of Process·
1 91 Va.l36.
Dc fendt:mt corporo.tion '\ras cha rtered in Hasr.mchusotts t a mrmufacturc c.md sell offi c e
equipment. Its plant::.: and •)fficos He ro in Nm·T York <.;.nd i\~a;::s3. cl;us e; t ts . It sold its
products to indepenrlont retE,.J.l concern.:;, 16 of then in Vir g:i.l!:."cc~, f. o .b, f'act<Ory. It
supplied its d eal er s \·J ith a dvertising material and :i.nformo.tion, but in no 1:1ay
financed them or directed t ho rotail snles. Several tili!o s a year each dealer v/OtJ.ld bo
visited by on agent of cJ.ofondant c orporc.tion, ~orho HOl' lcl he;lyJ :in f o.ruing displays ~.md
putting on d emonstrations . \{hilo ono of the s o agents l!C.s in !. lor f olk nncl. engaged in a
showroom dcmon s tro:t ion , ho Hf:'.s sorvod y ith proc ucs by plD.J.nt:i.ff .
Ho ld~ Servic e of p:coc o::;s nuGt be quMhod s:i.nco t]·Je ::..gent H:c:-~ not sorv od ·in n count y
or city vJhore ho fcnidod , or \olhorc his place of bus:inC:;sc ' "'-s, or Hhorr) tho priricipo.l
office of th o c orpo::c·c1.t :i..on w:ts l ocnt ,; d ~. Th.) fareign corpor:~.ti on c/ O. S not d oing business
in Virginia so as t o have subjected i·~·'seli"' t o the l mrs of this St ate . ·
PLEADING AND PPJ\..CTICE
..SsJ.!.;p
· 191 Va . 525 .
P suod D(du Pont ) for ';:,666 , 561 daJMgcs--Jv c t o defe ctive p:t~nt u.sod by P f or tho
purp ose of fin is hi"llG r c:.dio co.bim:ts vJhic:h paint r:>.o.dc tJy; c .:~bin et s unmorcho.ntc.b1G .
T):10r:o wo.s ono count f er b.c-cc.ch of ••o.rr0-n"t!v , one c ow1t a llog:l r,g fraud , nncl cn e c ourit
o.J).oging nogligoncc. D do,.mrrod on tho. ground. th~~ t thor o W '"'S mis j oinder . D c ontended
thnt P must ele ct t o s1..1.c o ithcr in c ont r ::wt ·')r :i..11 tc>rt .
Held: Demurrer ov c:rruled in spite of exprossions(dictc.) b tH o Virgj_nia c o.sos that
o.n oloction must be r,1cce'lc (l66 Va . 314 c.nd 181 Vc.• 390). lii stori co.lly Gn n. cti on f or
br~3ach of vmrrnnty gr o·w c.>1xt of deceit, o.nd ~~tV di.Q:t:i.nct i on between
c ommon l m1 f orms of o. c G·wn r.:::.s l~~p-ely d ls~per::.rcd ;:;ince tho c.d opti0n afOur- n otic e
of motion s t a tut o .
PLE.AD IHG A..li!D PRACTICE.
CnrrUnett'..rt c cs
1 91 Vi'.• 768 .
P su ocl. D who cliscl:::.::.r zcd h er 1~~\·JY'::lr just bof c:co tri::c.L Th e! j udf::;o go.ve her a c ontinuo..nco . She negl ected l:. o un(:;:'.;:;e ::>.Jtot hor l c:..ryG}' untjl s:·~r. rtJ_y h:::foro th o nov! d.~:te f or
trir.Ll 0.nd nlso srJC1ITod ['. Dt::-..to·m nt f r on her cloc+. or thr:!.t Dl'l. o H·c.s under his. cc.ro and
tho.t ho deemed it inL'..~J.v:i. so.blo f or h e r t•::> n. ppoo.r in C')l:rt . Tho l lCU J.,-.uyer nsh::cl f0r ~,_
sec ond contimJO.ilco cr.h.:i. ch u ;1.s rofl:cS')CL \1..1.~~ this cr:~ c.r ?
Held: No . The /:f,I'W.lt il'r; •f .~: c r·r~t ::.nu~·.nc e is wi'c,h i:1 tbe cU:; croti c"l of tho tri:ll j'u.dge .
Discho.rge uf C 0ll: ::J~l r)Y.' ?. .:•.l.:.>rc t o obtr.:Ll C OU11~3 C l i!l ti•.:lC i~: ;y·t <.'. bsolutc gr c·ll:K1 l\;l'
ri cont 1nuo.nce. OthorHL;•:: Ltf: .[\ ;i!c}·..;.nt cculd p G3 t :)ono tri:- 1 ~i nuc fi Pitcly by ch:::LD.ging
c ow1sol. The c1octr:.r 1 D c crt, :i.fic c.te :l.::; to e e qu i v occ.l. Dcs :L~:~. o;, , ovon i f jt :is inG.dvisc.blc
f or l<er t o o.ppo11r in c · l1_rt 1 hjr t estinn1y cn.:l 1-:l :-.: ,e;iv c:". b:,·· cl.ol-'C':Jit inn .
1

FT..E.DING .fuill ?IU.CTI-:::E
560A.
192 Va. 8
P sued D for fro.udulm1tly repre sent ing to her th:-. t a r::nrriage to him would bo vcclid
•.<1,:r. he 'tTell lmow tht . t so.i d m.::trr:i.&.ge v-r:. "ts fruudulcnt, and alleged that said i::nrd q~c
·,:-- ~ 9 subsequently 1:-.el d to be invc;lid . D demurred because (l) it is not all eged th.r:.t :::·
' r: s ' inn ocent;. (2) it is not a lleged Uw. t mL!rri2.ge \ W.S void rathe r thnn merely vo:i. d:..tl-,2.3
(:;, ) ~10 Llcts nre sta·cod but only the pleo.der 1 s c onclusions . The trial ccurt St'.stu:i.;!oc..1
the do:~turrer. vJas this correct?
}hld : l'Jo . The notice of d otion above is a g ood example of hovJ not to do it, but it ·
·:;0·:;s not:ify D of the n o..tU:i.' O of the cl£dJn. P should have boon allowed to •..DID.nnd, or D
s\ot: ld l1ave aslwd for Ct ' ~ill of pr-1 rticn l o.rs. I}.J il e 3;] 8 then governs tho proced.w:·e.

PL:SP...D:fi.JG P. nD PRJ.C'l'ICE
192 Vc... .47
D rnn over B, o. n:;_ne yor.r ol d bo~r, :..md killed hin. P su ed D, and a lso his f ~~thor, 'F .
D l:K.d his m-m homo :1.ncl. o\med tho cc.r, but P c laimod th:'.t D 1.v c~s F 1 s c..gent . Shortly
c..ftor~:m.rds, and before suit vPls sttcrtod , D, vJho w.1s in tho o.rny, v1as sent to FrCJTco.
F cng~;.god. A o. s C'.n F,t·;;ornoy o.nd A ~.sJ~ od for n number of c cntinua.ncos. 1Vhcn D rot-:..IT.cod
ho l:tJ.do no obj ect ion t o <' i1c.t h:'.d happened, but nft8r tho l r..psc of c. consid orn.blo
pe riod of time he movcxJ. t}:t0.: t. tho caso be dismiss.~d on the gr01md t hnt he hnd novcr
boon sor\ved ui th process . This notion \{c.s e;r::mtcd . !!o.s. this e rror.
Hold: Ye s. A _gonoro.l O.Dpc:::.r::l.nc:c by counsr;:l~"l :o.iJu;r of sorvicc of
O..RPEJO.rnnc c \-IUS c..uthorizod, Such o.n appov.r:>..nce is pri'.·1n f .".cio i:.uthorizod n.nd this
priEn f ncio o..uthoriz,r..vlon "hc·.s not Lom:~ robt'. tt0CI.. F cUd not tost if;y ·crw. t he hc.d no
<J.uthority fr cm D t o cl>3<:.l[;C A ns c ounscl,for oecb . D's fril JP~c promptly to mn::c c~
motion for tho 'vJithdrmr<.:.J_ of A' s c..llcgodly unnuthqrlzcd .<;..proL:.:r~~'.lCO . i s ovidcnco of
tl.l,lthoriznt·i nn Tho CO"lcr·c, '.HLL not <1 SSVJ:10 t hl'l.t A, c.no.ttc)rn oy of integr:l.ty c~ nd oxpericncb' v!2..S 2.. r c:nl: ir~t ur lopnr uho ur o:nrrfuJ.ly a ct:x1 fer D.
PLEADING AND PR.I\.CTICE Ar:rpo2.ls
i 92 Vu .60 .
1
owned an undivil:cl'\ mw ·b irc.1 :i.n.t or c st il1 Bl tcc 1:r., cro. If be di ed without :i.ssre his
·,. .
~r<Jst Hnc to go OC!_Uf.l.lJ.y to X nnd Y. vJhc v oro tho ot.h e r co-tonmrts in fee. X died
v· In . . ~~ uithout issue a nd h:i.s 1:idmr, H, clcd1ncd do'..-ror. X :::nd Y dcn~.cc~ th:.··.t she \vc.s ont:i.tlod
~
. to dw·er end filed c. biU for p~..._rt:~ ti on . Tho trin.l c o1..1rt ·r:.olc1 th'. t s he H~:s entitled
t o dmwr 1vhe reupo11 Z ::.nc1 Y ~~p pc c:.l r;d . Si•1ce 11 0 d ucrt30 r~£:l1 yet b een entered in tho
partition suit should tho c.. ~)p o.:'. l be c1ismissc::d on ·tho (; r Ol~1d th;::.t a n r..:. ppoal liar; onl y
in the co..so of t~ fiD c.l rl c cro c ?
Holcl.: No . Under V'§ --/.6? c.r.:. c:·::-1xnl lie s to c ork:,b i ntorlor;trl:.QD': docroos . One of'
these is n dc croo na·judic.::-.t i ng th8 )r :\ nciplos cf ;:·. c c.iJsc,r::~'.cl Hhen t!1o court decreed
~
- -- .
th.:.t t \,f >J::'..S on it c•.~ t o c;_ouur it Ctdjud ico.t od tho princi,;lcs · of tho cnus o b ot\orooE X and
Y on tho one pG.rt rmd H o:1 t ho othe r. (Tho r;tb;:Jr int orl~cutory Cl.ccro0 s tho: ~be
np•; c;CLl ud ~tro docro0s Jj.sso1ving nn iuJunct.i.ol.L,_ cr .r.:JQt:P ·in;:;; no! <oy ·_to be pc.id , or
pc<:o~_o s.-: . r·n_Q·I' n QR..ort" t o 1J · c:n ndod) .
J.
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PLEADING AND PPJ'~CTICE
li en~ Rules
mewed.
to dismiss the
D •ms c onvictcd eo•· ~ fo l ony. 'hl ·' ppeole• '·· 'l ll'> At. t c.r ncy •Gc"er.tl
11'1t of error on the r-;rc't'l1C~ t h:--.t the clcfmKb.;::t dld not t :llo his rwtico of _.. ,_pper'..l Ol1tt
: . sn igm10nt of e rr or ~.rit iliL :~~.xt:·' c1;·.yn ;·~ ft o r :f:tnr.J. ;judGJiJont.
The:; SupreL!O Court of ftp~)(~nls d :.·. tos:
In additi on to soo in;:; -c; ;.-·. t tho r cc c:r·J. jn tho t.r:i...'. l c curt ib c complotod , appollc..nt ,
in order t o pe rfect his r-.~jf-":w.J, mu s t ·t.::-Jro t he fdloHin~ s t ope : (l) vrithin :::;ixty c"l.nJrs
:'.ftcr f i nc..l j udgment cJ.ol:i.vor t o or serve on oppo::dr:g c ouns el n copy of his notice of
·a pponl illld nss igruet0~1t:1 c:. error , ~·.nr..~ fil () tho ori;)nr;.ls H:i.t1~ th o clerk~ (2 )nftor tho
r ocord is mnc.1o up, file \6th th(J c1cr1r: 11 d c ,'3 i znc.". t ic:n of t!1o JXTts of tho rec ord ho
cl.c siros printed; (3 ) .:-'. ft c.r -:~'.w ;~ty c\::'..ys fro1~1 t 1.to t J1~ \0 h ..) h:·.r; :f:' i l ~)c:. )t is dosic;~1::1.t:.i on f or
printing thG r ocorc.1 he l:;ust T'. ct:1.f:.r the cJe .,~J :· to trr'.l13l":1.it tho rccorC'. in time for it t o
bo do livcrod t o th o cJ..c r~-:: r f t. ho Sup:rur:lc ourt, cr c ~.1c of t}-.c justice s , Hithin four

h :> f'r c:m t ho d ett o of f i n nl

561A
Jucl gr: o ~r\:.; (L~ ) be

mus t d o liVOr t c· Op DO S i ng C cunsol 0. C ODY
his potit i r:-·n f er c.ppoe. l c.n1 f ile t ho or j.e;inc.l uitL t l~o c l ork of this c .::u r t 1 ·J r ~; · · c
j u:;tic(; t o 111hom tho r e c ord hc s b ocn tro.ns mittGcl , i·li t hi !1 t 1:-lo f our nonth s 1 por:l c·;1:. ;-.. : -,~.~.
C>r PW" t ho fil i ng f oo of .;'1.50 t o t ho clerk of tho Supremo Ccurt .
T;·1o pre cise gue st :~ rm prc s o:1t od i s wLo thor tho provisi on r cqv.iring the a ppo ll(~nt t o
l 'LI u h is n ctic o cf r>.p':>or;. l :.t.nd D.ssign!·1o nt s of e rr or wit hin ~J ixty rk~.r s fr eD. c1:--:(·,o 0f
:~':i.;·k·. 1 JUclgl'1cn'!t :i.e; n::nck .t (>ry nr dir o ctcry .
Hol d: This pr ov isi011 :is r.1c.ndatc:r :r i n crim:inc,l C.f)]JO;l.l s c.s 1•c ll ~\s i :1 civil crw s . I t s
purpo:.>c is Lr:• (.;i v o o. ppe l lvo oppor tunj_t y . (1) to ox ill'Ii no t ho r 0c cTcl nnd ::~;:: s ure hins olf
d:' its C';.rrc ctnoss b e f or e it l of'.v c s tho cl erk ' s o;f fico of ·i:.b\) t d cll c curt ; (2 ) t o f i le
in civil c~ s o s , r:ss igm·!c ;.lt s of c r oss c rr 0r; (3) t c dos i gnc..t o f c,r l•r int i n,<_; tha t pc~ri:.
c.f th o r e c ord he doon ;; n.:-:-.t c r ial t c au pport tho rulint:; cf t he tri :-.. 1 c r·ur-l; ; (L,.) t c -prop-n ·e: o. brie f i n pppon:i.t i on to tho gr ::-.nt ing of c.n ~·. ppec.l. I f n o ;1ct ic o (l f ::..~po ~··. l ; .ncl
:Js ni gr!l'lonts of e rror r_·.ru fi le~~ \.Ji t h in sixty c: 1.~· s tho prcv.':c il i :1g p~·.rty then l:n o\·rs t he. t.
t hu c r~cc :ts ondccl.• ~Jr it c f e rr or ~U sFiis sod.
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AND PRACTICE
.-,_,
192 Va . 205 .
Nrs . D. vms pr.:> s c cu t cx1 fo r
crimo . Th o Cor11:1omioal t h f;.;ilod t c. c <.d . l R, a mn t orinl
,.fitne s s . I n tho cl0si~lG c. rr~v.nont Nr :J . D 1 c ;'.ttor n03' ~c.rl·:) r.mch cf this f nct, a nc1.
s u g[r.ost od th:~.t tho r or'. fJ C>'.l th:.t R v <cs n0t cnl l o:·:_ vr :-·.G t h:ct :!.f R b:~r.l t o stifi o c~ his
t o s t jJncny wovl cl h~:.vo bcrJl" u nfc.v c r r;.b l o . Tho c.trJ_'r nc y f or t. 1:l0 COI;oonwoo.lth r e pl ied t hc.t
Mrs . D h.:>. d n et cu..llocl he r h tw b:::.n·.: :c s ;-, w it~1e ss ~'-~ Kl tk~t t llu . ~; h co fit s b oth f eet . Tho
o.l ert t r i o.l judge t hon ;.;tc;pr od t. h o ~ro c oc dine:s rmc1 cc.l l;;c} f'::·r c. c c nf orcnc e ou t of tlt c
honr ing of tho- .jury . lio ;?ointocl cut t h:'.t Vh18- 2iJ:3 he. d boon v jr::J.:-.t od i n th·.'.t the f <.'.ilur (
of defendant 1 s hu ::;h.'.; J :~. to test i fy in h e r L1.y rJr hc.<1 b0c:n c c;:;:Jr.:ontr.Jd u pon . He c. s b::c1
d of ondo.nt 1 s c c-un s ol i f ho 1-1 i s 1 ~c r1 cui. i n str uc t i r"n t c ~.-.ho e ff e ct thr ,_ t t ho j ury sh ould
·dis r ogc.r c1 the a r r,;w:1ont . Tho r op1y v ::•.1-; in the r.:ow'.ti·-r.J l~n the :;; rnmcl t hc.t suc h a n i n.--s truct:i. on would cm 1~-- r:;: :ph~.si z c tho iJ!1~·1r•:.rp c r :~· cr: lO.. r} ·s . Tho j uc'l.-.~c r ofus od t o g r ".nt c.
r:d.otri o.l. The ov :i:d.Oc1CO c l c ::.r·l :,: ;:;l)(M1)<} . !'11rs . D' s ~~uilt :-'..':1':1 t hJr0_ 1.JC.S n o e vidence tl,r-.t
she v1c.s p r o judic :i.u:l :Ln ~'.ny H«.y .
Hol d : Conv i ct i c-n etf _~·:;_}:. KY:'. , Tile imp r opor r on tl.r l:·s ~-..re; -ne t gr ~und f or n ovor s c~l b ecnuso
·of our st:-:-,t u t o of j g uCr ·i ·1 s (Vf-'8- L1i!.7 ) , 11 1-b j udgr:-tont ::-; };.~, n h e rcvc rs ud f
-:.ny_ orror
c ornnitta.d_oiLthQ_J;ri;:;.l 'T>,_Q UL it plcJ .ul,y_:-<J.ppco.n : f r "l.' ·-c ,w i~ o c ad c.~c.i t ho ovi (10Ylc o
thco.. t._h_g_ . Lcrt i., hrrl[e l~::.'..L: ~' f;d r tr i ::.l c.· ~ t bc Jc:.e r Y .s .:-.r·rl sub::rt :.: n tia l ju:::t :i.ce ho.s b ee ~
r r_:,:'. Chod • II
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PLEADING ALm PIU\.CT ICE
Con po.r e these h w c a~") S;
Cc·..sc l (191 V~ . 731) s:)ct:i.on 6 ~ d ) o~' .nule 5 ~ 1 r oq_ui r es , ~ 1) _ t! '-·~.t t he j udg::ont ap:?ealec· / (
fr on , ( 2 ) the t r l nl c ottr.·c 1 s qn ::n on , lf :·.ny , ( J ) a nd t h e c.s ::a _c~n..~ -:on'Ls of e r ror t hc:.t mw e
y:J
11lrc.ady been 1.10.de m.·:ijhii1 ·0}1n Toqtdrcd tine oll b e d c si p1at ucl. .f or r1rint ing by t ho
lti(
etppo llnnt, L!. nd Soct'i.on 8 of s o.id rulr:; r cquir o3 t he c l erk of tho Sv pr o:.J.e Court of
y-·
Appe a l s t o caus e tltei 1 ·to h o printe:cl . Tho cl cs ignc.t i o~ bJ COUili]OJ of t h n above f or
rint :i.ng i s f or th o c onvoni.c::lc c of t lw c1 ork . These part s of tho r oc orc'l. n:u s t be _pr intod v1h o t_·~1 o r d os i r,nd .cd or i ~ ot. Dos igm~t :i. on of th o :~c po. r 'c.r; i,s nurc~ ly '-' ni ni s toria l c... ct .
Tho rul o is dir e c tor y on1y . Iicnc o t. r1c f o.il ur c of <'.ppc l lun t t o :1c ~ e t h o n b ov o d r;~d.r~:nn
t ion s :i s not n o c c~: snry :ff.l.t ~.. l. So; 192 Va . 3 ~31- 332 .
Ca so 2- (Thc instcmt c -~cr30 ) S0cti on 6 (o. ) of Ru J.o 5 : 1 ;1rov:Ld.:J s t h,:-.t couns e l f or a ppe llant s hn ll fi1 o wi t h t lvJ cJ. ~; rl ~ cf th o court fr om ,,,rh :i.ch r.:.n ::c.;_-Jp<;e.l J.s t ake n n ot l e s s t hru
20 dnys be f ore t ho r .:.;co:~·c::. :i <~ t r cms:::i t t od c: d osi gno.t ior: of tl,c: purt s of tho re c ord
tbn t lw 1.>1ish e D pr .·.n i;r'r} . 1. :po l J.r. n t nc[;l octcd to d o t. hi~J . Sbm, l d h:!.:J c. ppo2.l be di smi::>ce(
Ho l d: Ye s . Tho por tion of t he re c ord t}~ .. t :L t o bo p ri n~cd :ir.v olv:;s d i scret ion t hf'.t
c a n bo ox or c i::J ed on1y b~,.- -:;; :o ::.q•p0Jlc:.nt . It i c i'\Ot :..·. r:or::; n::.; ist cri0.l c. ct (o.s in C[l..so 1
ubovo ) . Until nppc l lt.t:"lt cl r;::-d. c~:-Jo:t. . ,::.: ·J;Lo ;-:;c-.r t of U c rcJ c o:rd to be ;Jr i nt od the cle r k o:f
tho tr inl c ourt h:~ c no .:.ml:.lJ o.d.t :r t o t r ::a wu:i.t tho r e c or d to t l !C Supr ol':lo Court , This
p:rov :i.oion is clonrlr ,-:~~nu.-~tc) ry . To ir;nm·e t h i s 20 r1.rry r oc;yiro' lOnt would cronto tmtold
t ttr T7loi 1 nnrl confus i on .

J,J,~,-I:,~:c.-- 0-ff:t.-~,.....
562A
· (RGvis cd August, 19)3)
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
Criminal Procedure
192 Va. 437
'I'he maximum penalty for perjury is 10 years •.. D was indict ed for perjury and plead
guilty. The court referred the matt er of punishment to a probation officer who made
a d(:tailed r eport ..rhich recommended the ma::d.mum penalty. The court, without notifying her attorney and in -her absence, sentenced her to t en years. What errors, if
any, Here col'_!lmitted?
Error 1. · The cas e should not have been r ef erred to a probation officer. It is
o~ly when t he pe-nalty might oe mo:re- tt1arr 10--years that such- r Gferenceshould be made .
Vl/53-278.1
Error 2. The pr2Qation offic er has no right to rec ~rnnend a penalty.
Error 3. It was reversible error not to giv§.._£oun~_el_ tlw right _to__ cross-examine
tbo probation_of£ic er and to i ntroduc e evidenc e in r ebuttal.
Possible Error 4. The accused should have b.e.en_pr.e.s.ent ben "'t=;nt.enced. There is
a conflict of authority on this point and the Court found it unnec essary to pass on
it in this case .

PLEADING AND PRACTICE
~hirdtfa rtr Pr~ct.ic e
192 Va . 727
Has owner entered into a con~act wit ~ t as general contrac tor to build a large
nu.rnber of houses. L sublet the plumb in~ and gas fixture -vrork to C who put in inferior gas fixtur es. As a r esult there was a bad gas l eak in one of the houses and an
explosion r esult ed . The gas fixtur es put in did not meet contract specifications.
H sued ·L and C. Aft er pleadings had be ~n fil ed H moved tho court t o dismiss C, which
motion was gr ant ed. Lat er on in the c ase L moved to make_G again a party defendant.
This motion wa s denied . · Was this -er rorT .
Held: No. It was not an abus e of d"iscretion of th 8 trial judgG t o r e"f'u.s.e ... to add C
as a party. ·Many complications would a ris e if' he wer e a dded ::1t this stage. To what
extent, if at all, would C be affected by what took plac <:l <1 fter he was dropped and
bef or e he was added?
Not e : Third party practic e ha s not been as succ ess f ul as had been hoped even in
the English and Federal Cop.rts wher e the judges hav e mor0 control ov er the trial than
they hav e in Virginia. R_\l~•-l,. gffe?tiv o Oct. 1, 1951, reads, " Third party practic e is abol · hecLand-~cta.nt"-shall be. permitt ed--to...br:i.ng_ in a new party."
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563A.
P1 .& PR, l ime allowed to a ppeal .lJ:gm inter) ~p torx decree.
193 Va.l91.
D was employed by P, the Southwest Virginia Hospitals,Inc.> and •rihe hospitaJs individually to effect and manage a hospital insurance plan. D was very succes s f ul, anr::
P t hought D was making too much money. As a reslllt the parties fell . out. P terminated
t he c ontrac t a nd s ou ght equitable relief which involved an a cc ounting. In order t o
· ~Dterr.:ine h ow the accounting should be made it was first necessary to interpret the
.~c;.n tract. The trial c ourt interpreted the c ontract as per D's c ontentions a nd orde r ed
P to pay D some ~>54 , 000 at the rate of some ';p900 pe r mcnth for 60 m.cnths, and its
de cree also provided that if P f ailed ·to·-pay ·D as above s et forth then execution
should issue at D's r equest. The c ourt a l so referred several other matters t o a c omrnissi cne r in chancery who wa s to t ake ndditi onal evidence the re ~ n and report t o the
court at a l a t e r d at e . Some e ighty days after the abov e decree was e ntor0d, but befcr e
the commissioner rw.d made his report P appealed. D moved that the appeal be dismissed
becaus e P had net fil ed his notio n of a ppeal c.nd ass ignments of e rror within 60 days
aft e r the <'3 ntry of tho d e croo Gs r Gquirod by Rule 5:4,
Held: Moti e:n denied. RuJ e 5:4 applies only to finGl judgment s a nd d e cree s. Since the
de cree Qbove wa s int orl ocut ory(as othe r is s u e s were ye t t c b o d ecided), and adjudicat0d th G principles of th ::J c aus e it wa s a. ppeal e. bl'.3 qs cne of thE) exc epti c ns t o the rule
tha t only final d ecrE::cs c nn be appr3al ed. V/,'8-1}62(2 ) (c). "i·lhe r e 'ln int e rl ocutory decree
is a ppealable ns adjudic ating ~pri · l os cf tho caus e , th e aggri ev ed p~rty ~s:TICt
lirrii ~QQ. to the p(ir j od
r ;+l. fUL~'
-- ~-ErC OU't may appeal
an~~~Pe
e nt0r-od and the
a n appeal ther efr om has

Ii'J'!61.

e~

Note l. It wns a lso hGld th cct P ' s f [d lure to put up a prope r suspending b ond, or in
fact, any such b ond did not h:::r his a ppc~ l. ( Ths cnly effect cf s uc h a f ailure is tha t
the prevailing pa rty be l ow can go a ho'l.d t o get hj s r0 lief 5ust ".s i f no app8al bad
boon t aken.)
Not e 2 . It W ' S a ls o hl~ ld th:lt th:-ct porti cn of the d ocr':OlO allm.d ng D to have executi r
on futur o defaults was erroneous . The 0ffic e r issuing th o e xe cuti on is n ot the proper
pnrty t o det e rmin e wh e th e r or nc:t the r e has b oon r.1. def;-.mlt. Tho c ourt shouJd have
r eserved l eave t o D t o u. pply t o it fr cm time t o timo, f or r eli ef, if ne cossary t o
c ov er pnymont s cf irtstr1lmrmts thureaftor falling du e .
PL&PR.
Ploq of a ntra J:9. s c r.nvj ct--"throc t e rm sta tuto"
193 Vo. . 216,
D, a Nogr c , w.:ts indict ed by :m nll whi t o gr and jury ch osen in viol a ti on of D1 s c onstituti c·na l ri(5ht s . Ho was n0t tri ed until aft er 2 r egul a r t e rms of th o Circuit Court
hrtd gene by. When tr ied ho t:r god th o inv:::.lidi ty c f th e indictment . The tria l judge
put th o point down f er l nt ar a r gunent, and tho trhcl proceeded . D was c c,nvicted. Whe n
tho point was a r gued after th o c cnvicti on D' s c ont enti cn was sustfiin ed a nd the ccnvicti cn set e.s ido. Wh or cupnn a properly ch osGn grand jury r e- ind ict ed D a nd a ft er tw o
:noro r egula r t o.rms of the Circuit c ,-.urt h · ~d gnn o by he w2..s ::tgn.in ccnvi c t ed . D pleaded
t.mtro f oi s c cnvict and a l so thnt ho was d isch.'lr gr?d since throe; r ogul e r . t nr :ms of th<J
circuit ccurt in which his c!lso HE'..S pondine hr..d gene; b:,r vd.thcut a t ria l. (V#l9-16 5),
Hold: F'c'r the C onrncmwo<~ lth. Sinc o tho fir s t pre C8 t.Jdings D.g:~j nst D we r e v cid o.nd s e t
as id ..J ho h'l S n et bco n in j ocprtrdy. Tho l c.vJ ns l P.. id dmm j.n Pc: tt cn v. Mis siss ippi,
3J2 U.S.463 expr essly atatos tlle t th:::ct hcl·jing d ce s nc- t P1or:n th ,·,t a guilty defendant
mus t go free , "For indi ctments can he return 0d and c onvicti ons can be obtained by
juries selected as the Cons~Hut j on c owmands ." The fallacy in D~ ot he r con:t.ention i s
th a t h is sUJ,.ernpti.ng_t_a_.adcL.the_e~ ed tj me ~!2... t_!:e ~r i j naLguaghesL i n_dictment -to
th e elapsed time s :i.n e tb e nBK indictme t, This Qannot be done a nd hence V 19-165 has
no '~ppl icati on . The tw o indictments we r e separ ate a nd distjnct.

564A.
PL .& PR.
Powe r of Court to nake it s own rules
193 Va.221.
The Court 01 t aw and Chanc ery of the City of Norfolk adopte d the followin g rul e
( fa:.:ts changed slightly) governing practice in suits for divorc e :
11
0HDER ESTABLISHING RULE OF PRACTICE TO BE OBSERVED IN DIVORCE SUITS AND SUITS FOR
J.i.J:~ ; , TJU1ENT OF NARR.IAGE, ENTERED APRIL 11, 1949.
nr n o:cder to safeguard the public interest against litigants who may seek divorces
or annulments of marriage in cases in which such litigants have not acquired the
necessary r es idence and domicile as required by Section 5105 of the Code of Virginia,
or wh er e the grounds of venue as required hy said Se cUon do not exist, and to
be tt e r determine wheth e r there be legal cause for divorc e or annulment in any given
case the following rule of practice in this court is hereby e stablished:
"All such suits, by appropriate decree , may DE') r eferre d to one of the Cc>11missione rs
in Chancery of this court to ascertain and r e port (1) the facts relative to whether
tho n<;cossary grounds of jurisdiction a nd venue exist ; (2) the facts r e lative to
whet he r the divorc e or annulment should be granted or refused, and(3) in like manner
upon o ther matters r a is ed by tho pleadings and the evidence.
"All a'f the evidenc e in such cas es shall .b e t alwn and tra nscribed before such
Commissil:mor who shall havo authority to direct the Clork of this Court to issu e subpoenas for witnesse s and to make such investigat ion as may be pro per and necessary
to acc omplish the purpose of this rule .
"The complainant she ll pay the cost for issuanc e a nd service of such subpoenas and ~·
shall a l s o pay to said Commis sione r tn ndvnnc o of such hearing a f ee of Twenty-Five
Dolla rs to be taxed as part of tho cost."
It was conte nded th at n court could not adopt its own pri v<:~to rule nor delegate
its judicia l functions t o n. c ommis s ione r in Cbancc ry.
Hold: (1) "The general rule is thnt a ~rt of gtmcra_! _j uris diction
adopt a
rule of prr:J.Ctice 1frovid6'a tho subject is not r eg~- o:r ado uate l
rovide q for,
general l aw._ Such a ru l e mus t bo r easono.blo , nust not c ontrav ene th e Constitution
or statutes, or aff ect substantive l <.,w. 11 Tho rulo promul g;_tted above meots all these
r 0quireme nts . It helps to as ce rt o.in th r~ f :J.ct s spe edily, tends to prevent fr audulent
divorc es, qnd prot ects th8 interf)St s of the Commonw:;r.,lth.
(2) The re is n o d e l egati on of j udici "Cl authority. Th e c ormniss i onor :i.n cha nc e ry is
an off ic e r of the c ourt ;:md und e r its contr ol.

ox

~\\ ~ Pl.

Rcvi~w

& Pr.
Bill of
193 Va .320
(a) Fill in t he blanks , "A bill of r evi ew docs not lie to r evj cw or correct errors
al-1 ,v-J of judgment in the d et ermination of _____1 __ • If the re be e rr or in this pa rticula r,
V
af t er a final decree , it ca n be c orrected only by -- ·- 2
• Buut i f
error of l aw be npparent from a n ____ __l _ _ _ --·in the cause , a nd a
- - --'4
has been ente r ed, a proper c nse for a bill of r evi ew is .Qrima f a cie
presented." 1 f a cts; 2 a n appellate court ; 3 ins pe ctjon of the r ecord; 4 fina l
de cree . P.325.
(b) "There are onl y t\.TO gr ound s on wbi ch a bilJ. of r eview may h e fil ed, viz:
(l ) _ _ _ _
____ ___ ___
_
_ _ , or
11
( 2 ) on acc ount of
_ _ . 1 fo r error of l aw apparent on the fac e of
the rec ord; 2 newly dis c ov e r ed evidence . p.326.
(c) P fil ed a part i t ion suit ag<:ti ns t D 1,rho suffered u d ecree to be e ntered against
him by default on De c.20, 1950. On J a n. 30, 1951 D c :une to l H'e and filed a petiti on
for r e he[Ting for error of l avJ apparent on the f~cc e of t ho r ecord. The c ourt r eopened
th e c ase and f ound f or D. Was t his e rr or?
Held: No . Tho decree of De c . 20,1950 be cane finl:'.l 21 days aft er Us e ntry. 1-?hile the
ca se cannot be r e - opened bv " pl:;tition to rche::;.r ~~ f ter the d ucrco has be c ome fin a l th e
pe tition t o r e~r jf it_pDil~_Qut the or~gr s of l aw app~ront on- tho f a c§ ~f the
record C2n be ir.-B".r.teEJ.- a·s-a--b:i-1-J. - O-f r e ViOW -Which l i i)S to '"· fin a l d ecree for SUCh e rrors
·

\

565A.
Pl .& Pr.
Bill of Re view
Property
193 Va . J20 .
H a nd W, hus ba nd a nd'Wife , ovmed
house .;md lot a s joint ten a nts with out s'U.l'Vi:vorsh ip. H die d intes t a t e . The r e we r e three ch ildre n . W c ontra cted io s e ll t ho - l and t 0
D -..rh o r.:.groed t o pay off a first de ed of trust a t the r a te of :~26 pe r mont!-t, a nd t c
p.r:..y ·:i> 650 when W gave him a warra nty d eed • . D· t ook possess j on of the whole and ke pt up
~;he ~p26 payme nts. Te n y e ars late r a ft e r the d eath of W th e childre n fil ed 101 bill c) f
c clapl :.d nt f or pa rtit ion cla iming tha t D had no interest in the property. D f D. iled t o
duf·snd, a nd th e Commi ssion e r f ound tb a t the v a lue of the u sc of the property t o D f n. r
oxco od od th e $26 per month he ha d b een paying, a nd that the c ontract be tween W and D
,.m.s v oid for l a ck of r.lUtua.li ty a s W1 s childre n could not . bE) f orc Gd t o c onvey the ir
h('.lf int e r est sinc e thoy were not par ties t c th e c ontract. Tho Cor:J!TlissiC'n or 1 s r e port
vms 101ppr ov od by tho c ourt nnd a f i na l d e cree so f~lr c.s D w :s c cnc ornod was e nte r e d.
Sixty day s a ft e r the e ntry of the f i na l d ecree D obtrd n ed c ounsel. 1tihat, if a nything ,
c ~n ho d o ?
.
Hold: It i s prope r f or D t o proc eed by n bj.ll of r e v i ew f e r e rr or of l aw appa r ent on
the f a c e of th o r e c ord. 1-l.t the ve ry l east D 171ay claim n1l of vJ 1s rights in he r ha lf
of tho prope rty,_ a nd ho c annot b <) d e prived of tha.t ha lf ,just b e c ause ho c a nn ot got
the othe r ha lf. D is undGr no duty t o pay th e i~650 until n w1rra nty d e ed i s F;iven and
he nc e is n r;t in defa ult. Tho he irs c f vJ t ook hGr intor nst s ub .i c ct t o the c ontrnct
she had made with D.

a

PL . & PR.

Rul 9 5:1 , 3 ( o )

19 3 Vn . 390
Th o VrJ rd ict of the jury
. f or P w ·, s r ece ived by th e c cu:r.t e n ,J,Jly 7 , ~.m d -:-J. ofo n~h.nt r.: cvoc~ t o set it as ide , a s 1~!lY
s i gning r eas ons t hrJr Of 0.r . The n nti c·n '...J ilS t d<e n und·: r [li'lV :i scmont ['.nd c ontinue d f or
ru~· pr
argur.1ent vlhich wo.s ho2.rd c:n Oct c.b ;·Jr 26 at wi"ich t j l-:1C; th 0 c ourt ov e rruled t ho motion f
a nd prcn cunc ed jud.gmon t 1..1 pon U w v . n ·d1 ct . Nc' nrdor '.•lt'.s e nt ()r od on this d r,y, a c c·ntrc. vorsy having e.ri s<~ n be twee n c cun r.·H1 2.s t o V w c cnt :;nt s of th ~::: crde r t o bo e nt er ed
ca rrying int o aff e ct tJ-,o court 1 s orr:1l r r on ounc er.Jent. E t:~ 8h couns e l s ubmitt ed a dra ft
of a n orde r ( judgme nt) On Nov . 4. The r e upon the court d rew its ovm orde r, resol ving
th e diffe r e nces be h rocm t h t-J p().rthls , a ntedat ed th o s:".!~;e Oct ob8r 26 , 1950, endo r sed it
a nd mailed the origin,:tl t o tho cle rk flnd copies t o c ounsel. \,Jets fina l j ud gmen t e nt er·
ed on Octobe r 26 or on Nov. 4th? I f on tho formo:r date th o tra nsc ript of th e t e stimony and othe r inddonts of th0 tria l w::1s n ot t e nder ed to th o judge: within sixty da y s
from the timo vlh on j udgme nt wo.s r:mt e r ed . Rul e 5 :1, 3 ( 0 ) •
Hol d: N ov emb~.:: r 4th. The r o is a diff e r e nce botwo ..; !l t'f-)c rcmd:ition of a ,judgmrmt nnd
th e ont:r:y of a ;j1Jdcr,ntc nt. In t his c o.so th; j u,Jr:mont we s n.:nrio 'r:' c d on Oc t. 26 but it
v/fi.S not ent ered u nt il Nov . l+th . Entries n unc 12ro .t.~~nc c n.nnot b o g jve n r etrospective
of f oct '...rhich would r c sl' lt in c uttin g dO\m pJ. ri intHf 1 9 thn'-" fo r c.ppl ying for ' writ 9r
err or .
P s ued D f or dal:!llgos ml.ff.:Jr od :in an a ut. c·r:Jr-.bile fl cc:!.dNtt .

Crimind T, ' \ ·I .C~.nri Proc edure
19.3 V:·2.• L.L.,9
PL. & PR.
Code 19- 232 rr·ovid cs t hat i f tl~G w~r:lO net be o. viol ~.ti o n ~f t~r o or mor e st Atut us ~~
1' ~ conviction 1mdc r onrJ of tho s~, ntute;s sh.1 .ll '!''') a h'' r to a >:r osccut ion und e r the
othe rs . D was Jrivin ~ r e ckle ssly whiJ. ~ drunk . C ~n ho ho conv jctod of both r ockl os s
and rlrun:k on driving ?
Jbld: Yos . Tr1n o:f.'fons·~ r; ·'n·o n ot j r~ mtic nl. A :·1rvnl~cX1 Jno.r. r:1ight c onc d vA.l,l y drj v c
co.r ofull y, and sob··:; r !'lon ;; mot j r.t.:·s ·J ci v o rce l<I,;Js s1y .
In this c aso D W (~ n t~-· k .:;n 1 ~~; f c" r c
Ju~ J tic- J c;f th o p ·_·;r~. c o irrun·~;,ji ':: t c l)r a ft er hi s ~.rr cs t
I s tho justice of th •.:; pc;. . cc >: :: snu1pct(.)nt wi t'18S:3 in thu d rcuit c ourt t o t 8st:ify :.:s t c
his drunk un concli t.:i cn? Hol d: Y··J s . H; i s nnt L,::;tifyj.n0 r:.s t c sb.t.;:~r.v:.:rl't.s. me.de 'by th e
llccu.,od but ~,;,s t o wh~. t he s· ·· ~J reg· -:-d ir~ g h:i s ,£.;::;u'\,it_trn . i'kr ·:) c..v:.: r cu r pr :J s ont sta t 1.1t 0
(19 - 21..1) pr ohihH s tri_: 1 .~ust-:i C\-J S fr"lll t ._;st .i fyin g .-;s t ' ntr t·~·~r·mts .- n0 th o f c:rmo r pr e
hibiti (. n aw:i nst ,i u c.tj C O S Gf th e: p C: ·.c·_) S \, t c:: st i fy j "g n CJ lr);'1es<) r 'lppca r s i n th ·~
· ct ntuto .
I
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}l. &Pr. Cr~wtrrrrT-lrPxcrdcro ·-suspension of Se ntence
566A .
· D wEls c onvicted of involunt-::.ri mansl aughter a na sentenc ed to a year in jail and a
fiPe . The j a H sentence was suspended a nd D )'-'a s pla c ed on h is good behavior(not on
f c:r na l probation)for the year. vJjjthin a y ear he vi o:;.ated tho condjti on of the sus-pen:;:; r·;, -three times but these violations did not cone to the GOurt 1 s a ttenti on until a ft e r
··~.he s~pir o.ti cn of the yer.r. Ho.s the court jurisdiction t o revoke the suspensicn?
Hold:Y8s . The c ourt no.y_nr..e._:;u~rHm the tjme a nd the condi~j o11s ..Qf__thi~- 'Rrobation !J. f
it pr c:. scrjbes th e t.ime., ·-...e.....thcL p.nr.j,_Q
_ p_:r_<ibat.im_,_:t_QQ.__Q_ou J;::t___I'!'l_DY und er sect ~C2_n jJ-27 S_
revoke the sUSP.ensi cn <:::.nd the probation only within the proba ti on pe riod. If n o such
!_)l'Obatj <:m period h['.S been }2rescrf5e d tn8 C oun may:_yev_oke_ the S us pensi g_n· _g._ _any iiiiG"
w;l. Qli n thr;; nriXim1~f9;~riod f or which t hL d e f e ndanj:. might nrig i.na lJ.y have __been .inprisonc;
~"'L [)."-"~
.--,(/.J.Jt.
~::::;u>
J 'JUV'.-1,
Pl. &.Pr. Q_rimina.l Pro,e_edW:e
.
69 S .E . 2d JL.O,l9J Va. 502
D was on tf'ia l f or il1egally s e lling a half pint cf whiskey a t a c e rtain ..tir\e and
place . Her attorney put l~ on th e stand t o testify she w::ts ::tt n ncthe r pla ce a t tha t · ·
t:3.1!'1o . The judge them · snid , "I 1 m not going t o allow this e viden c e tha t D was in Richmond; it has notl-dng tc· de -....dth thi s cas0 ." The attornEw r emonstra t ed a nd said he
th ought it vl!lS most pe rtinent. The judg0 the n, without ::my oxpla.n'lti cm , r eversed himself a nd let the e vide nc e in. Tho a tt orney , howove r, wis hed the c ourt t o .declare a
oistrio.l , but th o met i on vtas ove r-ruled . Sh c1:l d a mistrinl have b een declared?
Hold: Ye s. The jurors mi ght \oT e ll have i nf e rred tha t tho prosjding judge did not think
the testinony r.1aterial, c r, if Elntorial , thc.t it was nd entitled t o crede nce. The se
j ur ors might have inferred al so thnt t ho pr(:JSiding judge wDs of opini on thnt . th e
on the redia ccused was guilty. It wa.s the jury 1 s cluty and not th e .iudg.Q 1 • t o .-£,'1
bility of the e vidence a nd h0 snould h <W0 scn1pul c:usly nbsto. jned fron c onduct us urping
the jury's functi on a nd indica ting bie.s ag.<J.i ns t the accused . Tho v ery l east ho could
hav e dcne wr.s t o expla:i. n t o the jury thnt he had nc,do a nistalro e.nd tha t they should
disregard his r er:mrks .
PL. & PR.

Ne cessity of Stating Grour:ds of De fens e
19 3 Va .51J, 521.
P sued D f er a d 8Dt w1t!i-:''Ot""'il"l'lj i ndi c at-i.e:r-t--t-hat he was sui ng hb 0th 0r than as a
principal debt or. P's ovi ·lenc e, ll cwovor, indicated th:::t i.f D w?..s lia bl e at a ll he ,,.,as
lia ble as guare.nt or. D tbon 2tter1pt od t o rely on th e defe ns e of tho sto.tute of fra uds
alth ough no such dofons £. W l S sot f orth j_n D' s grounds of dofonse . See Rules 3:5 .q nd
3:7. c ~n he do so?
He l d : Yes . Rul e s 3: 5 rmrJ 3 :7 c.r o a
th ·
ic_e_o.f-moti-en-indicates
the ne ce s.si.:t...y:~
tr e~o wns nothing on th e r ec or '
t o suggest U mt the sta tut o of frauds wcul d be ihvolvod until pla intiff introduc ed hi s
evidence . As D point ed out, if P had o.tt or.1pt0d t c s how t h::tt Pace , (the r eal principnl
d0bt cr) was D's agent, it c ould n s we ll have boen <lr gtJod that D sl-J.c:uld have pleaded
non-agency bof or o be:ing nllowed t o de ny it.

~

.r.

J~-./
. ! ,~<ltr\J\

PL. &. PR.-- Crininal Prcc oc1uro--C onst. Lm..r .
193 Va . 814.
X, a Negr o , wa s 'E n ed n nd c cnvic"toPi 6I t:mrdor of n whit') nnn. The case was r eve r sed
nd r enandod by t he Suprene Court of Appeal s . On th o r etrial c·f the case, X, for th o
i r st time def ended on the gr ound that tho g;r~pt.' ! .iY!X which indicted bin. wa s inpropery se l oct 0d, that is, ho wishod t o wit h,Jrnw his plo::t of not guilty and t c plead now
in abdeDo nt t o the ind.ictncnt.
.
Held: By f ail i ng to c·bj oct nn t h<:tt grrJund nt the fi r st tri •:tl the r.tatte r was wa ived.
One c annot bo pe rmi tto~~ t c :_:;:::.lJble r-n the c·utc oue 'ind l oso , a n:1 the n g0 t e new tria l.
A pl ea c·f net g nj lty wn.s r pl a n t o t l+&-lilB~ J£ 4 •. AA&-&.l:W&.y8--been- the aw:.. tha t 0ne
can_not pl ead in a bntor.w nt a ft nr plc:::tjin:r t o t ~e r:wr i t ~ , _; __n;'l , t':'i.V.Gn assj.lming tha t it was
d.iscret i cnnrJ with t ho tri.:'..l c ~=urt t c g r~c'r"t dof en·Jant 1 s rcqv est it c ertainly \.JP ::" •Jot
a n a buse 8f disc r ctjcn t o r oft; sr;) t c ·1r· s r . ~~"vlh0 n "~ new tri ~:l i s awa r ded_ ".:..:,e case is
in th e snne s itu::1.ti on e.s when the fir::o t t r i ::tl bo,,;c.n , th,;.t i s t n £~~:;, o.ll the proceedings subsequent t c the j cintlc r cf issue c,n t he plua l'w.v ing b.;;on sot a sirle , the
Ccr.monwenlth n.nd th e dcf on;Jant a r0 r:: t j ssuc on the pl 8r.t c: f ne-t guilty ."

56{A.
PLEADING AND PR.ACTIC?.
194 Va..39
D promised to de ed a hous e a!ld lot to P fol' . ~~8'500 as soon as D, or a certain rocl
o st ~1te agent, c auld f)nd anoth er place suitable for D. Months went by and D c ontinut/'.
to rm:Ja:in in the hous e . P filed a bill in equity alleg:ing th [' t D was making no atten,·, ,
to find other quo.rt c rs and was not a cting in good f a ith.
·
·
lk ld: The se nro me.ro conclusions of the pleader. It is not a lleged that the a gent
lt~~ s f otnKl a suitable place for D to go, n or a re there m1y a:verr.Jents of the circunstanc es as to D 1 s a lleged inacti on and bad faith.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
Equity Plea ding .
19L. Va . 50.
p s ued D in e quity when D. was alrn c s t 21 y ears of r.ge . DIs gu::::.rd i .<>Jl ad l i t el'! fil ed an
c.nswer . V.Ihe n D .b oc.mo 21 tho C~t a llowed hin t c. wi thdrt,;,w th o answe r and. en t or a
donurrer instead~ P's bill shewed .on its f ace th;:'. t if she ovor ha d'a c ause of a ct:i cn
it aroso when she was 16 y oc,rs of flge , tho.t she is n qw 29 ~ and that· the pa rty she
ch c.r go<l with a gross fraud was hor f~ ther who rlied a. ye o.r cr so age . Discuss points
invc lved .
.
( e./ (l ) 'J:J;;.cugh n demurrer and.:-illL:'lnsw.e-~tJa-y-ee-f-i-l-ea-At-thcLsD.nd.imo_a derJUrrer ..QP.nnot
h.&f'l'1 &PI b · d after an answer h
ill.ed . (2 ) -~u~ t~ c ourt, f o r good cause, may allow
}) ct- 4 th~ answer to be withdrawn and then J?el:!!!.tt ~d~murrer_ to be filed. RUle 2 : 2)reads ,
fL ~ "The time for filing pleadings may be extended. by the court in its discretion·, a nd
'N"'
s uch extension may be granted though the time fixe d has already expired; ***"
( 3 ) The moment an infant becomes of ago he has control of the suit and he rna~ disregard the answer s e t up for .him by bis guardian ad litem befor e a decr ee or judgment ~
has been rendered. (4 ) He r e P' s bill shows on its f ace that she j s barred by her ·
l a ches as she had 8 y ears aft er r eaching he r majority to as c ert Ain the f ac ts ~nd .s he
has de libe rat e ly wait e d until the princ ipal wi tness against he r has died,. so D's
demurrer should b e sustained.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAV.I
72 S.E.2d 402 , 194 Va .---.~
hi:red un ion men to do ,.( ·,,ob . They we nt- out on strik e so X tben hired non-union
/ , ~ fJ~n. X 1 s pl!~ce of bu siness wc s thon po:J.cefully pic1wted by. one picke t who carried the
-'1 ~ sual unfair sign. The purpose of the pi ckr~ tjn g 1<1<1 S to notlfy a ll union sympath ize rs
fV ~ of the f a ct of alleged unfa irnes3 and to bring p r ess~ r G othe r than physical on thos e
~ ~r ~ hiring non-union me n to cha nge ov e r to union men. X ~ppli e d to tho law a nd Equits
~~ ~.
Court of Richmond. for an injuncti on against picke tin g which the Jud ge r e fu sed.
<;
(1) HB.y a. single Jus ti.c c.: of th o Supretto Court gr <'.nt a n injunction? Yos. V:/18-618
rends, "Wh en <,1 circuit or co or9.tion court, or city court h '.l.vin g cha nc ery jurisdiction, or a judge th e r eof, shall r efu s e to awa rd r:m injunction or having awarded a
LS.,
a::...r"
uL c0 enlarge the sa'1.lo , a copy of tho prot emporary in ·unction dis so
coo 1ngs in court, l< lf >< may bo prese nt ed to a j'4dg.o of th e S1.1preoe Court of Appeul s ,
who rTJay thor eupon e ithe r ::wa...r.d ..an-injunction, _or rcinstn.te the injunction dis ~ olve d,
or enl a rge the in junct·~. N o~ If a judGe of the Suprene Court of Appeals o.wRrds
th e injunction ··
ent er ed ·1s a de
rJ.!li c ourt and n n a ppeal l iG.s to
t BP-.'Q'" _
peal-s .
;rvo c E"se tb t:t no injuncti on shou ld have i ssue d since tho
( 2· ,,...: wn.s h e ld in the 0.b.<
..?ttfP ~f t:_£.o pick~ t i ng W'\S not ill.e:g':l.l ~1 nd the Con<>titutions of both St nt e a nd
N n~ ion :11low fr eed om of speech . 191 Vr., . 272 . ( abs tr 'lcted in section on c onstitut ional
l nw} follow od.
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PLEADIN<.~ AND PRACTICE

Pleading and ;?ractice
Des.ositions .
568A .
19h Va .284
i:J filed a bill c!!f complaint for a divorce against H. The fifth paragraph of the bill
s tated that depositions would be taken at a -certain time and place stated therein.
~~o fu rther notice of the time and place was given H, and he failed to appear at the
said time and pl~ce. Are the depositions taken at that time and place in behalf of W
admis sible?
D
H eld: No. Quoting from headnotes, "The purpose of the required notice t6 an adver3ary of the taking o.f depositions is to give him the opportunity to appear and crossexamine the witn8ss, if he so desires. To accomplish its purpose a notice--- should
se .:;.j->:. r and explicit. A notice which is confusing and misle ading is not 'reasonable'
ana G.oes not me e t the requirements of V#8-307." Since the purpose of the bill of
complaint was diff~rent namely to inform the defendant and the court of the nature of
the c ase , a notice to take depositions incorporated in the bill is in conflict with
the. t e rms of the subpoena, for it notifi e s the de fendant to ·be pr esent at a time and
plac e ·and for a different pu~pose from that stat ed in the subpoena artd is apt to c~n
.fus e and mislead, or to be overlooked and is hence not the r ea sonable notice required
by tho Code.
Note: If at the time of commencing suit the J2laintiff des~_res to r.i..ve
notic e th'lt depO"S"r'tions will be taken at a ~-tain_time__and_plaM)_,_ thl.s_s.ho.uld- be
dine l?y 'a c l g_aL .;;n_d .explicit notice embodi ed _j..n a _§eparat e _ i.,nstrum~nt and s e rved on

tJ'l~ ·
PLEADING AND PR.ii.CTICE Federa l Proc .edure
199 F2d 720 • .
P sued D in a Virginia State Court f or fals e imprisonment and malicious pros ecution.
D r emoved the case to the Federal District Court. The ju.dg e thereof r equired P to
· elect the one action or the oth0 r. 1/Ja s t his corr ect?
·Held: No. Rule 8(e) 2 provid8s that~ a oarty may st:.:tte as man;y separate .c laims as
h_~ , regar ess of consi stenc:/, -:m d 1.-rhether based on legal or equitable grounds,
or both. And Rule 8 l(c) provides that the rules shall apply to civil actions removed
to the District Cou rts from the st ~~t e courts.
~ Burks(4th Ed)p.25b. state s t hat in Vi g inia slander, a n action for insulting
wo~ Jihel, maliciou~P-rosecution, f alse imprisonment and abuse of process may be
united in oria._ac:t.iort.
-PLEADING AND P HJ-~.C TICE Parties Insurance
194 Va. 367.
P l e ft his car at D's garagt:: to b e repaired. The car 1-.ras d es troy ed by a fire which
m:!.ght or might not have b e en du e to D's negligence a s r easonabl e people could have
differed in vi ew of th e evide nce introduced a t the trial. P was insured and the insuranc e comp:my paid P. D mov ed the court to pl.:1ce upon th e notic e of motion .for
judgment aft<;) r the naine of P the foll o-.li ng, "who sue s for himself and the Insura nce
Compa ny a s their inte r ests may appear. 11 This mo tio n W::l.S g r .::mt ed over the protes t o.f P.
Held:'. Error. This is in e.f f t: ct telli ng the jury that P has already been pa id, and
that they should not shift the loss from a. rich insur:1nc e compar:y who was pa id a
premium to bea r it to their ne i ghbor, D, >-rho se business has just been wiped out by a
fire . The cause of actio n by P ar'linst D b2.s not boen assignGd to th e insuranc e comp:my . The assignment sta t ute a llowing n.n .:!ssignce to s u G in his own name was not
passed .for the bene f'i t of · d e.fend &nts. f-'lo r .:::ov(;; r thG j 11dge ' s -::tcti on violated the spirit
of V#8-96 vJhich r eads in par t as f ollows: " Nothing in t his s c: ction sha ll be c ons trued
to pe nni.t th e j oinde r, or a ddi tion ;::s a new party, of a ny insuranc e compa ny on
a ccount of th e issua nce .7.-o any pa rty to :,1 c ausG o.f any policy or contract of liability
insuranc e for the benefi t of or that will i nure (to ) tht:: benefit of a ny party to th e
cCJ.usc • 11 If D r eally bclicv t: s that P may not a ccot1nt to t}-;e Insurance Co. he can ma ke
the a bove motion a ft e r v ~ rdict 1.vhen it will not af.f ect tne jury.
PLEADING AND P.1.ACTICE--D emurre r as a fim.l .JMS.c...ment
194 Va.J94.
P institut ed an a ctiori a t l [I.W aEains t D who demu.r r ed to the motion for judgment.
D' s d emurre r was sustained a s evi d enc 8d b~· an order ente ... ed on Narch 29 ,1951 simply
s t ati ng t hat it was adjudged .::.nd orde r ed -::. hat the demurrur be sustained, "to which
a cti on of the Court th e Pldntiff exc epts • 11 On Hay 21.J.th P asked for l e ave to amend

'·

;;6jJ\ .
bj_.s mo t io n for judgme nt which request was r e fus ed on t he gro und t _1at the c our t was

r.vi thout jurisdiction to allow an amendment after the expirati on of 21 days of the
e~ri:. r;; of judgment. Did the Court have jurisdiction to allow the amendment?
11
(t.•'C r: ~d: Yes. This ~ ? ur~ ha s cor:sistently h eld that.
order merely sustai~ng o r over·
\)~~ ~'llh ~w a d~mu~rer k,H~ ~o.Lfinal-. An c:rder sustalnln " such a demur:er. ln orde r to
\ {,I' be~ .f :tnal Wl thln tillun~g_of-C Gde , sec. mus t go further and dlSffilSS the cas e . 11
Ins t ant case reversed and remanded. Hule 3:13 reads, 11 In granting l e ave to amend t he
c •"J c.~. rt may make such provision for notic e thereof and opr-ortuni ty to make res ponse a s
the court may deem r easonable and proper." nThe trial court .in the exe rcis e of its
discreti on, may pe rmit a litigant to amend his motion f o r judgment, .and impos e such
t e rms and conditions as may be r e asonable and prope r, and if the litigant fails t o
comply with the conditions within the time spe cifie d, he is barred from furt her
· pros e c;1ti on of the· same ca.J.se , a gainst the same parties!'

ar:
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PLEADING & PP.ACTICE
194 Va. 409 .
The C&P Tele phone Co. sought to e njo i n the City o f Newpo rt News from colle cting a
3% gross rec e ipts tax. It prayed the court tha t in th e e v :::~ nt tha t equitabl e r e li ef
was not ei ve n on th e g round that th e r e was an a d r::qua t e r cm,;dy a t l a.,_.r t hat the c a s e
be tra nsferred to th e law side of the court. The co..1 rt di sMiss ed t he c a s e be c a tlSe
the r e vms an ade ua t C:; r emed a t l aw. Wa s tbis e rror?
Held: Ye s. "V# .provide s that ' no c a s e shall be di smiss ed s imply bec ause i t was
brought on th e wron _ s ·
· e-e em.rt·1 , but t hat whe n a pl ai ntiff ha s proc eedBd · in
equl y w en tle should h av .:! proc eed ed a.t l av-1, or the ot he r wa;/ about , t he cou rt s hall
di~ a transfe r to t ho proper f o r~n ."
PLEADING & PRACTICE
Res Adiudic at a·
194 Va .S57
IJI!he n X di ed he vlaS s u rvi v ed by A; A 1 s daue:ht e r, B; a nd by C. B cla imed tha t X a nd A
had contra cte d a va lid common law marr i e.ge in Wa shi ngt on , D.C. in e 3.r ly 1902 and that
s he wa s the l e giti ma t e cl:ild of X. C cla imed that B wa s i ll8gi tima t e , and tha t she ,
C, went through a ma rri::tge c e r emony with X i n l ate 1~102 a nd had lived with him as
his wife . until X 1 s death in l 94 G a nd that s he >-Jas his 1tlidm? and s ole he ir a t l a1r1.
X ma rri ed . C no . obj e cti ~n was made ?Y A w~o h0.s s ~ nce marri ed ~ numb e ~ of times
t.i;>
;r.-without ev e r d l vo r clnG X. Aft er X tt:as kJ_llE:d ln 1 9!~6 ln an a•J.tomoblle a cclde nt C
. .);.t. qua lifi ed as his pe rs ona l r e pre s ent ativ;.,; a nd s et t1 C:; d t he c laim unde r the deat h by
~)
wrongful a ct statut e fo r ~?1200 . Aft c;r S<:: t.t l ernont o.f th0: c l ::ti m B sued C, a nd C only ,
~~
for h t: r pa rt of th8 ::r,1200 . The tri a l c ourt i nst ruc t 0d th e jur y that B was not entitle<
to a ny j'1dgment in h e r f :wor unl"' ss they found she w-1.s t he l:::gi timat e daught e r of X.
'rt10 ,jury found in he r f wo r a nd gav e h e r :;j;l and cos t s . B is now claiming to be X1 s
h eir and a s such entitled to X1 s r <;alty. She s a y s t ha t i t is r ns a djudic ata tha t s he
is l ogitimat <:: .
e n:s ad j ~dicat a i t must be a
Hel<i:. It i s not r e s a dj udi c __ t a . ~;~ ·: ..
v~id rfdgment. ·~ be a V-'l lid j.udgmc:lrt.- t b.e omplsli nt_mus_!, _:otat~ n. cause of a ction,
:m a
n ec e ss~ )a r ti os {Tll.J..St _be._ joined . Si nc t; i n Virgi nia i n d e;ath by vrrongful a ct
c asCo:s
e .JUrY have an ·atsolut~CJ:cl,.i.G a stO how t n._)ir aw"'. rd s hall b e ..dis:tn 6l*t ed
members o f th €.1 s®-' cl::.t s s t ht:r c i s no assuranc;::; lrJllat -'-'-'IL " · r..at__:t.ha_ju..r.,-y, i f
thor - '
he..en_o_ne_,_ woul d not hov e gi. v e~tl1 0 Hhole _s um to the v!idow. _Thus B 1 s c ase
was ba d on it s fnc u as f ound ed o n m0re sp ucul :1tion. !vlo r 0over , if E 1s t heory i s c o r rec
A wo uld bu X I .s wi dot-r, :md A vn.s a nc::c e .ss::~ ry pa r t y . S.Lnc •, s h l! 'd::.J.S not j oined i n t he .
a ctio n th e judgme nt in B 1 s f nv o r we.s a nullity 'lnd h enc e not rt;s '.ld judica t a .

~
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I n-AfJ!LEADING & PH.ACT I CE
194 V2. . 607, 610 .
" _I} ;. j.n a bill f o r an in .j ~nction , .q.i_l -;;E~d t Lat . ll e; i·nls th e owne r ~f a c e rta in tra c t of
'~l b.,. ~'f.arul b nd tha t D w'ls c uth ng v <J.lu J. t. l c tlmh e r t .-10r e fr om. I s the blll demurrabl e ?

/'..~~ q-/f

~'.,);-(J He ld: Yes . It i s not s uff i ci .:.:,lt me: r ..::ly to alh:g ..:: ownersnip . P should a l so s et fo rth
/~ ? 'hi s titl~ . "Wh•:! r c he c l 'lims und e r a p;:p:. . r t itl e he sh o ul~ ~unu·ally exhi b~ t _ns ti tlF·
""'l
pap e r s , o r copi es t he r eof , o r such of th t::m :=.tt lcn~.;t ~1s t-Tll . L m'lkG out a pr l ma ~
c n.s e of title ."

5'7 0A.
PH.AC'riCE Ste t ut.e of IimHati ons . Wills Contracts
19h Va.641.
U and N 1:.Jere Uncle and niece. In 19 L~ 5 U told N tha t if s he would take care of hi m
J'' o1~ t he res t of hiS life h e
would leave her everything a nd gave her a validl;'/
e:.u-;·c uted V\'ill l eavj_ng everything to her. U di ed on l"'ay l G, 1948 and N had t he will
in he r favor probated. Later N dis covered a late r will, but this will had be en r evoked by U by cutting 011t his name and the names o f the witness es. Court proceedi.ngs
r esu lt ed and it was held that the second will r evoked ·the f irst will althou gh inope r a.ti ve as a will for oth er purposes, that the des truction of the r evoking wi ll
di d not r evi ve ·t he original will, a nd that U h ad died int estat e . On Ha y 24,1951 N
s u ;:;d tJ 1 s a dministrator for dama ges f or breach of contract. The d efens e was the t h r ee
yea r st a t t;.t e of limitations.
H d d : The def ense is not valid. Unde r :the doctri n e of ant i cipa tory r epudia tion N
had an action a gains t U durh!f hi s lif etim~_ because of U' s abs lut e..:.r::.epudia · on.
Srp c_ould_.haYe "' .ed __t~
lOCai~l J:lis d eat l} . V!Lfr 31 reads, "The peri od of
one yr::. a r . from t h e d eath of a n' a rt ' shall be exclud ~:;d : r om the com ·tab on _o_L.i..ime
wi hin w l Ch
the ope r a ti on of any _ R.t_a_t.]J......t&.:.Qr rul E2_ of lmv, it ma y b e ne~es sary~to
commenc e any proc eedinr s to pres e rv<2 o_r )revenL th e_ lo ss of_an ri g~~ remedy."
This -:t_n --~ - e c cnapge s t he th~e year statJ.t e to -~ four yeJ.r _one _whe r e one of-t h e
part i es al es.
PLEADING AND Pi~CTIC S
Damae:es
'
194 Va.704.
P sued D for the t,ort o f. ~nal c onvers at i on . The jury , though properly instructed
r e turne d a v erdic t for P f or :B , 000 11 a s pu ni tiv e da'T!age s onl y ." The judg e sugg ested ·
to t hy f or eman t hat th e l as t four wo r ds sho ,lld be cro ssed out. The for eman obliged
and Without f urther d el i be r atio n each, member o f t h e j u r :-;: acquiesc ed in the change .
J;l_ cont ends that t her e can b e no v e rdict awa rdi ng pu ni t ive damages unles s ·th e r e wer e
CQlnpensat Qry amag_as_and Sinc e th e jury found puniti V 8 damages- only, it is really a
v e rdic t in his favor.
·
H eld: D is only h alf ri gh t. It v.ras e r ro r f or the tria l c ourt to strike out the last
f ou r words a s t h at vJa S a cha D;ge in s ubstanc e r a th(_; r t han mer e form. Acquiesc ens e by
t h e jurors without d elibe r ati on di d not cure the def ect. But t h e v e rdict for P f or
;jpJ,OOO punitiv e damag es onl y , c a n no t b e int e rpr et ed a s a v e rdict for D. Rath e r it
indic a t es tha t the jury mi sund.:::r s tood t h e- instruc t i ons. Ordina rily, th en, th e c a s e
woul d be r ev e rs ed and r emand ed , but s inc e n eithe r side wi sh ed a noth Gr trial it was
af fi r med by m.1tual cons ent.
fLBi~DHJG ft

PLEADING AND F: RACT ICE
19L~ Va . 709 .
X was injur c~d in an a ut omobil0 acc i d ent d11e t o t.h e n;"gligcmc e of lJ. A f ew months
th e r eaft er X di od f r om a hea rt a t tac k not connected v.rith t he inj u ry. In th e meantime
X h a d start ed s uit against D. Aft ur X 1 s d eath P qualj_f i ed a s he r pco r so na l r epres enta o..
tiv e o.nd r evived the s ui t . P cla i ms tha t th e jury can m·mrd d2JTlagos fo r pai n a nd
f l u r rcring sinc E:: h e i s pros c:cuting X' s suit and X coul~ lf,fve r ecov e r ed such damag es .
QtY' , v l He ld:: No . V#8 - 62B ~pa .s s er.J in 1950 r eads , ".No causr::) ~lo f i n j uri es to p~rso n or prop~
e rty sh all be l ost becaus e of th e d c::d h- o.f- th.G-pcr.s on l ·j flble_fo.r_j:._he-inju x..y-dDcau s c of ac t ion fo r i n j uri c;;s t o P''rs on o r p ro pPr t y sha l l h 0 l os t be cau se of th e
~ r::_:t h of ti1e pe rso n in whos e f av or · tl1 e c .qus e of ~c ti o ~1 cxi sl~~d , pr:ovi 1*d~ howev Q~,
ln suc h act:LO n no r ec ov t:; r can be h ad for Jn® t a l m UJ.sh
a ln or suf e rln ~ ." Thls
l angua ge may e lnc onsi s t <::nt -vri t h Vr J - · 0 but if i t i s, t h e.: l at er statute the one
quo t ed) pr eva ils . I n d .:;at h b y vJrongf ul a c t c as ~ s the r e ce.n be no r ecov e ry for pa in
a nd s uffe ring of t11 e d Gc cas c::d , and i t. wou l d be i llo E;ic a l to a l low i t 1.vh e r e the ·
· :?.dministr at or su ed d ef enda nt on a r evi v ad action, :1nd not :cllow i. t where ._the admi nistrato r s u ed on th e or i gina l c ::mse of acti on .
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194 Va. 766 .
In a negligence case in which the evidence as to P' s contributory negligence was co 1~
G icting the jury f ound for P in the sum of· $2, 000 vJhich was fair compe nsa tion for t J
in juries r ec eived. P vJas only 18 and had brought suit as if he were an adult. D c on!;jcnds the whole proceedings are void. Is he right?
~.,j ~ 'Held: No. ~il.e an infa nt should__Q_u_e_ by next 1)'i erid,_J I£n -4 BZ reads in p rt: " No ,juct
1,...... ~ t mc:~t or dc-;c r ee shall be arrested or____:rexcr.sedtll)E_o!: th?_ app<,'la ranc ~ of eithe r party ,
/))JD \
bm ng unde r the age of twenty.:-ona years , _by:_ attorney, ....:~f t he ve rd~ct, whe r e ther e is
[ . d
Qne , or th e judgment or decree , be for him, and not to his pr e judic_e! 11 Note that if
1.,: r.:/'
the: judgment had been against him it would hav e tret.m- a- nulli{y, and if t he damages
had b<::en grossly inadequate in a clear case it woul d hav"-' bs en to his prejudic e .
PLEADING AND PH.ACTICE Federal Juri s dj ctj rm and Proc edure
194 Va .872
D in viola tion of f edera1 stat ut8s against ce rta in unfa ir l a bor pra ctic es by t h r eat f
of forc e prevented P • s employees who we r e members o f the AF of L from continuing t o
work for P. D sta t ed that P wa s in United Mine Worke r ' s t erritor;>' a nd that th e men
would ha v e to j oin a n affiliat ed uni on or e ls e l The thrG.J.ts t ook place in Kentucky.
P is a Virginia Corporati on e niJaged in the c onstructi.on b'.l s iness . P sued D i n Ri chrno
in a State Court on common l av-J "'principlos. Has t he court jurisdiction?
fi e ld: Yes. The f ederal sta tute s provide r emedies but they arc not exclusive . P may
i gno r e such statute s and sue on common law principles . Malici ous l JL_inte rfe ring wi-th
P 1 s c ontra ctual r~:: latio ns 1tri th th e AF )f _ L_<!_nd wi t ll__!,h D c v l com_pa.nielLfQ!:_which he
wa s dolng const:ruction wo.r:.lL.co.nstitut ed _tnr.t f.o_r which bot h c ompensatory and
punitive d amage s c ould _lli,)J.f;lCcNe r ed_und~ r th e l o.1t1s of Kentuc ky . It was a l so he l d
that the upreme Court of Appen.ls c vu l d strike/ o·;.t. an unprc.vcd it em of compe nsatory
damag es in the sum of :!n46, 000 f or injury t c. P' s business r e puta ti on, and, a s
modified, give judgment f or P witho ut lt.emanding t hu cas >J .fo r a new trial on t he
que stion of damages .

Venut~ and JuriscJi c~n
194 Va . 9J..li
D, a def endant and sht-1 riff c f F County, h3d giv en the bond r equired by s t a tut e ,Hhic
bond ran in f avor of thG CornmGnwoalt h , a rr.l the S Suret y Co .,Inc. of Baltimc r e was
surety the r eo n. D r esi.ded in F Qount y . He bnkt:. the CGndi t i.ons of his bond in w
~ County t o the i n jury <:.f P, the breach being contractual in nel;tur e . V#S -716 proyiQ_es
+a remedy by motio n on off icial bonds but states t)1~t__sui t ma be bro~gh!-_ i !:J. "the
court to or ill wh_ich 1::._ ~< ~~- a ny bond taken by an officer, or ~i ven by an sheriff-:< -r.- ~~
~ ~ is _!'0 ·uireU.CL · e ~turmi_d ,-fi._led_, ~ r recorded," in our case F County . P sued D and
S in W County in the Co~nonwealth' s ncune t o wit, tfCornmonwealth o.f Vi rg ini~, Ex Rel. J
v.D and S for the b enef~t o.f P." D was prope rly s e rved in F County, and fll ed a pl e<
i n abat ement ( as did S whose s t at utory agent was s e rve<i)cont ending that th e only v em
was the st at ut ory one of F County.
·
Held: (l)Th e plea in abatement is.>bud . v#8-"(l6 is cwnul a tive and fives a n addi:t . ona:
v~
.e caq._se oLactio n_a. r os e lii if1 Count y , t hat wa s a prope r v enu e , (2)
b~ cince this i s not one of th e c a s e s in which proc ess will i ssue out as far a s D
conc e rn ed, th o s e rvlce on D w;:ts a nullity ana th e; Clrcu:Lt Cou rt of VJ. County ac qu:
ed no j urisdiction ove r b. A· ·· s ti..nction WAS drawn in th e c a s e of actions on offici;
bonds as fo llows: (a )Whc:re t he bo nd is ktY.:cn by an off1c e r pu r suan
o s a u or y
aut hority (as whor 8 h e t2Jces a n indemnifying bond),that is onC;; of the f our cases in
which proc e ss may i s sue-: o~.tt of th e co unty or c ity in 1t1hich th e action i s brdught.
<&~~ See V#S-47(1). (b ) But whe re a bond i s given as r equired by stat ute f or th e faithfu
·performance of the duti .cs of thu offic u, this s ecti on has no application. Not e (l):
Sinc e S was a corpor tion , prc,cess prope rly can b e issu" d out o f W County t o be
s e rved on S ' s s t n.tutvr y ;:tgont . Nvto (2): \.-Jb ere t ho s e rvic e of process on a defendan
is inva lid, no f o rmitl pl8-'l is r e:qui r ed, .m d the court should itself raise th e obj ec
i un , if obs e rv ed. Not e (3): But i.f n curpon.tLm is J. d(;f e nda nt on a note and S is
:m indors e r , and Pl-'linti f f suro s defcnd.:n:t and S i n A Cc ~nty 1trhe re the Corporation
has its pr incip1.l <dfice , pr c,c css will issu e vut of A Cuunt y :md can be served on S
in F County whe r e S r esides {;.ls in this c a s(;: then: a r e c, th c r gr ounds o f v enu e than
that t ho c aus e of action J.rO S§ in A County). 146 V:. .21) ,135 S .E. 823 .
.
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')LEADI.NG AND PRACTICE Rule 5: 1 , Sec.4, and Rule 1:8
195 Va.269.
~Vi thin sixty days after final judgment defendant filed with the clerk his. noticB of
!"' appeal and assignments of error as follovrs: "Because the trial court erred in givi ng
to 'the jury in writing, improper instructions on moti on of the Commonwealth. 11 The
.
/
unly objection to the ruling of the trial court is sta(ted thus: "Defendant obj ect ed
\Z-<.t
and exc epted to the action in giving the instructions specifying them. )"
Hdd.:~ The writ of errarr should be dismiss ed. The assignments .J.f e rror must specifi·
call v- po int out the errors reliad_on.~or.....identify_the i tr~.tcticns alle gedly e rr o.n.e.ous
l,;y~ . Rule 5:1, Sec.4. Furthermor e Rule 1:8 r equire that th e r eas vns f ur obj ecth
be stated with r eas onable certainty. Couns e l must 11 lay his firit;e r on the error." It
is nut enough t o invite the court t o delve into the r e co rd and winnow the chaff
f r om the 1-1heat.

J

/r".;.'\,x

PLEADING MID Pn.A.CTICE--Meaning of "convict:i,_on11 •
195 Va.353.
V#4 6-416.l requir es revocation of the d river's license of any person twice convicted within -a· twelve months' period of violating any speed law. D wp.:s once ~onvicted
and later on in th e twelve months' period was arrested for speeding . He gave bon:d
a nd f or"feited it rathe r than stand .trial. Should his license be revoke d?
He ld: Yes . The l egislature did not intend t .o l eave the violator of speed laws such
an easy way out. Th e act is constitutiona l as it is a reasonable r egulation of one s
privilege to drive a c ar on the highways.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Not 3. quoti e pt yprdict
195 Va.468.
In eminent .doma in proc eedings t hr u:.! commissioners f avor ed a sum of around $5,000
a nd two commissioners f 3.vor ed a sum a round :;pl2, 000. It was then suggested tha t ea ch
ma n put down the sum h e f avored, that th es e amounts be a dd ed, that the t otal be
divided by fiv e , a nd th e amount obtained the r eby then be 'Conside r ed. The re wa s no
agreement made in advance tha_!: t hat amount would nece s sarily be the: aiTlOiii1t of the
award, although such sum was eve ntu all~r awarded.
·
Held: The awa rd is not invalid as a quotient Y~di.ct . Had they all agr eed in advauc e
to accept it vTi t hout fur t her conside ration then it would hav e bee n void. It is only
natural for people to hav e diff e r ent opinions on va ltle s a nd vJhe.n they do, there must
be some c ompromise, and if the c ompromise is based on r eas on it is imma t e rial tha t
some figur e more or l ess a rbit r a rily t aken, was us ed a s a sta rting point f or the
a rgume nts.

I

PLEADING AND Pit\CTICE
195 Va.678.
Case l. P sued D, a foreign corpo r ati.on , for damages for breach of coYltract. He di e
not allege or prove that D had ever done busi ness in Virginia, or that D had ever
rJ .J . .,.- t ~ designated anyone to be his agent i n Virginia. Process wa s served on the Secretary
l~ ltvt
of the Commomrealth. D moved to quasi the proc ess for l ack of juris diction. P c on-~~~~_:;, tended t hat a ll pl eas in abatement must be swo rn to, a nd henc e the orq.l motion shoulc
be ove rru l ed.
Held: A motio n to dism.i ss :·or want o'' · isdiction(as distinguished from want of
venue ) is not a l ea in a batement and henc e need natbe- sworn .to. While such a n obj ection c ou
have been mad e by a pl ea in ab;tt ement, it need not be. Indeed th e
court of its own motion co11ld have dism~ssed the case .
Case 2. P sued D, 3 fore i gn corporati on, for da ma.ges for b r ·~ach of contract. Ther e
wa s proof tha t the cor por01.tion a yea r or two bef ore th e instituti on of thi s action
.had be en doing busines s in Virgi nia but th::tt it bad clo s r·~d its offic es in thi s State
before t his a ction wa s started. The r e was no proof that D h.'l d ev e r appointe d the
Secre t a r y of the Commonwealth as i ts s t .- tutory agent. Proc es s was s e rved on tha t
party. On these facts th e tri.al court di smisse d the c~1s e: on mot ion for lack of
jurisdiction.
He ld: Error. A i]!Qtion t o dismiss f or l ., ck of jn.,-j sdi cti o o.,_li~abatement
is not sufficient unles s H nc ' gnt.iv ~"~ry_ gmunct_o~ Jurisdictio.n_enJ.!Jlltla.'\;&d in th e
s t-;tut e s. Unde r V//13-217 a fore:i gn cor poration trnt doe s busint:s s in this St a·te by
that v er y a c t is deem0d t o hav e a ppoint0d the SGc r ct a ry of th e Commonwealth his agent
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to receive process. While there was no jurisdiction under V#l3-2ll or 13-214 -since
no agent had been appointed, there was jurisdiction under V#l3-217 supra, and this
grqund of' jurisdiction had not been negatived. nT.h§_provjsjon of V#l3-217 for the
sefViCe of process is a co~JjQn_gQQ~~ t is allowed to do business, accepted
by_it when it e.n:ter tne-Sta.te- a-nd- engages- in-business wi tli]) qt_-Q_omesticat~ing- or
appointing....s; statutory ...agento It should no the..r.SLaf..t_e r,_ by:_t}1!L_s~ le expedient of
cl.ru;.ing its offj c
d leaving th-is 'urisdiction, be a:llowed ~o wi thdr_aw -that assent
so a_s_ t..Q._def eat al!_~ction which_ greJ'!__Q.U.t of_bus.i~ness_ done here. 11
195 Va.784.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
In an equity case none of the testimony was presented to the tria~ court for
certification within the time allowed by law and hence did not become a part of the
record and could not be considened an appeal~ However nQffierous exhibits offered in
evidence when...the testimony was being heard were marked for identification and
initialed by the judge. Rule 5:1 #3(d~ provides that when so marked and initialed
the exhibit becomes part of the record. Defendant wishes to rely on the exhibits in
the Supreme Court of Appeals.
Held: "It carmot do so in spite of the l anguage of Rule 5(supra). Evidential valge
canna be iven t o that which constitut es only a part of the evidenc~. "The oral
testimony not made a part oTthe r ecord may -have weakened or totally destroyed· the
evidential value of any or all of the exhibits now relied upon by the appellants.
If a litigant without consent of other interes t ed parties, were allowed to present
his cause in this court upon only a part of the evidenc e , the inevitable result
would be that the merits of the c ase "1-JOU.ld be determined on appeal upon evidence
materially different from that considered by the trial court. That cannot be permitted..11
PLEADING AND Pf~CTICE
Statute ~f Limitations
195 Va .827.
S a sub-contractor in 1943 p11t in a defective union in a eas pipe which l ed into a
house which was being built by D, a contractor, for P who acc epted the hous e in 1944.
Because of the defect(l)the union broke,(2) gas followed the pipeline beneath the
building,(3)collected in the basement, and(4) was i gnited by a flame or spark causing
an explosion in 1948 which destroyed tho hous e . P sued D claiming that the statut e
of limitations was five years and that i t did not start to run until the def ect was
discover ed as a r esult of tho explosion.
Held: ( l )~.rong rr3sulted in c ons 8 qwm:t.~ · · ~ ct_ gamag_e_ t o pro erty rather
truw
:irect · ·ur:y thereto, and hence would not survive at common l aw . Therefore
the statute of limitations is one ye g,r . This is to be contrasted with 185 Va.?l8
w~e E reli e ~ on o. fals e stat ement t hat a_ f_11rn;;t.ce w:::ts of sufficient capac1ty to
heat the house as the wrong in tln t cas e was a direct damage t('l E 1 s property. (2 )The
st atujJ o ~J.~;tn;io ~-_s arts t run e.s soon ·'lS the wro ng is done r egardless__9f the
cl,;i.ffi __lt_ o.f__'--sc n :t.:Uning Ju:Lf.act~unll.!s s defend-:m f r~u Ll C;n y c onc~a ls _ f act s ;
and not from th8 t i me it is a sc 0 rt a in~:.;d that dam"Lge h:~.s been sustained. The fraud
must be actual and not cor;structiv(; . In tho i ns t .:~. nt case tb c::re was no actu<1l fraud
on p' s part o.s D had only constructive noti ce of the defect /Jhen D told P in 1944
that all lvork had been prop(crly done . This r epres ent ation >-ras m~"ldo not for the purpos
of concealing ::1. fraud, but for tt:11-:; purpos e of coll0cting the bal anc e D actually
thought was due him. St atut es o.f l i mitations nr c st atute.: s of r epvs e and that purpos e
would be def eat ed if one might bo he ld li abl e mG.ny y8.:.tr s l at e; r . (Note : Th e court di d
r;ot commi t its elf as t o under gr ound trespas ses . It mer ely st 'lt (;d that there was no
trespass in this cas o.)
~ [; S A@ ttj..i :)l.fl t c..
195 Va . 86l.
PLEADING AND PRACT ICE
Mrs. P while drivine her hus band ' s car was in :m <J.Cciuent vrith X who sued her in a
civil and polic e court f or :ip252 d:uni1.ges Llone 1'\1-S c:).r. Mrs . P count erclaimed f or $207
damages dr ne her husband 1 s . car. The trial judge r efus 0C:l t o dismiss the counterclaim
but donieu r ecbver y t o e;ith,.; r pn.rt y on tht.; ground t h"l.t each was negligent. That is
X l ust his suit agaj_nst Mrs. P bee ~ us c he was m;glig0nt, a nd Hrs . P l ost her suit
I
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on the counterclaim becau~ she was negligent. Later Mrs. P brought an action -for
.;~ : 1 0, 000 against X for personal injuries incurred in the accident. X contends that H
h:~s already been adjudicated that she was negligent and hence recovery should be
d.:;nfed.
'
/
Held: On rehearing (196 Va.322) Contention upheld. A gratuitous bailee can su.ef a
th:Lrd party for injuries dona_the-Gai-1ed-prop.er_ty.. He~ce we had the same p.§;.rlies and
tho same issu.es and the matter is
.s..._adjUdicata. (Two judge s dissented on the ground
t h5
a
en 1.ssue was not made at the trial, and one cannot raise a new
issue for the first time on appeal)
PLEADING AND PRACTTC~~ --Equi_ty
·
196 Va.l9$.
A bill in equity was f~fo~~OFmatiRn of a fire insurance policy. Defendant answered. The parties __?:greed that the prlbci:pal..,..c-on:tr()_yersy was whether or
not defendant was guilty of fraud or other inequitable conduct a nd----that-mat.ter was
submitted to a jury 11 pursuant to Code 8-213 11 which provides that in a cas e of ·-a:---------plea . in equity the parties are entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right. The
evidence showed no fraud but it did show a mutual mistake. Nevertheless the jury
found for complainant and the trial court refused to set the v erdict aside.
Defendant appealed.
Held: V#,8-2l3 a:QJ21ies only to a Q).ea, ..and...._no~ to '
Hence the v diet of
the jury in this case would at best"'"tie advisory only. Since there was no evidence to
support the verdict it should have been disregarded. ~ this error is harmless as
r eformation should have been granted on the ground of mutual mistake of fact-.---PLEADING AND PRACTICE
196 Va.247.
C by his will directed that his executors create several trust funds out of his
total estate and gave them the power to s ell his realty for this purpose. The
executors claim that K holds an undivided 49/ 100 interest in the Grand Caverns as a
r esulting trustee for C and brought this suit to e st~blish such a trust. The
executors did not mak e C•s devis ees parties. K demurred on the ground that at C\s
death title to the r eal estat e pas s 0d to his devisees and that this suit could only
be maintained by them. What ruling?
Held: Demurrer overruled. I<' s claim overlooks the f act that tho executors were expressly given the power to sell the r ealty. In such _a cas e the executors take the
title to realty for the purpose indicated and are the proper parties plaintiff.
PLEADING AND Pf~CTICE
Creditors Rights Mechanics Lien
196 Va.295.
_b p, a sub-contractor, furnished C, a contrac tor , witn ready mixed concrete for M
Ji ~· from June 23 to August 3. There was evidence that i f the bill had been paid by
(pe-t'
August 25 there would h;we been a discount of 25 cents per cubic yard. The memoran• -- ~ dum claiming the lien was duly fil ed and suit was instituted to enforc 0 the lien on
~·
the following February 21st. The statute(V//43-17 ) r equires the suit to .be instituted
within six months after the whole 'Q';;bt becomes payable. lvas the suit instituted in
time?
Held: Yes. The debt becomes "payable 11 as soon as suit caul · be successfully instituted and when interest at the l egal r at e would c;Jmmence if unpaid. Since there
was a discount i f paidt58Tor e ugust:-25tn no inter est would- start to run and no
action coulibe m:arnt:a:i:I' - oeTo:i'G"t"ha't- dat e . T1'1 e- ru -e-that- t1TEr d'8b-t H; payable when
the l ast of a series of services ren or ca- pursuant to contract is performed has no
application if a l onger time is allow~d for payment as it was in the instant case .
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
Contempt of Court
196 Va .428
The Circuit Court of N. County ordered a Ferry Co. and the Pennsylvania Railroad
Co . to continue ferry s ervic e. They r efus ed t o do s o and were fined for cont empt of
court. They appealed . What r esult?
Hel d: The Circuit Court had no jurisdiction t o issua such an order. In the absence
of statut e the oper at or of a ferry can C C:·'lS e his cper ations. He may f orfeit hi s
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franchise if he does so, but he cannot be forced to continue. Since the Court had no
n ~•.thority to issue the order such order was' absolutely void and hence could be
7iolated with impunity. Note: If the Court had had jurisdiction, disobedience of i t3
order would hav:e been contempt of court even though it was later determined that t he
l m1 violated was unconstitutional.
PLEADI NG AND PRACTICE I~vited Error Torts
196 Va.469.
P was driving his car. His wife was his passenger. D was driving at an excessive
speed and ran into P•s car as P was making a left turn. P•s wife was killed. She was
the mother of nine children. P qualified as her personai representative and recovered a verdict of· ) 10,000 11 payable to P, the personal representative." D's attorney
suggested that the verdict be changed, if that was what the jury intended, to make
the .,~10,000 payable to P. The jury were then told they could make i t all payable to
P, or all payable to any one of the children,or divide it up between them. The jury
stated they wanted it all to go to P. The Court then asked the attorneys if that was
all right with them, and they answered affirmatively ~ D noH contends that P was
guilty.of contributory negligence, that at least there was a jury question on that
point, that a beneficiary who was to blame in causing the death cannot share in the
proceeds, and hence that the verdict is contrary to la~.
Held: While a beneficiary whose negligence proximately contributes to the death of
the deceased cannot take, D, in this case is now estopped to claim that D was guilty
of such negligence. He himself, through his attor ney, strgges ted to the jury that p
be made the beneficiary and told the Court he had no objection to such a verdict,
l!_aving invited the error, if any, he gannot now take advantage thereof.

~
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PlEADING AND PHACTICE Pleas in abatement
196 Va.59D.
D, a railroad, ordered a lar ge amount of coal from P. Preliminary negotiations
were ~n Wise County but the contract was accept ed in WiJming ton,N.C ~ The coal was to
be delivered to D F.O.B. mine in Wise County. D refused to s end in orders from its
Wilmington office as it had done in the past. The principal office of D l-Ias in
Richmond. P tendered coal to D in Wi se County which was r efused. D was s erved with
process in Richmond, though sued in Wise County . D filed a plea in abatement which
the trial court sustai ned and this appeal followed. Note the followi ng points:
(l) ' Wise County is not the proper venue unless all or part of P 1 s cause of action
arose there. If this condition is satisfied then process will issue out because D
is a corporation.
.
(2) The cause of action in case of breach of contract ar i s es ei t her where the
contract i s made or where it is breached. The contract in this case was made in
Wilmi ngton. It was also breached there when no or ders were given. But it was also
breached in Wise County when D refused to acc ept coal t here. Hence part of the cause
of action arose in ~vise County and that county is a proper venue. Reversed and
remanded. fli"1iJU Where defendant files a lea in abatement the burden .QL pr..oo£... is
on him to establish a
e alleg~ in sai d plea .
PLI~ADI NG

AND .PRACTICE
I~.ns.istent Pos itions
196 Va,)49,
P sued D for :ijill,589 and. for ~p 9, 533 allegec:lto be due on two s eparate construction
contracts. D defended on the ground t hat the contract was illegal because P had contracted for work in exc ess of :;r20 , 000 in violat i on of V#54-113 et seq. as he had no
state license . P contended that tl1e statute was inapplicable where t here were
·s eparate jobs each under •a>20, 0CO. D then wi thdr ew his plea of illegality andsa.itild
that the part ies had made a compromise s et tlement. Thi s compr omise pr ovided that D
would pay P :pll,500 t-Jithin sixty days , and t hat i f he fai l ed to do so t hen judgment
for the whole amount sued fo r s hould be enter ed. Thi s agr eement was entered of
record. D f ailed to pay withi n t ne s ixt y days, and obj ected to t he Court entering
j udgment for the full amount sued for becaus e the original contracts wero illegal.
Held: D cannot play f ast and loose with t he Court . HavJng withdrawn t he plea of
illegality, and entered a compr on1ise agre ement of rec ord, he cannot now ass ume an
i nconsistent posi t i on. Were it otherwise t here could not be orderli ness ,regular i ty,
and expediti on, all of which are required in or der to do just i ce.
1
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PLEADING AND PRACTICE
..r._L\dicial ~ales 0
(
.z._
Twas trustee under a deed of trust of ~e 1iotel ~erson in Clitt~rl ~rge , The
O''mer died and his widow filed a bill in. equity for the settlement of his estateu
:eJl d.le this case was pendillg default was made in paying the debt secured by the deed
of trust. T informally moved the court for permission to sell the property as per
the terms of the deed of trust, and an order was entered authorizing him to do so.
I>rer;y one agreed to this procedure. The hotel was sold and brought $90,000. T's
commission would be :~4500 if this be ·regarded as a sale under an ordinary deed of
trust but only ·1~2100 if this be regarded as a judicial sale. To which commission
is T entitled?
Held. to :$4500. It is not a .1udici'aL sale becausetrthe CO\.li't appointed no commi§.sione~ to hold the sale, required no bond, and made no provision for its confirmation
all of which are required in the case of a judicial sale. The order was to sell as
per the terms of the deed of trust, so the sale is an ordinary sale by a trustee
of a deed of trust after default and request by a creditor secured by the deed of
trust to sell.
PLEADING AND PHACTICE ~s adiudi~ata
196 Va .597.
C maintained a barrica e in a high1...ray where it abruptly narro1...red from four lanes
to three. B drove his car into the barricade, lost control of his car, and went on
into M's house damaging the house and himself. M sued Band C. M won as to B but
lost as to C and the j~dgments becarne final. Then B sued C who entered a plea of
res judicata. Is this a good plea?
Held: No, for three r easons. (l)The ,parties are not the same(2)The issues are not
necessarily the same for even if C were negligent as to B this was not necessarily
negligence as to M as questions of proximate cause and ambit of duty would be involved in the controversy between M and C that would not necessarily be involved
as between M and B or between B and C. (3) Estoppel by judgment must be mutual to
give rise to the defense of res judicata. There is no such mutuality here for if C
were to sue B for damage done to the barricade the judgment in M v. B would be no
bar as the parties and issues would be different. Note: The fact that neither B nor
C filed a cross claim against the other when they were sued by M when either could
have done so under Rule 3:9 was also persuasive that the i:csu.es were different.
PLEADING AND PHAGriCE lmm~ity f rom Ci til Process
196 Va.651.
vl drove his c.ar from his home u1 Tennessee 'tb testify in the case of Comm. v. D.
at the request of the Commonwealth, W owed D : p2,000 past due. D attached W's car
(for which the :lp2 ,000 was due to D) and served trim with process. The Unifonn Act with
reference to out-of-state witnesses(V#l9-242 et seq) was not followed. Should the
service of process be quashed?
Held: Yes. Both the attachment and personal service on tv should be quashed. The
statute is in aid of the common law and does not prevent a simpler method where a
will come voluntarily. Th . rivile e from being served with process extends
ro
o
·
ss r so
ecessary
ance as we ~his
person. 11 This immunity works no injustice to anyone, or
he.w~tness comes
with~n the State, there would be no opportunity to serve process upon him11 • The
courts of Tennessee are open to· D if he wishes to sue w. 'rhe advantage to the Commonwealth is too important to yield to the personal advantage or disadvantage of ·
individual suitors.
Pleading and Practice Equity Pleading Cr~ditors Suit
196 Va. 790 at 796.
Ten creditors appeared before a commissioner in chancery to prove their claims as
per an order of r eference frvm the chancellor. ~.ne of the ten cl~ims were allowed.
The owner of the disallowed e;laim appealed. There is not enough f«;>r all. Are the nine
creditors whose claims were allowej necessary parties in the appellate proceedings ?
t/ Held: Yes as their rights may be adversely affected. Her!ce their· counsel should
.\ { .';/ordinarily be served with copies of the notice of appeal and assignments of error,
~~ designation of parts of the record to be prtnted., and petitions of appeal as required
.
by the rules of court. But where a receiver is contesting all claims in order to conserve funds available and the creditors acquiesce in his actions notice tothe receiver
or his counsel satisfies the requirement that such notice must be ' given "opposing
counsel."
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196 Va.360 ,
A, the grandmother of X, and B and C, the parents of X who was three years pf age,
formed a partnership . and borrowed 4~4, 000 of X t s money. X attached A's personal prope:c ty after the partnership had been dissolved but failed to furnish an attachment
bond. Does the failure to furnish the bond end the case?
(1) No. 1tJhile the attachment is dissolved, .the case then proceeds as one at law.
On the above facts are A, B, and C jointly and severally liable?
(2) Probably yes as it was wrong for the parents of X who stood in a fiduciary
r8lat:i.onship to use his money for themselves. Since A acquiesced in this wrong she,
too, became a party to it • .Tort liability of partners is ordinarily_ jQint_and_sav.eral.
(3) In the instant case the parties all agreed to an instruction that liability
was joint and several. They also ag-reed that the case should be tried without joining
B and C. v,!flen A lost, she appealed o.n the ground that the case should be reversed
becau.se it was an action against an individual for a partnership liability. Held:
After acquiescing in the way the case was presented below, she is now estopped. One
cannot invite error, and then complain of the error. The instructions asked for
granted as asked for became the la'l-r of the case even if erroneous.
:1 :~r,EAIHNG AND P}(AC'J.'ICE
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PLEADINCJ AND PRACTICg
R!.!..le 1:8
196 Va.966,969.
A and B are brothers and heirs or'i' , tr1eir father, who died intestate. A was a'
fugitive from justice and owed some ·4ti5 ,ooo in debts in Virginia. B was administrator
of F ' s estate. 'I'he share of each was worth about :iv26,000. A's creditors had attached
his interest. A received -:~5,000 from B and used it to pay off the debts. A gave B a
deed absolute on its face conveying to D all his interest in the estate. Later A
filed a bill in equity for a decree to the effect that the deed was a mortgage.
When the evidence was taken by deposition A offered testDnony the object of which was
to invalidate the deed as having been given to one in a fiduciary capacity for a
grossly inadequate considera~ion. B did not object in the trial court that A's
evidence did not conform to the allagations of the bill but elected to meet A on the
evidence introduced.
Held: This is a ~ r, and he ca~nnot now object to the vari ance •. If he had objected below he could have compelled A to allege lidth more exactness the grounds of
his claim. Having failed to do this, the objections he could llave made below cannot
now be considered. Rule 1:8.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE ~~j ~j+ a +i o ns in Death by wrongful Act C~s ~ s
196 Va.l95l.
P started a suit under the death by wrongful act statute two days before the
statute of limitations would have run. He failed to prosecute the suit, and took a
voluntary non-suit some six months later. He then started a new suit on the same day
for the same thing. Is the second suit barred by the statute of limitations.
Held: Not barred. The express language of V/18-634 excludes from the ·
limitation the time that the first action was pending if th:.?.t action 11 for any cause
abates or is dismissed without determining the merits of said action". The statute
does not use the vJOrd "nonsuit". Yet its dominant pc1rpose is clearly dl.sclosed.
Given the liberal construction to which it is entitled, that phrase evinces an int e · t to
t 1 laintiff the time the first action was pending. The ~e is
~~~~~~WL~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ction.

PLEADING AND .PHACTICE Detinu ~ - C~ ng e of Venue
197 Va.27
P, who had been treas urer of A \>unty, ',vas running for re-election. He had received
~ letter from B, a banker, to t he effect that a check was enclosed in payment of
Commissions for effecting certain loans . P turn~d this letter over to X. Shortly
thereafter X and P fell out and X wrongfully gave the letter to D who was P's
opponent. D prepared a circular in which he printed excerpts from the letter and in
which he charged that P was misusing his power to put county money in certain banks
in return for the banks giving him a commission on priva·~ e transactions. P ran advertisements in the local n.e wspapers to answer the charges, but lost the election.
He made an affidavit to the effect that be could not get a fair trial in A County
so the venue was changed to H County. 'rhe court (l)ordered that the l etter be returned
to P, (2)allowed ::P)'OO damages to reimLursa him for the advertisements, and(3)dis-
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allowed damages caused by his failure to be re-elected. Discuss points involved.
Held: (l)It was error to change the venue to H County on the mere .:;'Worn statement
.l f' a party that he could not get a fair tr:Lal in A County. Facts and proof thsre0f
s0. ,indicating must be presented; (2 )The let-:t.er belonged to P and he is entitled to
it; (3)and (4) T
es allowed in detinue
e wron ful detention of the proper·i:,;>r must result directly from the detentiono In ..tbe instant case he damages renul'E'ed i"rom the misuse ~rthe IetterCits puoncati.Qn).and not from the deten:tion. If
3. thief steals your car, and later negligently runs irito you the latter damages can:1ot be recovered in an action of detinue, but only in an independent action for
negligence since t]1ey resulted not directly from the detention, but collaterally
from the mis~Ee of the property wrongfully detained.
PLEADING A~TI PRACTICE--Interro,gtories-Short v. Long
197 Va.l04.
Short attempted to pass Long s \ ruck and a coll:llion result,ed. The evidence as to
who was to blame was in conflict. Short sought by interrogatories to ascertain what
quantity of alcoholic beverages Long had consumed during the eighteen hours immediat E
ly preceding the mishap and at what hours he had consumed them. He could have
elicit~d the same information from a number of witnesses, but did not do so. V#8-32G
provides that in a case at law a party may file in the clerkts office interroga~orieE
to any adverse party. The trial judge quashed the said interrogatories. Was this
proper?
Held: Yes. The time covered was so long that the questions asked were irrelevant.
Besides it is not an abuse of judicial discretion to refuse to allow interrogatories
where the party wishing them has ample opportunity to inquire into such matters
before and at the trial. Note also ti1at the rule against self-incrimination might
be applicable.
In this case the evidence indicated that Long had been damaged some :1~900. The jury
only allowed him ~p400 on his cross-claim. Short contended that this was error and
hence a new trial should be awarded.
Held: Even if it is error only Long can take advantage thereof as Short has not
been injured thereby. And that, said the court, is the ulong" and the 11 short 11 of it.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
89 S.E. 2d4 197Va • .: Lft)
(1) In a complicated automobile collision case in which there were five lawyers,
four cars, and five parties involved the jury was having difficulty in coming to an
agreement. The trial judge talked to the jury telling them that the case had already
taken much t~e and expense, that if they disagreed there would have to be another
trial before another jury no more capable than the present one, and that while no
juryman was under a duty to surrender his conscience he hoped that they could come
to some kind of reasonable conclusion.
(2) It also developed that one of the jury was a first cousin of one of the
attorney:s;,
Held: As to(l)above that the judge's remarks were proper as stating the truth,
and since he stated that no one tvas expected to surrender his conscience; were unobjectionable. As to(2)relationship to an attorney is not a common law or statutory
ground to challenge a juror for cause except in Georgia when the attorney has the
case on a contingent basis. In the instant case the fe e was not contingent, and
besides the objection came too late.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
19~ Va.l36
Complainants filed a bill of complaint in 19.52 to set aside a decree entered in
1919 on the ground that such decree was void,(a)because a proper party was not joined though none of complainants claimed through him,(b)because a deposition of an
important witness was prematurely taken and admitted in evidence 9 (c)and because the
allegations in the 1919 bill were false and perpetrated a fraud on toe court.
Held: As to(a)Nonjoinder of a proper party will not authorize equitable relief
from a decree to other defendants who were properly joined and served, as to(b)the
only result of taking the depvsition prematurely would be to make it inadmissible
and if the result of this were to l eave the decree unsupported by sufficient evidence
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the remedy was by appeal; as(c)that the 1952 bill. af complaint·· only-alleges-intrinsic
f: ·e:md relating to matters expressly 'disposed of by the 1919 case, and that equity v7il::'
e;nl;y relieve for extrinsic fraud practiced on the court on collateral matters which
p!'evented a fair submission to the court, and(d}that complainants were ba:ned by
t :·1eir laches in that · they w~ - 33 years unt.il after numerous witnesses had died
without alleging_any-reason for the long delay.
£)LEADING AJ)JD P:'1ACTICE 11/r.- J. b ·~t:.~~t ~;-h1'U-c:-- 89 S.E.2d 320, 197 Va.367.
P sued D for injuriJ~~· ~er b~ck arising out of an automobile accident. At the
trial she testified that she had never been in any other · automobile accident(except ·
a minor one about which she was not asked)and that she had never before hurt her back.
She also testified in such a way as to show that D vlas negligent. After the trial an
anonymous phone caller told D that P was a liar, and for him to contact X. D contactec
X and found out from him that he had settled a case out of court for $800 as a result
of P 1 s claiming her back was badly hurt in an automobile accident in which X(who was
uninsured)had been involved. Is D entitled to a new trial(P having obtained a verdict
and judgment for :ipl5,000) and proper aff idavits having been filed?
Held: Yes. D could not have obtained this evidence before or during the trial by due
diligence, it is material on the question of damages as eome of her present dis- '
ability may have been due in part to the former injuries, it is not merely cumulative ~
it bears on P's credibility as a principal witness, and probably would change .the
result of the case.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
Consti1rutione.J T..<~w..
89 S.E.2d 329, 197 Va.395.
P was convicted of reckl ess-driving in October 1953 before the mandatory requirement of revocation of a driv8r's license in case of two convictions of reckless
driving within any 12 months period went into effect, and again in Hay 1954 when such
a law was in effect. By statute V#46-424 there is no appeal from a mandatorl revocation by the Commia ~ ione:r e.xc.e.p.t.....f..or- mi.s:take f _iden.tit;y-_ wher e_the_judgments- OT.convic~~ · P appealed to the proper Circuit Court on the ground that the
act was ex post facto as applied to the 1953 conviction. The Commissioner demurred.
Held: Demurrer should have been sustained for by statute no a ppeal is allowed except
on the question of identity. Hence the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to determine
any other matter.
PlEADING AND PHACTICE
197 Va.471 .
P was under contract to erect a smokestack at X's factory. He sublet this job to D.
Because of D's negligence X1 s factory was inj ur ed, and so was the smokestacik. As a
result of court action P paid X for the damage done to X1 s factory and recovered the
amount from D by way of re-imbursement. P is now suing D for the damage done to the
s1nokestack and D claims that P had only one cause of action for all the damage done
when the smokestack fell, that this cause of action cannot be split, and that having
recovered on one portion thereof he cannot now vex him twice for the same thing.
Held: While the principle stated above is sound, it is not applicable to the facts
of this case for pr s cause·s of act.ion(plural)~ere separate causes of action. The
moment the smokestack was damaged P had a cause of action, but P 1 s separate cause of
action for re-imbursement for money paid X for damages done his factory did not arise
until later after P had paid wbat, as betvreen P and D, D should have paid.
PLEADING AND PllACTICE
197 Va. 457.
By his .wl._of complaint P s ought ~ o gu~ t t ~ tle to his mineral rights in thirty
acres of land, to r equire defendants to account to him for his share of profits obtained from mining said minerals, and for statutory penalties for mining within five
feet of the boundaries of his la.nd without his consent. No survey was filed and it is
impossible from the allegations to asc ertain the boundari es of the thirty acres. The
demurrers of the defendants were sustained and P r efus ed to amend.
HeJd: Affirmed on appeal. Defendants are entitled to know from P•s bill of complaint just what he is complaining ab01lt o Unles 3 the thirty acres is precisely located defendants have no wa'./ of knowing j ust what acts on their part are alleged to be
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;,rrongful. It is impossible to trespas-s on, or to quiet title to "thirty acres of
Jand "11 P' s bill of c~rnplaint is .baci!f.o~ir.de£ini.tene8s.
PLi~ADH'G

AND PRACTICE ~trial Conferenc&-summary Judgment
197 Va.589.
P billed. D for poultry~od soi d by 'it"'\ o D.-u- c ialllled w e food was d:::fective, tho.t
he had · lost some ~~1575 worth of poults because of the defects and deducted that
.: :nOlli1t, from a check sent to P marked, "Payment in fu11. 11 D notified P it was not
a~cepting the check in full payment, and later had it certified, after which P
notified D that its only purpose in certifying the check was to protect itself in
case jud~nent was obtained. At a pre-trial conference the court, after see~ng the
letters and a photostat of the check rendered summary judgment for p on the ground
1
that the check had been accepted in full payment.
Held: Error. The re-trial onference and summary judgment provisions of the rules
are desi ned to prevent clear cases from . oin
o r~a • u w erever t ere is a
bona fide dispute a out the facts the parties are entitled to a jury trial. Here
ther~ are at least two disputed facts·' (l)Whether or not the check was acceptedih
full ·payment pursuant to a n express agreement, a.nd(2)whether or not the poultry food
was defMtive. Pre-trial conference is not a substitute for a jury trial where facts
are in dispute.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
197 Va.736.
p was injured in a collision with D, an infant. The jury· viewed the scene with
court and law-Jers absent, and at the trial found for D. P moved for a new trial on
the ground that the jury had improperly taken measurementr> and made time c.hecks while
at the scene of the view. He introduced an affidavit by his counsel that four of the
jurors had made admissions to that effect. No hearing was had on the motion. The
Court, without notice to D's guardi1.p ad litem, inquired of the officers in charge
of the jury whether or not the alle~ed acts had been committed, and, receiving an
affirmative reply·, set aside the V6:!"dict : and awarded a new trial. Wast his proper?
Held: No. D's guardian ad litem was entitled to_ notice so he cou.ld cross eJ:amine
the officers. The affidavit of P 1 s counsel was hearsay, which, while justifying the
Court in making an inquiry, was inadmissible in evidence at such an inquiry. Case
reversed and remanced so the 1notion for a new trial may be properly presented and
argued •
. · I _, ..,

PLEADING Al'iD PRACTICE
197 Va.807.
D sold a building to P for ~P150,000 cash. D warranted that the freight elevator
was in good condition Hhen he knew it had been condemned by the municipal authorities
Three years later P sued D who relied on the defense of the one year statute of
limitations.
Held: The five ear statu
.
' ¥- X-e.St.~a(even if the
result of fraud s.urvive under Wt'64-1~ . By V//8·-24 if .no other time is stated the
statute of limitations is five years on ac t i ons that survive and one . year on actions
tha
PL&ADING AND PRACTICE
197 Va.
Appellant requested Supreme Court of Appeals to set aside finding of the trial
court on the ground t hat it was not s ustained by the evidence. In ~ m1t iag the
pa~ts of the record that should be printed she indicated only the portions thereof
that were favorable to her.
Held: This is a failure to comply with the rules as the court cannot tell whether
such an assignment of error is good unless it has before it a transcript of all the
evidence germane to the point.
Held, also, that copying a p.? rtion of the evidence into one t s brief is not an
acceptable substitute for -a designation of parts of record that should be printed.

Va,37
P s car and D's car collided. The only fae:t in dispute was whether P or D was on
·i·hz tvrong side of the road. While the jury was recessed one F informed the jury that
i i.:> insurance company carried the insurance 'for both P' and D and he volunteered full
infqrmation about attempted settlements. F 1 s conduct was not known to the Court~D, or
th e Insurance Co. until after verdict in favor of P. When the presiding judge heard
c1f the matter he summoned the jurors and F to appear before him. He finally held
there toras no prejudicial error.
Held: Reversed and remanded. 11 \ve are mindful of the rule that generally the teotri.mor\)': of jurors is inadmissible to impeach their yerdic~ that exceptions to the
rule are rare. 1rJe, ho-..1ever, subscribe to the exsr eotion that p_ri vate communications,
possibly pre;judicia4 bet we.en_jurors and thi rd partill_ are forbidden and ;:i .JWalidate
the verdic t--- 11 • In this case__ apy evidenc.e...o.£ insurance was· irrelevant. Ther·e- i s -;;o
presumption that the . error was harmless. Note: It was also held that the argument
that the insurance company should not profit from the wrong of its agent was
fallacious as F had no authority to do what he did and his actions in so doing were
outside the scope of his employment.
FJ).:'..;J)ING lUi.J
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PLEADING AND PflACTICE
Ivl?-ndamus Prohi_b ition
i)t
Va.lOO
The State Water Control Board filed a petition for mandamus against X of X Cou,nty
to force X to comply with certain anti-pollution orders. The petition was not filed
in X County but in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. V#B-42 reads in part,
"Jurisdiction of writs of mandamus, except such as may be issued from the Supreme
Court of Appeals, shall be in the circuit court. of the county-:~-::-:;- to which the writ
relates." Defendants filed a timely plea in abatemen:. and Petitioners demurred thereto incorporating into the demurrer f p_cts not apparent on the face of the pleadings.
The Court sustained the demurrer and ordered X to reply to the merits. X then sought
an original writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Appealso
Held: (1) The ;y:_ord 11 Jurisdiction11 in Vf/8-42 is used in th e s ens e of venue and not
in t e tee nical sense of ·ur, sdlch.on. Henc-e-the---Ri-e-hmo·nd=<Zottrt{-being a court of
general jurisdiction had potentia: jurisdiction. This being so the writ of prohibition should be dismissea . Prohibition cannot be used to test venue, or to correct
errQ.r of a court having the po;,rer to adjudicate. (2 )The demurrer to the plea in abatement should not have included facts not
part of the r ecord f or a demurrer lies only
for error of law apparent from the re~ord itself. (3 )Even though the case has been
tried on its merits X may still insist on a decision as to whether or not the
Richmond Court was proper venue since Sec.3:6 of the rules r eads in part, 11 A plea in
abatement or motion to quash is not waived by the simultaneous or subsequent filing
of other pleading s,~ by trial~ the merits. 11 (Emphasis added).

a

PLEiilliNG AND PRACTICE
R~le 3:21 h~
198 Va~213.
The final order of the court overruling plain£i ff 1 s notice to set aside the verdict
and pronuuncing judgment thereon was ente':red on March 1'7. Or.. the following April 7
pla-intiff filed with the clerk a paper, designated a motion to set aside the vercil.dl.ct
becaus e a witness summoned by defendants, · but not called, had made improper remarks
to members of the jury. Four days later he served notice on the defendant that he
would pres ent his motion to the court and ask for a hearing thereon.
Held: Under Ilule 3:21 the judgment became final on April 7th(21 days after entry of
final judgment). The mere flling of a motion with the clerk within the 21 day period
does not extend the period. Since th e trial judge did not vac ate or modify the
judgment within the 21 day period, it has become final, and t he trial judge no longer
has jurisdiction to deal with it further.

u!

PLEADING AND PFU-~CTICE
198 Va.231.
D County constructed a s ewage disposal plant across f rom P 1 s Hotel. He filed a
claim with the board of supervisor-s f or ~!i35, 000. This cJ.aim was disallowed in his
absence. Under tbe Code written notic e of its dis allowance must be served upon him.
Instead of serving SllCh notic e as ·p3 1 tlce ten11~ of vt/8=5T1 it \<Ias mailed to his
attorney who actually received it.
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Held: By V#8-53, if the notice is actually received, then it is immaterial that, it
w11 not served as per the terms of V#B-51.. l:leld, also, that the deposit of a ~~50
G.1eck is not an appeal bond, since a check is not a bond. (An appeal bond i s r eq_Llired
by statute where one appeals to a court of record from a decision of a county boar·d
of super'risiors . (Rule 5:1(11) has no application since that rule applies only to
eppeal s to the Supreme Court of Appe~ls.)
FIJ:"!;ADING AND P ~?ACTICE
198 Va.237 and 198 Va.242.
':'hese cases state that in tructions iven to a jury without ob ·
· n become the
l aw of that case whether right or wrong. It would o ow that ~n affirming such a
cass_the Supreme Court of A~P.eals does not decide one way or another Qn_the law
gtyen in the inst~atiens.
PLli;ADI NG Al\lD PRACTICE
198 Va.2?4.
In this case Appellant's appeal was dismissed because;(l)the printed record included the pleadings when no objections had been made thereto in violation of Rule 5:1
# 6(e);(2) the printed record failed to include the opinion of the judge in violation
of Rul e· 5:1 #6(d);(3) only a small portion bf the record that was germane to the
assigmr1ent of er rors was printed when Rule 5:1 1/6(f) stat 8s that "It will be assumed
that the printed r ecord contains everything germane to the errors assigned.'! Subsstant i al compliance with the rules of agpen a t e;:}2J:P ~Sl~ure is necessa,n: fo £ the
or~e rly and expedi tious administration of justice _
Parties
198 Va.277.
PLEADING Al\m PRACTICE
X mmed Blackacre . He conveyed it to Y. Through an error the land books . continued
to show that X was the owner and Blackacre continued to be assessed in X' s name.
Aft er some twenty years had gone by the city i n which the land was lo~ated instituted
proceedings against X1 s devis ee and parties unkno>-rn to f oreclose its lien for taxes.
Y's successor in interest claims t hes e proceedings were vo i d on the ground that a
publication that X's devisee's lanct(describing i~is t.o be sold for taxes and not
otherwis e identifyi ng the parties ur~nown was not l egal not ice to him.
Held: Y's succ essor i n interest is right. X had no inter est in the land when he
died, and his devisee took no interest. The proc eedings should have been against Y,
a ndY's successor in interest, and t hey were necessary parties.
PLEADING AND P ~C TICE
198 Va.288.
X wu.s convicted of r ape and sentenc 9d to life i.r:lprison:nent. Four years later he
sought his r el ease on th e ground t hat th e r ecord showed that he was convicted by a
jury of eleven. It can be shown by the t estimony of a deputy clerk that a juror's
name (Emerson Macon) was inadvertently omitted. This is corroborated by papers filed
i n th e case by t he clerk to a id hlm in the performanc e of his duties--in this cas e
a jury list and his minut e book.
Three analyses were made in this cas e and a venerable Virginia rule in forc e over
130 years was expr essly over-ruled to t he horror of Justi ces Miller and Buchanan .
(1) The old rule . Aft er a ,iudgment i s no longer in the breast of the court, the
record cannot be changed nunc pro t c;,nc unless the basis for the change appears in the
record.;itself . The record-o:.f""the court imports, absolute verity. It should not be at
the merc y of the vagaries of othe r s ' memories and r ecords.
(2) Th e Att orney-Gener al did not ask the .':.i upreme Court of Appeals to overrule this
principl e, but mer el y to hold t hat memoranda made by the clerk f or his use, and f iled
in t he cas e , are quas i reco r ds,i. e. r ecords f or s ome purposes, one of which should
be to correct errors-nll1~ pro ~u~~ in the r ecord itself .
(3) But t he Supr emeC ourt of Appeal s stated the old Virginia Rule was the minority
r ul e and was law in only seven st at es . It expr essly overruled the old rule and held
\ ) i n this case t hat any compet en:. e"[idence ev ·
·. out side of an r ecord was ad~ \L m~ssible fo r t he ,pUr pos e o{ rec o rdin~ci.uallrv:--l:t~ad-a.n~ o~ng
· ~.,r epr or s in t he r eco r d nunc ro ·::.u_n£ when t h_e evi denc emad.eft clear_th§.t the ~ord
~ It emphas i zed that no such order should ever be issued to make it app ear
that t he right thing was done at t he right time when i t wan not actually so done .
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Criminal Procedur~Go.ns-'I.A.itutio.nal L.:::.w.
Sec·c:Lon 6 of the ~~rg1nia Constitution reads, 11 In criminal cases, the accused mo.y
r.~ lead guilty; and, if the accused plead not guilty, with the consent and the con-·
·-ur.:renc.e of the Commonwealth's Attorney and of the Court entered of record, he may bE
tried by a smaller 'number of jurors, or waive a jury. In
of sucha waiver, or
plea of guilty, the Court shall__ try the case.n (Underlining added). D was tried for
rape ·with the consent of the Court and of the Cormnonwealth 1 s Attorney, but such
consent was not entered of record. He was found guilty and · sentenced to 30 years.
The trial court later entered a nunc pro tunc orderw cure the defect. Is the defect
cured thereby?
-Held: No. Entry of the. consent of record was a condition precedent to the court's
having jurisdiction. This case differs from 198 Va.288 in that in that case the panel
was actually composed of twelve jurors and not of eleven as stated in the order while
in this case there is no proof whatever that the consent was entered of record as
required by the Virginia Constitution.

case

PLEADING AND PRACTICE--D~ath by Wrongful Act Statute of Limitations
198 Va.612.
X was, killed by D in Virginia. X's personal represent at 1ve of Nevada sued D in
Virginia. The case was properly dismissed because a foreign personal representa~ive
.,j 1
by statute has no standing in a Virginia court unless a . Virginia appointed personal
~~~ • representative joins with him. In the meantime the one year statute of limitations
~ ~::> ha
n. However our statute of limitatious (V#8-6J4) has a savings clause, "bU.t i f
S,~ ~
uch action is brought within such period of one year after such person's death,and
for any cause abates or is dismissed without determining the merits of such action,
the time such action is pending shall not be counted as any part of such period of
one year *-:H~11 • P, of Virginia, then qualified as X1 s personal representative and
sued D. (Statute of limitations in death cases r.ow two years)
Held: The savings clause should be interpreted liberally as it is remedial in
nature. The instant case is governed by this clause. The new a~tion by P is for the
same wrong, the issues are the sam0, and the parties are substantially the same.
Since the new action was brought within a year, if the time the old action was pending is not counted, it is not barred by the statute of limitations.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
S~atute of Limitations
198 Va.653.
A son lent his mother ~P4,000 with tfie understanding that she could pay it back at
her convenience whenever she wished. Six years later the mother died. The son filed
a claim for $h·,OOO. The executor contended the statuta of limitations had run.
Held: The statute has not run. There was no cause of action by the son against the
mother until she wished to pay. Hence the statute had not even started to run at
the time of her death. And since it was a loan and not a gift the son is entitled
to collect.
PJJ8ADING AND PRACTICE
198 Va.586.
Golf Club filed a bill in equity against D seeking to enjoin D from collecting
surface water in large quantities by means of a storm sewer and dumping it on Golf
Club's property to its damage. The trial court enjoined D from discharging water
from any premises it owned onto Golf Club's property but refused to award damages.
D turned the storm sev:er over to the public authorities and sold all the land to
v~rious individuals. The evidence as to the amount of damages was in sharp conflict.
What should the Supreme Court of Appeals do?
Held: The lower court cormnitted error when it refused to allow damages. Since thes
damages are unliquidated they canno·t be ascertained by the Supreme Court of Appeals.
Nor can the case be transferred to the law side of the trial court s~ that there
can be a common law jury, as that can only be done when the case is originally
brought on the wrong side of the court, and this case ,.,as originally brought properly on the equity side. So the Supreme Court of Appeals remanded the case to the tria~
court for a new trial limited to the issue of dama~es and l-Iith directions to order
an issue out of chancery and impa.nel a jury to determine the quantum of damages.

5 8~.
198 V8. o 66~.•
P, whi le a passenger in XIs car, was inju.red when X1 s car and D1 s car collided at
a.n i ntersection. P sued D who test:Lfied that . his speedometer showed that he was
c:;o ing five miles an hour at the time of the accident, and that his view was obs truct·;d by trees and bushes. D had the right of way. There was a verdict for D. The Court,
!:i<:t the verdict aside and granted P a new tria l. At the second trial D testified that
his speedometer was broken sometime before the accident. On this trial there >tias a
Yu dict for P for :1~20,000 which VQrdict the trial court refused to set aside.
~ J'nat r esult on appeal?
Held: Case reversed and dismissed. The Supreme ·Court of Appeals will examine
alleg ed errors in the order i~ which they took place. It was reversible error to s et
, aside the verdi~t rendered at the first trial for D's lack of negligence was found
as a fact by the jury in that trial. All subsequent proceedings should be annulled
so it is immaterial how D testified in later proceedings that should not have taken
place.

1-•r B.\DJ.NG AND :?RACTJ:CE

PLEADING AND PRACTICE Ru)e 3;2l(Q. )
198 Va.700.
P was injured in an automobile wreck as n result of D's negligence and sued D for a
large s~~. She alleged that she had suffered serious brain injuries. D asked the
Court to designate a competent disinterested physician to examine her. Should the
Court grant such a request?
Held: No. While statutes authorize the Industrial Commission to follow such procedure in Workmen's Compensation cases, there is no such general statute. The matter
is covered by Rule 3:23(d) in actions at la~1. Under this rule the Court may reqnir:e
the la·· ·
· to a medical ex.::1mination by a doctor of defendant'S choice.
T.fuether it will or 1=1ot i s wi thin the d1scret1on o t 1e Cour.!:_. The report of the
examining doctor is for the guidance of the person who made the motion for th~
examination and the written report is not admis sible in evidence ur.less offered by
the party submitting to the exdmination. The doctor may testify as to his findings
subject to cross examination. Disputed questions of f act are still for the jury and
there is no presumption that the examiner's report is correct.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE
198 Va. 727.
Is a sheriff's s alary subject to set-~ff or
1 V#S-449.2 provides that
the sa ar1es o coun y offlcers are subject t o garnisl~ent but VdS-449.3 limits the
appllcation 0f the above section to offices created by the legislature and the
bcalities.
Held: The first statute is not applicable as the office of sheriff is created by
the St ate Constitution. Hence the common law . applies and at common law the salaries
of
blic officers of al
ds are exempt f :rom garmsrunen - .f.Or r.caSOJ1S-O.L_public
poiic • hat is, i f a public officer was not sure of his salary he might not be
willing to perform his duties.)
·
of jury verdict where plaintiff' s evide ~ is stricken 198Va ~ 737.
In 171 a.
,
ucc plaintiffs evidence because it clearly
failed to prove his case. He then dischar ged the J ur y and entered judgment for the
def endant. It was held on appeal that a jury verdict was indi spensable. The case was
. • remanded for a new trial.
Held in the J..nstant. case t hat tb~ 1950 1\!!les of Court . have changed the law, for
under Rule 3:20 a s~ ry .Judgment ;Tna proper cas e, may be gi:v..e~ime-after
the- par t i es ar e at issn e . I n moving to strike pl aintiff 1 s av:ide.oo·e-tf're-cl..af.endant is,
~eff ect 1 a sking f or a summar y judmment.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Misnomer--Rule 3: 13
198 Va . 813.
The A Co., Inc. was-afsso lved in 1950 and i ts bus iness co ntinued by the B Co.,
I nc. under the trade name of The A Co. P l eased some t r ucks to it in the name of
The A. Co. and when i "':. fai led t o pB.y t he agr eed rental inst i tuted this acti on
against The A Co. The trial court dismiss ed t he case on the gr ound that there was
no such l egal person as The A Co . and refused permi ssion to P to amend his pleadi ng .
Hel d: Error. Jlu l ~3 : 12 J irects , "Leave to amend shall be lihenlly: granted in_
~rtherance of the end s of justice." V#B-97 pr~vides - that no pl ea in abatement shall
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be allowed for misnomer but correction shall be made by amendment on motion
;.:ccompanied by an affidavit! of the right name.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE,..-Statu
. itations--Personal Injury
198 Va.824.
P was injured by D in a co lirion on Nov.23,1951 . She became mentally ill on
Harc:h 31,1952, recovered Feb.3,1954, and filed her motion for judgment on June 9,
1951.,. . On June 30th D filed his grounds of defense none of which indicated he was
going to rely on the statute of limitations. The court allowed D to amend under
Rule 13 tn Nay of 1955 so as to add that defense. V#8-24 provides for a one year
statute ·of limitations or1 actions that do not survive and a five year one on actions
that do survive unless some other period is stated. This statute is a very old one
and was passed at a time when all personal action died with the person. In 1950
Vf/8- 628.1 was enacted. It reads, "No cause of action for injuries to person or
property shall be lost because of the death of the person liable for the injury. No
cause of a ction for injuries to person or property shall be lost because of the
death of the person in whose favor the cause of action existed, provided, however,
in suc{l action no recovery can be had for mental anguish, pain or suffering." Does
this. statute change the period of limitations from 1 year to 5 years?
"'Held: No. It was not the intent of the legislature to chanre the statutory period
of limitations by indirection, but only to provide f or the survival of the cause
of action.
Note 1. If P was sui juris after the date of the collision her intervening insanity did not stop the running of the statute of limitations.
Note 2. Since 1950 the le gislature has a nded VhB-628.1 so that the statute of
limitations' in_Rersonal injury_cases js no~ twQ y~s. It a so now proviaes~ressl~
that the statute shall not be construed to extend the time within which an action
for any other tort shall be brought, nor to give the right to assign a claim for a
to r t not otherwise assignable .

PLEADING AND PRACTIC E
199 Va.32 6 .
P sued D for personal lnJuries. She filed her motion for judgment on May 14,1955
and process was s erved on D promptly . On J lUle 2 D lodged in the clerk 1 s office a
written motion for a bill of particulars as to the nature and extent of her injuries,
but no court order was then entered requiring P to file a bill of particulars or
extending the time forD to file responsive pleadings. On t he following October both
of these matters were act ed upon affirmatively by the Court . P claimed that she
should have judgment by default because no responsive pleadings were filed within
21 days.
Held: A motion for a bill of particulars is not a r esponsive pleading and hence
it is true that no res ponsive pleading was filed within 21 days, but under Rule 3:13
the time allowed for filing pleadings may be extended by the court in its di~cretion
except in the case of pleas in abatement. Since the cour t in the instant case exercised its discretion and extended the time fo r ~ng.. of D's res ponsive ;eleading !> i s not entitled to a default judgment •

.-

PLEADING AND PRACTICE

199 Va.3 68.
A Has awarded an appeal on March 7,1957. On March 15 the cler k of t he Court of
Appeals mail ed A a letter notHyi ng hi m of the estimated cos t of pr inting the record
and petiti on f or ·.a.ppea.l. V#8- 482 provides that tha estimated cost of r i nting s hall
, t hat if not s o paid the appeal
be pJdd-: ·
0 da s o
e
shall be dismis s ed . A paid on Apr i l 17th.
Held: Too l at e . Appeal di smissed . The pr ovision in t he Code i s mandatory. It says
"date of noti c e" and t he noti ce 1,ras dat ed March 15. This does not mean date of
r eceipt of the notice . Such a date would be t oo i ndefinii:.e. In fact, i n t his cas e,
A di d not know when he r eceived the no~ic e .

,

PPAC'l'I CE Statute of
586 . Lj_mitations
199 Va.444 .
F and D were father and daughter and vl was his second wife. D, when under 21 years
'J, age , received an award of $5,000 damages as a result of an automobile accident.
Tins money was paid to F a:; guardian for D. F borrowed $4500 oftlis mom~y at 4%
int erest from D giving her a note which was lost. F paid the interest to D regularly
after her marriage, and wrote o, an officer of a trust compa11U which was named as
e~:e '~u.tor of his will, acknowledging the debt to 0 and telling 0 the date to which
ir~t eres t was p;>.id o F died and the statute of limitations has run unless this
acknowledgment of the debt. to 0 started the period running over again as from that
date .
Held: Wnile a casual written acknowled ment to a stran cr(as distinguished from a
written one to the creditor himself is not ordinarily sufficient to revive the
obligation, here. 0 is not a tota stra'.n er as the letter was writt en t o 0 to influ ..
en e lS ac lon, and a new promise on F's part to pay will be imp e : Hence the
debt was held to 7be a proper one and sufficiently proved.

P:"EADD!G AND

PLEADING AND PRACTICE
199 Va.453.
In an automobile accident case in which D's car struck P, a pedestrian, as P was
crossing a street, the court instructed the jury that if it believed from the evidencf
that D drove his car through the traffic red light, then this was negligence. There
was no evidence offered to the effect that D had driven his car through a red light.
Held: Reversed and remanded. It is error to give an instructio ~aad_on_a_hypo
t
not su orted b any evidence. The Jury-s·notrl:d- no be invited to return a
verdict not based on evidenceo
PLEADING AND PRACTICE _Rule 3:J3
199 Va. 472.
P filed a motion for judgment against Don Dec.7,19SS. Process was duly served 0n D:
and the purport thereof explained. No responsive pleading was filed and on April 10,
1956 a default judgment was entered. D appeared by counsel l ater on in the day and
claimed he had had no notice of the suit and that he had a valid defense in that he
did not own or control the pr ~perty on which P was injurad. D made an affidavit to
this effect and moved that the original process be quashed. The evidence indicated
that D was a man of intelligence and that he had been personally served. The court
denied the motion.
Held: That under Rule 3:13 it is within the sound discretion of the court as to
whether or not such a motion may be grantod(cxcept as to pleas in abatement). Since P
has willfully or at least very negligently failed to file any responsive pleading~
wi thin the twenty one day period it w.:ts not an abuse of discretion to deny his motion,
PLEADING AND PRACTICE--Habeas Qorpus
199 Va.727.
P was tried and ccnvict.ed of eight felonies and sentenced to serve two years for
each one successively .. While serving these sentences he attempted to c;scape and was
sentenced to an additional year for such an attempt. He applied f~r a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the eight sentonces were void because of serious irregularities in his trial. It is admitted that the additi onal year for attempted escape is
valid, b ~t credit on that year is sought for the time s ~rved on the void sentences
which is more than a year.
Held: Against P. ~{_h e is being valid) ~ held ~
~abeas corp1 ~iilJ not lie. One
cannot use habeas cor us s
~ubstitut e for a writ of error. It is immaterial
w ether or not the f irst sentences are valld or vo la~S: h e- ls not now entitled to
his freedom even if t hey would have been held void had they been properly atta:'J.tl.ed.

